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Abstract 
The study examined the four major political reforms undertaken in Kuwait post- 
liberation: the restoration of the National Assembly in 1992, the separation of posts 
of the Crown Prince from the post of the Prime Minister in 2003, women’s suffrage 
in 2005 and the redefining of the electoral districts in 2006. These were analysed to 
establish whether these political reforms represented a process of democratisation 
or political liberalisation that ultimately consolidated the power of liberalised 
autocracy and was merely a regime survival strategy. To do that the study employed 
a theoretical framework that considers Robert Dahl’s (1971) criteria: political 
participation, contestation and expansion of civil and political rights to assess 
whether Kuwait’s political system is democratic or not, in conjunction with David 
Potter’s scheme (1997) of the six pre-requisites that can promote and/or inhibit the 
process of democratisation: relation of state and political institutions, societal 
divisions, economic development, civil society, political culture and 
transnational/international engagement in order to identify the drivers and/or the 
obstacles to a democratic transition. This analysis contributes to the wider 
discussions on democratisation processes, furthering the understanding of the 
necessary conditions for democratisation, as well as what the nature of the obstacles 
to reform are in the Gulf region.  The study concluded that the political reforms 
were not evidence of democratisation; rather they were part of Al Sabah’s own 
survival strategy and are better understood in terms of a liberalising autocracy. 
Nonetheless, they brought to the surface the contradictions inherent in the political 
structures and processes and allowed a space for civil society movements to emerge, 
mobilise and attempt to counter the dominance of the state as well as coming forth 
as another significant factor (the first being the National Assembly) pushing for 
democratisation. This apparent increase in civil society activism gives hope that 
change is possible.   
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Chapter One: Introduction   
 
 
1.1   Research Problem  
This study examines the series of political reforms, which have been implemented 
in Kuwait during the period 1992-2013, questioning whether or not they constitute 
a process of democratisation.  Claimed transitions towards democracy have been of 
particular interest in the Middle East, especially the Gulf monarchies due to the 
reality of persistent autocratic or authoritarian political systems. The Arab Spring 
of mid-December 2010 raised hopes that a real transition was possible, that the 
region was turning a corner and democracy was in sight. However the trajectory 
was not sustained and parts of the region instead descended into civil wars, chaos 
and violence. Tunisia stood alone in its ability to transition peacefully towards a 
more democratic system of government, with analysts suggesting that it had 
benefited from the relative strength of its civil society, a long history of 
constitutionalism, even a particular political culture (Murphy, 2011). In light of 
these events, it has become all the more urgent to understand what constitutes the 
necessary requisite conditions for democratisation, as well as the true nature of the 
obstacles to reform in the region.  
Kuwait has been something of an exception within the Gulf region, having been the 
earliest monarchy to attempt to institutionalise political participation and create an 
open and relatively liberal system of government. Nonetheless, its political history 
has been complex and fraught, with the results of political institution-building 
falling far short of the expectations of its citizens. The study attempts to understand 
and assess why the anticipated outcomes of the reform process in the period post-
liberation have failed to materialise and instead a form of political paralysis and a 
failure to substantively enhance the democratic credentials of the political system 
occurred.  The study looks specifically at what have so far been the drivers of, and 
conversely, the impediments to, the democratic reform. 
Kuwait, in its attempt to establish a liberal political system represents a unique 
experience among the Arab Gulf states. It had arguably gone further than any of its 
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neighbours; building a reputation as a modern, forward looking, participatory state. 
Being the only Gulf monarchy with a wholly elected National Assembly, a vocal 
Opposition, and with its citizens enjoying an unusual degree of freedom of speech 
and association, it offers possibly the most likely candidate for democratisation in 
the Gulf. At the onset of Al Sabah rule (1752), there was a “popular consensus of 
the rule of Al Sabah” with the relationship between the ruling family and the leading 
merchant families being one of cooperation and consensus (Abu Hakima, 1967). 
With the attempt to institutionalise political participation, starting with the first 
elected Legislative Council in 1938, politics became more contested. However, 
despite its vibrant political arena, it has proved unable to progress to the status of 
democratic state and, at times, has appeared to go backwards or to be stuck in some 
form of political paralysis. Today, Kuwait seems mired in vitriolic and antagonistic 
political gridlock. Whilst there has been significant scholarly study of the politics, 
economics and society of Kuwait by individuals such as Jill Crystal (1990, 1995) 
Mary Ann Tetreault (1992, 2011), Abdul Redha Asssiri (2007) and Ghanim Al 
Najjar (2001), a gap exists in terms of understanding why Kuwait has been unable 
to progress forward in its democratic journey.  
This study considers Kuwait's recent political history (1992-2013), and specifically 
a set of four major reforms, which were anticipated to contribute to an invigoration 
of the democratisation process and which took place post–liberation. It seeks to 
examine the dynamics or drivers behind the reforms, the substance and impacts of 
the reforms in order to understand why they have not resulted in the outcomes 
anticipated and pushed for by Kuwaitis. Thus, it uses these reforms as windows into 
the underlying structures, processes and dynamics of the political system. The 
particular reforms were: the restoration of Kuwait's National Assembly in 1992 
(after six and a half years of suspension); the separation of the post of the Crown 
Prince and the Prime Minister in 2003; the political enfranchisement of women in 
2005 and the redefining of the electoral districts in 2006.  
This period was extremely important in Kuwait's larger history. It came in the wake 
of a brutal Iraqi occupation and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait by an 
international coalition of forces led by the U.S. With Al Sabah under intense 
pressure in the aftermath of the liberation to restore the legitimacy of their rule, and 
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with an unprecedented level of international scrutiny and support, the time was 
opportune for a breakthrough in the democratisation process. The ruling family 
faced pressure from both important external partners and from Kuwaiti society, 
which was invigorated by their experiences of resistance. 
 
1.2   Research Questions  
The main research question is therefore as follows: what are the drivers for and 
obstacles to democratisation in Kuwait. Specifically are there particular sets of 
conditions or factors that facilitate or hinder the process of democratisation and how 
do these manifest themselves in the study of democratisation in Kuwait.  This will 
assist in evaluating the political reform process in Kuwait and the meaning of these 
political reforms in terms of indicating a process of democratisation or whether they 
can be better understood as a process of political liberalisation which serves 
instrumental regime interests in the consolidation of power (liberalised autocracy).  
It is hoped that answering this question will not only contribute to our understanding 
of Kuwait's political system and its attempts of establishing a democratic system, 
but will also contribute to broader discussions and understandings of political 
reform process in the Middle East and the dynamics which propels them forward 
or holds them back from progressing to much needed democratisation. 
 
1.3   Research Methodology   
The methodology of the study is based on a theory-driven consideration of 
democratisation using the deductive approach as the most suited to answer the main 
question of the research and achieve the aim of the study, while the qualitative 
method of research, choosing the research semi-structured interview, is used as the 
tool to collect primary data and information that enhances the analysis through 
engaging with key Kuwaiti research subjects that possess valuable knowledge and 
understanding of Kuwait’s political and democratic narrative.  
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Deductive approach   This approach allows the use of a theoretical framework to 
structure the study of the political reforms in question, and the analysis of them. It 
examines the political reforms, firstly, by locating them within the longer historical 
trajectory of political development in Kuwait. This enables us to determine the 
degree to which Kuwait could claim a democratic political system by depicting a 
theoretical understanding of democracy drawn from Dahl (1971), and on an 
understanding of the necessary pre-requisites for democratisation developed by 
Potter (1997).  
Dahl (1971) offers a set of three criteria by which we can assess whether a particular 
political system is democratic or not: political participation, contestation and 
recognition of civil and political rights. The assessment of the development of the 
Kuwaiti political system, and of the recent reforms which have been introduced, 
offered in this study, uses this set of criteria for determining progression towards 
democracy (or lack of it). 
Potter (1997), meanwhile, synthesises the three main theoretical approaches to 
democratisation (modernisation, structuralism and transitional approaches) into a 
list of six common pre-requisites: institutions which provide a societal balance to 
the power of the state, societal divisions, economic development, a vibrant civil 
society, a favourable political culture and transnational/international engagement. 
The specific configuration or combination of these may differ in every individual 
case and there is no clear requirement for any one over another. Nonetheless, by 
focusing our attention of these six elements of the Kuwaiti political narrative, we 
can identify the drivers for, or obstacles to, a democratic transition.  
The study also acknowledges, however, that there are significant bodies of research 
literature, which account specifically for the absence of democracy in the Middle 
East and the Gulf region. Three of these offer us specific insights and will be woven 
into our analysis when they help us to assess the Kuwaiti experience. Firstly, the 
concept of ‘rentierism’ sheds light on the particular pathway of economic and 
political development, which has resulted from the very high levels of oil wealth 
accruing to the state. ‘Rentierism’ enabled a distributive state to evade 
accountability to citizens whilst manipulating institutions and societal divisions to 
its own ends. It also created tensions between the economic development it enables 
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and political development, which it attempts to impede, thus opening up space for 
challenges from civil society movements and political Opposition.  
The second body of region-specific literature concerns arguments as to whether 
civil society exists or functions fully within the region. The thesis rejects the 
cultural approach arguments that Islam, and Muslim society are culturally and 
normatively at odds with civil society, whilst acknowledging that the development 
of civil society in Kuwait has been to some extent impeded by a manipulative State, 
the particularities of the societal divisions, and the impact of distributive 
‘rentierism’. 
The third body of region-specific literature, concerns the alternative understanding 
of political reform processes in the Middle East offered by researchers such as Rex 
Brynen et al. (1995), Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger (2004), Bahgat 
Korany et al. (1998), Simon Bromley (1997) and Daniel Brumberg (2002, 2003). 
They argue that regimes have introduced political reforms, which offer a controlled 
degree of liberalisation in the political and economic realms, not in order to 
genuinely advance democracy (participation, contestation and civil and political 
rights) but rather to broaden the coalitions, which endorse their autocratic rule, and 
to offset public discontent at the inequalities created by economic liberalisation. 
The reforms amount not to democratisation but rather to 'liberalised autocracy'. 
Whilst this theoretical proposition does not form the framework for the analysis, it 
does assist in understanding some of the results of the study. 
Because the reforms which constitute the object of study are institutional reforms, 
the focus of the study is necessarily primarily on the first of Potter's (1997) criteria, 
that is the institutional arrangements which structure the balance of power between 
the State and society. Each reform is examined in terms of the particular imperatives 
on Al Sabah ruling family that drive its introduction, the role played by other actors 
such as the National Assembly, tribal or religious groups, social movements and 
civil society. The specific political processes through which reforms were proposed, 
enacted and received are discussed, as are the outcomes, which are assessed in terms 
of their overall contribution to enhancing participation, contest action and/or civil 
and political rights.  
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However, the analytical narrative offered for each reform process and outcome is 
infused with consideration of the other five criteria, where relevant. Moreover, the 
nature and role of civil society receives additional and specific attention as the study 
examines both top-down reforms devised by the regime at its own initiative, and 
those reforms, which were forced upon the regime by bottom-up expressions such 
as the Orange Movement, which pushed for the electoral reforms in 2006.  
In conducting the study, the researcher drew, where possible, on secondary data and 
information such as governmental official publications and governmental websites, 
as well as scholarly literature. It also drew on primary data, collected by using the 
research interview, to enhance the overall analysis and overcome some of the 
constraints of the available secondary data. 
 
Research Interview      Interviews were conducted by the researcher in Kuwait 
during January-April 2013. These were used in order to mitigate some of the 
aforementioned difficulties in collecting data, as well as a tool to engage with key 
Kuwaitis on their views and perspectives on the political reform process. The 
research utilised purposeful sampling, as it is the most effective tool in selecting the 
research participants by enabling the researcher to interview participants who can 
inform and contribute to understanding the research topic (Creswell, 2013). From 
among the various techniques used to determine the research sample (convenience 
sampling, maximum exposure sampling, critical case and snowball sampling), the 
snowball sampling is used to determine the research participants.  This is based on 
referrals from the initial small number of participants to generate additional subjects 
who are familiar with the research topic and have the expertise and knowledge to 
enhance the analysis (Bryman, 2012).  
The sample consisted of 25 subjects with a wide range of backgrounds that have 
been involved in the politics of Kuwait during the period of study. They fell into 
four categories: government officials, CSOs leaders and members, academics and 
ex-members of the National Assembly (see Appendix 1). A number of the subjects 
of the sample (13) preferred to be anonymous due to the sensitivity of the subject 
matter, while the rest consented to be referenced by name. The anonymous subjects 
are referred to in the study, in numbers, from 1 to 13. 
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The interview protocol, the actual tool for gathering the primary data, included one 
type of question, the open ended question, allowing the research participants to give 
full answers with as much explanation as they chose. The process of data analysis 
involved analysing the transcripts and the notes, identifying the themes within the 
data and gathering examples of these themes. The resultant data provided personal 
views and perspectives from this wide range of participants to corroborate the 
interpretation of events in this study as well as inform the assessment of whether 
these reforms maintain a liberalised autocracy rather than a genuine trajectory 
toward a transition to democratisation.   
 
Research constraints    the researcher faced a number of constraints while 
conducting the study, which are divided into three sets. The first concerns the 
difficulties in the collection of data and information. Secondary sources covering 
the whole period of study were very limited and included inadequate information. 
In addition, most secondary sources were relatively short, being either articles or 
chapters, with few scholars having written in depth or length about the political 
reforms. Obtaining official information and data from the National Assembly was 
difficult without the use of a special social network. Access to some governmental 
websites was available, but the reliability and consistency of the data was limited. 
In particular, data on the elections and assemblies’ interpellations differed between 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the National Assembly, thus making the process 
of collecting reliable data time consuming.  In the end the researcher opted to rely 
on the MOI for the data on political participation in the elections of the national 
assemblies and on the Kuwaiti National Assembly’s sources for the data on the 
interpellations.  
The second set of constraints concerns the sensitivity of the topic of the research. 
Kuwait, despite having a vocal National Assembly and a relatively more relaxed 
attitude towards freedom of speech, expression and press in comparison with the 
rest of the Gulf States, writing on the politics of Kuwait in general and the topic of 
democratisation in particular is still considered a taboo for a Kuwaiti citizen. This 
sensitivity of the topic constrained the study on two levels. The first level 
manifested itself by the limited number of interviewees willing to be recoded and 
named in the study, hence their treatment as anonymous and their interviews were 
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not taped; the researcher took notes. In addition, there were a number of people that 
the researcher approached and were unwilling to be interviewed despite 
guaranteeing anonymity. The second level concerns the researcher’s self imposed 
restrictions due to the sensitivity of the topic as certain issues regarding the ruling 
family were avoided as a precaution to being labelled “anti-regime”. Also due to 
the tense and volatile political situation in Kuwait during 2012-13, with the 
intensification of demonstrations and protests against the ruling family, the period 
of the study did not go beyond 2013. The researcher opted to use Kuwait’s local 
newspapers for some of the sensitive points discussed as a protection tactic.  
Moreover, the researcher needed to create a distance to the subject matter especially 
when discussing women struggle to gain the right to vote (the researcher being a 
woman) and more importantly not allowing the researcher positionality on the 
issues and events investigated to affect the analysis and the outcomes of the study. 
This distancing was not an easy task but essential to eliminate bias that can 
undermine the quality of the research.    
The third set includes certain organisational constraints. Some of the people 
approached for the research were unwilling to engage with a woman on the politics 
of Kuwait while others refused on the basis of the researcher being a postgraduate 
student. Setting the time and place of the interviews was time consuming and the 
interviewees chose their preferable time and place to conduct the interviews. 
 
 
1.4   Main Argument  
The study argues that the political reforms studied do not, overall, constitute 
significant progress towards democracy. Kuwait on one level fulfilled two of Dahl’s 
(1971) interpretations of what democracy means: participation and contestation. 
Nonetheless, these existed in a restricted form (the electoral base remains very small 
despite its doubling by given women political rights in 2005) and heavily controlled 
(manipulations of election law as well as unprecedented levels of dissolutions of 
the National Assembly) leading to what could be described as a meaningless 
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practice of democracy as ultimate political decision making remains in the hands 
of the ruling Al Sabah family. As for the third element of Dahl (1971), the period 
witnessed an increased suppression and repression of civil and political liberties 
although this was to some degree countered by the increased activism of civil 
society.  Subsequently this period can be described as an attempt to institutionalise 
democratic practices but ended up augmenting an authoritarian political system.  
How can we account for this lack of progress? Potter's (1997) six criteria offer us a 
rather mixed explanation. The thesis demonstrates that the reforms have not 
substantively altered the institutional balance of power. The Amir and Al Sabah 
family retain their predominant position over the political system. The National 
Assembly is no more able to hold them to meaningful account than before the 
reforms, although the National Assembly remains a site for vocal opposition.  
During the period in question, the regime has continued to use oil revenues to exert 
its ‘rentier state’ model of economic development. Whilst this ensures a high 
standard of living, an ever-more educated and internationally connected population 
who demonstrate dissatisfaction with both the political system and its primary 
agents, it also creates economic and political interests tied to the regime and helps 
the regime manipulate social and political forces to its advantage. The ‘rentier state’ 
model is just one example of the contradictions inherent in Kuwait's current 
political development. Relatedly, the political culture exhibits characteristics, 
which are both supportive of, and obstructive to, democratisation. For example, the 
Amir has been successful in exploiting tribal, religious and other identities and 
cultural preferences in his efforts to 'divide and rule', and even women's movement 
remains constrained by traditional, exclusivist cultures and divided identities.  
At the same time, young people have demonstrated evolving 'global' identities and 
norms, which connect with more liberal societal groups demanding greater freedom 
and democratic progress. Kuwaiti society certainly exhibits the societal divisions 
which Potter (1997) suggests are a requisite for demands for democracy, but the 
Amir has been successful in manipulating them through patronage, rent 
distribution, and alliance building such that they more often obstruct democratic 
progress than assist it. Civil society is constrained by the state’s legal arrangements 
and the exclusivist traditions and practices, yet it has shown itself willing and 
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capable of challenging Al Sabah rule through protests, demonstrations, coalitions 
and lobbying, with some success. International engagements or pressures feature 
less than might have been expected. After an all-too-brief moment of international 
pressure in favour of democratisation post- liberation of Kuwait, the regime took 
little account of external pressure. The reforms subsequent to the re-establishment 
of the National Assembly were all responses to specific national political debates 
and crises.  
In conclusion, the study finds that the political reforms initiated in Kuwait since 
1992 cannot be read as evidence of democratisation. Rather, the study suggests that 
they were implemented by Al Sabah ruling family even when responding to bottom-
up pressure from civil society, as part of its own survival strategy. They are better 
understood as representing liberalising autocracy. However, that is not to say that 
other processes and undercurrents are not working in support of democratisation. 
Society is not static but constantly evolving, responding to the opportunities 
afforded by economic development, education, global communications, 
international exposure and domestic political debate.  
The study, therefore, makes a contribution to wider discussions of democratisation 
processes by indicating that they can be multi-layered, where progress in one 
dimension (in this case, the evolution of civil society and social expectations) can 
be offset by impediments at another level (in this case, in the unwillingness of the 
regime to allow adjustments in the institutional balance of power towards society). 
Concerning societal divisions, which Potter (1997) deemed necessary for the 
democratisation process, they can operate both in favour of democracy and against 
it, simultaneously. Democratisation is then a complex process where alterations in 
power structures and institutional arrangements towards an expansion in the realms 
of participation and contestation and civil and political liberties can be very 
challenging. The study concludes, in the case of Kuwait, that little substantive 
progress is being made towards democratisation as Al Sabah ruling family 
introduced political reforms as part of a survival strategy while reinvigorating 
authoritarianism and the oppression of the political opposition and civil society. 
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1.5   Chapter Outline 
The following, Chapter Two, sets out the theoretical framework for the study, 
developing the definition of democracy to be used, from Dahl (1971), and 
examining the main theoretical approaches to democratisation (modernisation, 
structural and transitional approaches). From these, it introduces Potter’s (1997) 
scheme of six pre-requisites for democratisation, which can enable us to assess the 
status of Kuwait's political environment at any given time. The chapter then puts 
these within the context of research on democratisation (or its absence) in the 
Middle East, specifically referring to theories of the ‘rentier’ state, Arab and Islamic 
civil society and liberalising autocracy.  
Chapter Three provides the democratic narrative and analysis of the state-society 
institutional relationship and power structures and processes prior to 1990. The 
discussion focuses on the manner of consolidation of Al Sabah rule through looking 
at the use of tradition, patriarchal and segmented identities and loyalties as the base 
of their rule, in addition to the increased role played by oil wealth. The chapter then 
discusses the two different formations of political participation; the mainly 
consultative phase of political participation (pre-independence 1921-1939) and the 
parliamentary phase (post-independence 1961-1990) that characterised the 
development of Kuwait’s political system. This analysis enables an assessment of 
the status of Kuwait's political system against the criteria of democracy 
(participation, contestation and political and civil rights) and the role of Potter’s 
(1997) six prerequisites in this political account on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of 
1990. 
 
Chapter Four provides an analysis of the first two political reforms; the restoration 
of the National Assembly in 1992 and the separation of the posts of Crown Prince 
and Prime Minister in 2003 and the impact on the process and/or conditions of the 
transition to democracy. The chapter begins by considering the overall political 
environment, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and illustrates how 
bottom up pressures exerted by the Opposition, combined with the pressure 
exercised by the U.S. led to the first reform. The chapter then moves to discuss the 
four national assemblies elected during the period 1992-2003 and assessing them 
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against Dahl’s (1971) criteria of democracy. This is followed by a discussion of 
circumstances that led to the second reform and its importance to the relation 
between the National Assembly and the government. Finally, the chapter evaluates 
if any changes occurred in the balance of power between the state and the National 
Assembly that might indicate a process of democratisation and/or the lack of it.  
Chapter Five provides an analysis of the second tranche of political reforms; the 
enfranchisement of women in 2005 and the redefining of the boundaries of electoral 
districts in 2006. The chapter shows that the civil society remains constrained by 
the state, lacking autonomy and subject to close legal scrutiny. However, the 
evidence also suggests that civil society activism (women organisations and the 
youth Orange Movement) have become increasingly adaptive and responsive to the 
political climate and have been able to exert considerable pressure on the ruling 
family to affect these reforms.  
Chapter Six examines the period 2006-2013 and indicates a deepening of the 
democracy crisis in Kuwait, manifested by the reassertion of the authoritarian 
tendencies of Al Sabah rule and the significant deterioration in the relation between 
state and society, causing gridlock and impasse. Al Sabah’s continued reluctance to 
share power and adhere to the democratic objectives of the reform process was met 
by increased activism on the part of civil society, led by the youth in an alliance 
with the reformist elements in the National Assembly. This turbulent period 
suggests that the four reforms, although they have been ineffective in changing the 
balance of power between the National Assembly and the Amir, have opened the 
space for an enhanced role for civil society; mobilising and protesting the Amir’s 
top-down measures and demanding more democracy, more rights, more freedoms 
in a manner that is changing the political dynamics of state–society. The overall 
discussion continues to be referenced by Potter’s (1997) scheme and Dahl’s (1971) 
postulations.  
Chapter Seven The conclusion addresses the theoretical implications of the analysis 
and suggests that despite the limited impact of these four political reforms on a 
trajectory towards democratisation, they have brought to the surface the 
contradictions inherent in the political structures and political process of Kuwait 
and allowed a space for civil society movements to emerge, mobilise and attempt 
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to counter the dominance of the state as well as emerge as another significant factor 
(the first being the National Assembly) pushing for democratisation. These 
contradictions will be assessed in terms of Dahl’s (1971) postulation of the meaning 
of democracy and Potter’s (1997) drivers/hindrances to democratisation.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and the Theoretical Framework 
of the Study 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
The chapter reviews the literature associated with the meaning of democracy and 
the theoretical explanations of democratisation that will allow the study to address 
its main task of evaluating the political reform process in Kuwait by providing an 
understanding of the drivers for and/ or obstacles to democratisation and how these 
manifest themselves in institutional structures and political processes. To do this, 
the chapter is structured around three main sections.  
 
The first section starts off by establishing what is meant by ‘democracy’, the end 
condition to which a democratisation process leads to, and then concludes by 
privileging the definition of Dahl (1971), which offers three key criteria of 
participation, contestation and a minimum level of civil and political liberties as 
paramount to defining and exercising democracy. These elements are broad and 
flexible enough to render themselves useful analytical tools in a variety of 
circumstances and situations concerned with assessing the process of 
democratisation. 
 
The second section then considers the three major Western theoretical approaches 
explaining democratisation: modernisation, structural and transitional approaches 
by focusing on their main propositions and limitations. This will be followed by 
Potter’s (1997) theoretical scheme that synthesises the main preconditions that the 
above three approaches have in common. He offers six explanatory conditions for 
ascertaining what instigates and drives the process of democratisation. These are 
identified as economic development; the societal division (or the relations between 
different social groups within society); the relationship between state and political 
institutions (or the structure of power within and between the state and the political 
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institutions); the contribution of civil society in exerting “pressure from below”; 
political culture or the compatibility of political culture with democratic norms and 
values; and finally the impact of international and transnational engagements.  
 
The third section focuses on reviewing the regional theoretical explanations for the 
general absence of democracy in the Middle East. The discussion examines the 
relative strengths of the cultural and the structural explanations with a special focus 
on the concept of the ‘rentier state’, as it has been the dominant approach to the 
study of oil rich states. This is followed by a consideration of some of the proposed 
mechanisms whereby democratisation may yet occur, through pressure by civil 
society or the voluntary liberalisation of the autocratic regimes. The work of 
scholars such as Daniel Brumbergh (2002) and Holger Albrecht and Oliver 
Schlumberger (2004) emphasising political liberalisation and regime survival are 
of significance to this study as it will assist in drawing the final conclusion of the 
study in terms of whether these political reforms have pushed Kuwait further 
towards democratisation as seen through the prism of Potter (1997) and Dahl (1971), 
or were they simply regime survival tactics and strategy.       
 
In summary, in order to determine the nature and impact of the political reforms as 
a process of democratisation or regime survival, Dahl’s (1971) definition of 
democracy is adopted as the signifier in this process, while Potter’s (1997) six 
conditions/processes are the factors against which the political environment in 
Kuwait is assessed. In specific, if it has been conducive to democracy or detrimental 
to triggering it and/or is it a more complex situation with the presence of both 
elements and effects, those that facilitate and others that hinder the process. That 
will lead to the last determination of the study of whether the process was geared 
more towards democracy or regime survival.   
 
2.2   Defining Democracy  
Despite the extensive use of the term, the concept of democracy has proven difficult 
to define precisely. As yet, no consensus exists on its definition (Ball and Dagger, 
1991). As Georg Sørensen (1998,54) observes, democracy has a “dynamic nature” 
that enables it to grow and develop to incorporate new aspects and dimensions when 
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the social context or the analyst’s perception of it changes. The concept of 
democracy thus, has evolved to include a variety of values, aims and ideals, 
changing both the theory and practice of democracy. This was a necessary 
development, as what David Held defines as “classical direct democracy” would 
not have been a viable way of governing in modern and complex large nation-states 
(1987: 149). More complex interpretations of ‘democracy’ emerged in the 
eighteenth century, first in the USA and then in the UK and France. During this 
period, a new school of thought developed specifically the concept of liberal 
democracy, in opposition to the medieval hierarchical institutions and the despotic 
monarchies, particularly suited to the emerging Western industrial capitalist 
societies. Yet, while this conception of democracy has enjoyed preponderance for 
more than two centuries, it remains, as Birch indicates, plagued by the “vagueness 
of the terms commonly used to define a democratic political system, the difficulty 
of clarifying these terms in a value-free way, and the array of partially incompatible 
justifications for democracy advanced by democratic theorists” (Birch, 2001: 73). 
 
This Western liberal interpretation of democracy claims to draw its conceptual roots 
from basic elements that constituted the political order of ancient Athens. 
“Democracy” is a term of Greek origin that comprises and relates the demos (people) 
to the kratos (rule or authority), interpreted as ‘rule by the people’ (Lane & Errson, 
2005). For the ancient Greeks, Athens was the largest polis or city-state and was 
thought to provide the best example of such a system of governance. Henry Mayo 
(1960), Anthony Birch (2001), Terrence Ball and Richard Dagger (1991) and 
Giovani Sartori (1987) argue that the Greeks provided the concept but not a 
complete model for democracy, for as Birch (2001) observes, the Greeks had little 
knowledge of the rights of the individual; something regarded today as a major 
element of modern political democracy. The Greeks, therefore, only offered the 
basic principles of democracy, which Birch (2001) claims were different from the 
system of “representative government” found in the modern Western world. Still, 
Held states that the existence and development of democracy in Athens may be 
regarded as “the source of inspiration” for modern political democracy in the West, 
arguing that modern Western systems are shaped by the fundamental political ideals 
and values of Athenian democracy, such as equality, liberty, and respect for the law 
and justice (1987:15). 
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In an attempt to clarify and overcome the difficulty associated with the lack of 
consensus on how best to define democracy David Collier and Steven Levitsky 
(1997) divided the literature largely into two perspectives, the substantive and the 
procedural. The substantive, often labelled as the “maximalist” approach, tends to 
look at democracy from a broad perspective deriving its definition from Alexis-
Charles-Henri Clérel de Tocqueville’s idea of social democracy (1840). It regards 
democracy as not just a system of government or political system, but also as a 
specific social and economic system (Sørensen, 1993). Charles Tilly observes that 
theorists writing in the Tocquevillian tradition tend to focus on the living and 
political conditions that a regime promotes, such as welfare, individual freedom, 
security, parity of status, public deliberation and peaceful conflict resolution (Tilly, 
2007). 
 
In this vein, Held (1987) combines the insights of liberal democracy and Marxist 
traditions and proposes that democracy is not only a government that has been fairly 
elected, but also must be one that acts in the interests of its electorate. Like others 
advocating this broad conceptualisation of democracy, Held includes all aspects of 
political, social and economic life in the definition. He thus suggests that 
“Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of their own lives […] 
they should enjoy equal rights and accordingly equal obligations in the 
specifications of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities 
available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights 
of others” (Sørensen, 1993:10). Held’s definition requires the accountability of the 
state and a democratic reordering of civil society. Tocqueville suggests that civil 
society is the bedrock of a healthy democracy and that members of civil society are 
the best actors to promote democracy in countries that lack it (in Encranaction, 1999: 
9). Thus, the maximalist approach extends the arena of observation to include all 
aspects of society as well as of the political elite and institutions in determining the 
democratic (or not) nature of the state. 
 
The second, alternative, definition has a narrower perspective and is known as 
“minimalist” and tends to be more procedural - focusing on democratic procedures 
such as elections and electoral rules - and is therefore also referred to as the 
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“electoral democracy” approach (Diamond, 1999). Philip Schumpeter is considered 
to be the founder of the procedural definition of democracy (Barro,1999), 
describing the concept as a political method and as “that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1959:269). 
Schumpeter suggests that the main elements of democracy are political parties, the 
autonomy of the elected political elite from the state, the existence of opposition 
and the formation of civil society: in essence, contestation and participation 
(Schumpeter, 1959: 270). According to this perspective, then, democracy is a 
procedural system whereby politics and political decision-making are 
institutionalised through free and fair elections, with different political elites 
competing for power. This type of procedural definition focuses on the criteria of 
competition and is regarded by some scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1959), as the easiest way to distinguish democratic regimes from non-democratic 
ones. It acknowledges the need for a level of freedom of the press, speech, 
organisation and assembly in order for competition and participation to be 
meaningful, but does not incorporate these criteria into the actual measure of 
democracy (Diamond, 1999).  
 
Midway between the minimalist and maximalist stances one finds Dahl’s (1971) 
definition of democracy. In coming up with what is, in effect, a definition of “liberal 
democracy,” Dahl (1971) builds on Schumpeter’s (1959) work to define democracy 
as a “unique process of making collective and binding decisions” and "a process 
which produces desirable solutions”, as the main characteristic of a democratic 
government is its responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens (Dahl, 1989:5). 
This responsiveness must provide the citizens with the opportunity to: (1) formulate 
their preferences; (2) signify these preferences to their fellow citizens and to the 
government by individual and collective action; and (3) have their preferences 
weighed equally in the conduct of the government with no discrimination because 
of the content or source of the preference. These three opportunities are dependent 
on eight institutional guarantees; (1) the freedom to form and join organisations; (2) 
freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote; (4) the right of political leaders to 
compete for (electoral) support (5) alternative sources of information; (6) eligibility 
for public office; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making 
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government policies dependent on votes or other expressions of preference (Dahl, 
1971:3). 
 
Thus, at its core, Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy embraces three main 
dimensions: participation, which refers to the right of adult people to participate; 
contestation, which refers to organised competition through fair and free elections, 
and a level of political and civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, the press, 
worship, and the freedom to form and join organisations (Diamond, 2003; Sørensen, 
1993:12). These dimensions are considered by scholars such as Tatu Vanhanen 
(2000) to be standard categories for distinguishing democratic regimes from non-
democratic regimes. Yet these dimensions cannot be found in each and every 
political system. For instance, there is room for political systems to adopt a 
democratic discourse without translating that narrative into substantive political 
change. Furthermore, some states may meet these conditions to different degrees, 
ranging from being fully democratic, non-democratic, or simply authoritarian. For 
example, in many countries elections are carried out without seriously affecting the 
quality of democracy or leading to any political or socio-economic development. A 
regime may include an official opposition and thus meet that criterion, but that 
opposition may be in effect powerless and only able to operate within the sanction 
of the state. Nonetheless, by extending consideration beyond Schumpeter’s 
electoral competition alone, Dahl (1971) does offer a way to assess the democratic 
trajectory of political reforms; i.e., testing whether they are expanding the realms 
of participation, contestation and civil and political liberties. Most studies 
attempting to measure democracy have used Dahl’s (1971) conception as a starting 
point (Sørensen, 1993:16). This study follows that tradition. 
 
To summarise, theorists have offered divergent definitions of democracy – the 
presumed end condition of democratisation. The “minimalist” conception provides 
too narrow a set of criteria against which to analyse forms of government since it 
focuses only on the electoral processes and institutions and not the outcomes of 
policy-making. This is particularly problematic in countries where electoral 
institutions and processes are new, weak, run parallel to alternative modes of 
political decision-making and/or contestation, and where the outcomes of elections 
are not themselves “democratic”. The “substantive” or “maximalist” definitions are 
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equally problematic since they focus on a broad set of embedded social, economic 
and political criteria which assume the process of democratisation has progressed a 
very long way towards the achievement of actual democracy.  
 
In the end, Dahl’s (1971) conception may be considered more useful for the 
purposes of this study. It provides a broad enough set of criteria for identifying what 
elements a transition should encompass in order to move towards the end state of 
democracy; at the same time it does not assume that social and economic 
reorganisation around those criteria has yet occurred. Specifically, democracy is 
understood in this study to mean a political system that encompasses participation, 
contestation and civil and political rights, so that democratisation becomes a 
trajectory of political reform towards those objectives. This definition alone is not 
sufficient to underpin the theoretical frame of the study.  Subsequently, there is a 
need to examine the various theoretical explanations of what triggers or inhibits the 
development of democracy in order to discern the most appropriate and useful 
explanation to this study. 
 
2.3   Western Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Democratisation  
Just as there is a lack of consensus on definitions of democracy, so too there has 
been a failure to agree on the requirements for democratisation among scholars 
(Vanhanen & Pridham, 2000). However, there are three predominant theoretical 
approaches to the study of democratisation: the modernisation, the structural and 
the transitional. As the discussion shows, these three approaches share common 
factors and considerations that predicate the progress and presence of democracy. 
Potter (1997) has been able to synthesise these three approaches by identifying six 
common considerations among them and suggesting a fourth approach that 
elaborates on these six factors or preconditions necessary for democratisation to 
take place and to explain why democratisation occurs. The discussion in the next 
section gives a brief overview of these three approaches and then moves to focus 
on the fourth approach, the synthesis of the three as suggested by Potter (1997). The 
fourth approach is the core theoretical scheme adopted by this study.   
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2.3.1   The Modernisation Approach 
 
The work of Lipset forms the basis of the modernisation approach to 
democratisation (Sørensen, 1998). The main question it posed, “how traditional 
societies could achieve the same economic, social welfare systems and democracy 
as modern societies” (Doorenspleet, 2005: 55). To answer that question, Lipset 
employed a quantitative method to establish a positive universal correlation 
between economic development and democracy (Potter, 1997). The core of the 
theory emphasises a number of social and economic variables or requisites, either 
associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful 
democratisation. His conclusion was that “economic development involving 
industrialisation, urbanisation, high educational standards, and a steady increase in 
the overall wealth of the society is a basic condition sustaining democracy, it is a 
mark of efficiency of the total system” (Lipset 1959:76). Lipset added, “The 
stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the system’s efficiency 
in modernisation, but also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political 
systems” (Arat, 1988:22).  
 
In his cross-national quantitative study, Lipset indicated that “no matter what index 
is used for economic development, such as wealth, education, industrialisation, or 
urbanisation, those states tend to be more democratic than authoritarian” and 
claimed that more democratic states have a higher level of economic development 
(in Doorenspleet, 2005:58). In his view, economic development and wealth change 
the structure of the class struggle, in that wealth alters the social conditions of 
workers and moderates the lower classes, making them tolerant and less exposed to 
extreme ideologies, which in turn decreases conflict. For Lipset, wealth also affects 
the political role of the middle class, enabling them to “play a mitigating role in 
moderating conflict as it is deployed to reward moderate and democratic parties and 
penalise extremist groups” (Doorenspleet, 2005:58).  
 
Lipset’s claims were, however, rejected by other scholars. For example, in his study 
of Latin America, Guillermo O’Donnell (1986) argued that, instead of democracy, 
a high level of modernisation leads to authoritarianism. O’Donnell observed that 
the industrial modernisation of the 1960s and 1970s did not meet the needs of the 
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majority in those countries where it happened; to pursue this model in the face of 
popular resistance, the ruling elite therefore needed an authoritarian system. The 
first modernisation theorists, including Lipset’s, were also criticised for their 
methodology, their determination to produce a universal model of the political 
system, and neglect the impact of external and intervening factors, such as 
“colonialism, foreign domain, control of multinational corporations over 
developing countries, and the unequal pattern of trade between them and the West, 
and finally the nature of the international system” (Doorenspleet, 2005:61). 
 
The newer generation of modernisation theorists of the 1970s, such as Samuel 
Huntington and Larry Diamond, consequently, took those issues into consideration. 
They did not adopt the idea of a universal model for political systems, but instead 
suggested that the factors that trigger the transition to democratisation differ over 
time and in each state. Furthermore, new modernisation theorists do not equate 
modernisation with Westernisation; they do not assume a unidirectional linear path 
of development and they take into account the impact of historical developments 
on each state studied (Doorenspleet, 2005:61). They also considered other factors 
besides economic development, stating that there is not one factor which is 
sufficient when explaining democratisation, such as the impact of intervening 
variables; for example class structure and how international factors affect 
democracy, arguing that democratisation in authoritarian states is provoked and 
aided by new means of international communication and by democracy in 
neighbouring states (Doorenspleet, 2005:62). They further reinterpreted Lipset’s 
original ideas to suggest that when the people of a state are more developed, they 
tend to be more democratic, hence, the measurement of development must be 
shifted from the development of the state measured by GNP, to the development of 
its citizens, measured by education (Ibid.). 
The modernisation approach, then, highlights the importance of both economic and 
educational development in providing the conditions for democratisation. But it 
does not explain why some societies become democratic while others do not. 
Furthermore, it assumes that modernisation inevitably leads in a casual chain that 
starts with industrialisation and includes elements such as education to create 
conditions for democracy. Some highly industrialised societies such as China and 
Russia are far from being democratic.  
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2.3.2   The Structural Approach  
 
This approach was first established by Barrington Moore (1966:418) who argued 
that political development is a long class struggle to replace the rulers and the rules 
of the political system by expanding participation in rule-making and improving 
social and economic equality, and that the emergence of the bourgeoisie is key “No 
bourgeoisie, no democracy”. However, Moore also suggested that there are no 
particular patterns for the “starting point” that determines the process of 
democratisation. Rather, structural theorists emphasise and prioritise specific 
historical conditions whilst acknowledging the influence of other conditions that 
promote democratisation, such as economic and technological development (Ibid., 
427). Moore was criticised for being “economically deterministic and neglecting 
non-economic factors” (Doorenspleet, 2005:86). 
 
Dietrich Rueshemeyer et al. (1992) developed Moore’s work to include non-
economic explanations of democratisation, including the role of international and 
transnational relationships in promoting political development. Their study on three 
regions (Europe, Latin and Central America and the Caribbean) showed that the 
three clusters of powers (class power, state power and transitional power) “are of 
importance for democratic development” (Doorenspleet, 2005:76). They also 
regarded class as having a central role in the struggle for democracy, emphasising 
the role of an emerging urban working class. The structural approach is itself about 
the search for power in creating the conditions for democratisation, notably a 
rebalancing of power with the rise of new socio-economic classes. 
 Essentially their core idea is that economic development is principally relevant to 
democratisation not because it creates wealth and increases the complexity of 
society but because it changes the structure of power (Potter, 1997: 18–2). Thus the 
approach focuses on the long-term process of historical change, arguing that 
democracy is a matter of power and that over time economic, social and political 
structural changes gradually lead to different conditions which may offer political 
development and democratisation, or which may rather constrain democratisation 
and political development (Potter, 1997:19). Although the work of Rueshemeyer et 
al. (1992) addresses the criticisms levied at Moore, the combination of two different 
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methodological approaches (qualitative historical and quantitative cross-national 
studies) has led at times to contradictory results and impacted on the appeal and 
significance of the approach.  
 
2.3.3   The Transitional Approach 
 
Dankwart Rustow (1970) and Guillermo O’Donnell and Philip Schmitter (1986) 
established the transition theory, as a critique of Lipset’s modernisation theory, by 
providing an overview of the complexities of the transition process to 
democratisation in developing countries, showing how it evolves with different 
factors and more than one actor on the movement from non-democratic rule to 
democratic rule (Potter, 1997). The core idea is that democratisation is a process 
that develops through different phases: preparation, decision-making, and 
habituation or consolidation (Rustow, 1970: 345–358). Rustow argues that “one 
must not assume that the transition to democracy is a world-wide uniform process, 
that it always involves the same social classes, the same types of political issues, or 
even the same methods of solution; there are ‘many roads to democracy” (Ibid., 
350). 
 
Rustow’s (1970) transition model consists of four phases. Firstly, there must be 
national unity, referred to as the “background condition”; followed by the 
“preparatory phase”—the breakdown of the non-democratic regime (probably as 
the result of a crisis)— and the “decision phase”, that is, the initial establishment of 
democratisation and lastly the “consolidation” or “habituation” phase, with 
democracy now ingrained in the political culture (cited in Sørensen, 1998:40). A 
new regime will technically be a democracy following free elections but will not be 
fully democratic; the regime then has to be consolidated, which happens when all 
political forces regard democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Ibid., 39). 
 
Upon examining what triggers democratisation transitions, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter suggest that a precursor to a democratisation can be discerned when “an 
authoritarian regime begins to modify its own rules in order to provide more secure 
guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
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1986:6). They show, for example, that some Latin American countries started with 
what can be described as a “period of liberalisation” in which the authoritarian 
regime offered some civil and political rights to its people, thus creating a space for 
“oppositional activity” or “public competition”, albeit within a framework tightly 
controlled by that authoritarian regime (Ibid.). Developments in some Eastern 
European countries, such as Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, 
also illustrate the process of democratisation as beginning with liberalisation 
instigated by the existing authoritarian regime (Sørensen, 1998:42). 
 
The transition approach looks for the long-lasting effects of change, rather than just 
the immediate or technical impact, i.e. whether the changes introduced are 
embedding democracy and creating real change of benefit to that society. The 
aftermath of the transition — the “habituation phase” or the “consolidation phase” 
— looks at how political reform leads to democracy and the concept becomes 
deeply internalised in the social, institutional and even the psychological life of a 
country (Linz and Stepan, 1996:5; Sørensen, 1998:45). It has been suggested by 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) that “a democratic transition is complete when 
sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an 
elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of 
a free and popular vote, when this de facto government has the authority to generate 
new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by 
the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure” (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996:3). Rustow (1970) argues that there are no identical issues or 
forces behind any existing democracies and the institutional outcomes of any 
struggle always differ and can never be identical.  
 
In summary, the discussion above on democratisation implies that no one theory 
can be expected to define democratisation and all its circumstances in a way that is 
relevant to every case. Yet, each theory provides some valid insights for this study, 
and there is considerable overlap between them. One way out of this theoretical 
conundrum is found in the work of Potter (1997), who proposes as mentioned 
earlier, a synthesis of what he considers the most useful aspects of all three theories, 
uniting them in one scheme that emphasises six explanatory prerequisites for 
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democratisation. The aim of the next section is to detail this scheme and evaluate 
its usefulness to this study.   
 
2.3.4   Potter’s Theoretical Synthesis 
 
Potter (1997) overcomes the limitations of each of the aforementioned theoretical 
approaches to democratisation by identifying six common factors or conditions that 
can explain the transition to democratisation and why democratisation occurs in one 
country and not others, as found in the previous three theoretical approaches. He 
defines the “explanatory factor” as “a condition, structure, or process that 
comparative analysis suggests is associated with, or causes, democratisation” 
(1997:22). These factors are: economic development; societal divisions; state and 
political institutions’ relationship; civil society; political culture and finally 
transnational and international engagement.    
 
1. Economic Development  
 
In all three theoretical approaches, there is the assumption of a highly significant 
positive correlation between the degree of economic development and 
democratisation. For modernisation theorists Moore (1966) and Rueshemeyer et 
al.(1992) for example, “economic development is a capitalist development that 
fundamentally structures the historical route that countries take towards liberal 
democracy or other political forms” (Potter, 1997:24). These theorists employ 
“intervening variables” that mediate between economic development and 
democratisation in attempting to discover how economic development triggers 
democratisation (Potter, 1997:24), including, for example, the levels of education 
and urbanisation.  
 
However, in practice and reality not all transitions to democracy originate from 
economic-development. As Moore suggests, it is not inevitable that a country with 
a developed economy becomes democratised, and structural theorists consider that 
the political output of economic development is neither clear nor uniform (in Potter, 
1997:25). Although economic development and the free market foster democratic 
ideas, this development may also lead to the weakening of democracy or even to 
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the support of authoritarian rule (in Potter, 1997:25). Transition theory scholars 
such as O’Donnell conversely see acts of economic development as catalysts to the 
“competing elites busy crafting the democratic compromise” (in Potter, 1997:24). 
In some cases where countries enjoy high level of per capita income, such as 
Argentina, they have had many years of authoritarian rule before democratisation 
took place (Sørensen, 1993:25).   
 
2. Societal Divisions 
 
Potter (1997) argues that social divisions are a prerequisite for democratisation. 
Under both the modernisation and structural approaches, “economic and capitalist 
development produces class divisions in society based on wealth and life-chances” 
(Potter, 1997:25). Socio-economic development, according to Lipset (1986), leads 
to the emergence of a middle class who initially have pro-democratic values, while 
for Rueshemeyer et al. (1992), capitalist development results in the emergence of 
an urban working class which presses for a transition to democratisation.  
 
Likewise, transition theory suggests that class and group struggles are essential in 
attaining democratisation; however, various social and economic classes in 
different countries vary in their stance towards it (Potter, 1997). Moreover, this 
theoretical approach argues that the necessary divisions, which trigger 
democratisation, can be on the basis of “ethnicity, race, tribe, gender, language, 
religion, or other cultural criteria” rather than necessarily class (Potter, 1997:26). 
However, they also collectively stress that a shared “national identity” is important 
in creating a sense of the “political identity” which defines the boundaries of the 
political community (nation-state) within which new political arrangements are 
sought, although each approach places different values on its impact and role (Potter, 
1997:26). 
 
3. The State and Political Institutions Relationships 
 
According to Potter (1997), the extent of the state’s power relative to society and 
its institutions is a factor in all three theoretical approaches. Democratisation 
equates with a change in the balance of power between the state and independent 
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classes, represented through institutions in favour of the latter. Modernisation 
theory scholars such as Larry Diamond (1999) argue that where the state is able to 
exert dominance over society, it is unlikely that democratisation will occur; case 
studies of countries in Africa and Asia indicate that when the state controls most of 
the economic, political and social institutions, individuals become dependent on the 
state and become risk averse when it comes to pushing for democratic change 
(Sørensen, 1998).   
 
Potter (1997) stresses that the concepts of state and class are very “generalised and 
abstract” and that they cannot offer an understanding of the “variation” in the 
democratisation experiences in different countries. He argues, therefore, that more 
can be achieved by examining the political institutions within a country (such as 
political parties) and their relationship to, and (in) dependence from the state in 
order to assess whether a political system is likely to transition towards democracy. 
Potter (1997) argues that this can help in understanding the various patterns of 
democratisation as well as “how they shape the political outcomes of similar state 
relationships in different countries” (Potter, 1997:27- 28).  
 
4. Civil Society  
 
For Potter (1997), the three theories imply that civil society is an important internal 
factor in understanding the “pressure from below” or the transition to 
democratisation and that a strong civil society can resist authoritarianism. The idea 
that the civil society plays a role in the democratisation process was promoted in 
the case of Poland, where the activities of the Solidarity Union and the Catholic 
Church were the main cause of the collapse of the communist regime (Niblock, 
2005:486).  Transition to democratisation in other Eastern European countries as 
well as South Korea stimulated through demonstrations and strikes by students, 
unions and citizens destabilising these authoritarian governments  (Linz & Stepan, 
1996).  A strong civil society prevents the state from becoming over-powerful by 
channelling discontent with the ruling elites into vocal demands for political reform. 
According to Potter (1997: 28), an autonomous civil society that includes for 
example political parties, trade unions, professional associations, community 
development associations, social movements, and other non-governmental groups 
29 
 
which put pressure on the regime is a prerequisite for democratisation. 
Modernisation and transition scholars argue that democracy “is brought about by 
individuals and groups who fight for it” (Sørensen, 1998:28); and the emergence of 
and an increase in civil society can bring with it other factors that help to facilitate 
the transition, such as the mobilisation of an independent media.  In some cases, in 
Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the mobilisation of civil 
society was accompanied with the consolidation of other factors that facilitated the 
transitions, such as the rallying of independent media. 
 
For transitional scholars like Rueshemeyer et al. (1992), civil society is also an 
outcome of economic development, strengthening the capacity of the lower classes 
to participate in changing the balance of class power. Diamond (1999) makes this 
point also by arguing that economic development leads to greater concentrations of 
people in more populous areas of residence, while simultaneously dispersing them 
into diverse networks of interaction. This results in “decentralizing control over 
information and increasing alternative sources of information and dispersing 
literacy, knowledge and income, and other organisational resources across the 
population, thereby, increasing the possibility for protests that can challenge the 
authoritarian regime” (Potter, 1997:28). However, they warn “a weak urban class 
civil society becomes a tool for maintaining the authority of the dominant class” 
(Potter, 1997:28). Civil society can then play an opposite role in which some classes 
may tend to maintain authoritarian authority to protect certain interests, opposing 
democratisation (Sørensen, 1998). It is important, then, to create a balance of power 
between the state apparatus and civil society, which is described by Tocqueville 
(1840) as the “institutional bedrock” for promoting democracy by inspecting and 
maintaining the balance of power with the state.  
 
5. Political Culture  
 
Political culture is the “system of values and beliefs that define the context and the 
meaning of political action” (Sørensen, 1998:25). Lisa Anderson, although not a 
protagonist of the approach, defines political culture as “the values that might 
support or undermine a particular set of political institutions, the particular 
distribution of patterns of political orientations-attitudes towards the political 
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system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” 
(1995:7).  Potter sees a supportive political culture as a strong prerequisite for 
democratisation and argues that countries with pro-democratic political cultures are 
more likely to be democratic (1997:28). Yet, the three theoretical approaches do 
not agree upon the importance of political culture as an explanatory factor. 
Modernisation scholars rely heavily on the concept, arguing for a strong statistical 
association between a certain level of education within the population and its 
commitment to democracy, participation, moderation, and tolerance of opposition 
while the structural scholars consider political cultures a consequence of 
democratisation and not its cause (Potter, 1997).  
 
To the transitional approach, political culture is almost a neglected factor, as it is 
argued, “transitions to liberal democracy are caused by the calculations of political 
elites in conflicts, some of whom eventually recognise a common interest in 
democratic compromise” (Potter, 1997:29). This, however, excludes broader 
society from being a primary agent for change and so a widely shared political 
culture is not important to the early democratisation process. Arguably, however, it 
may play a role in the consolidation phase as elites and societies become 
acclimatised to democratic norms and behaviours. Ultimately, political culture has, 
as described by Sørensen (1998:25), a “dynamic nature”, meaning that its nature 
and impact can vary considerably and it is not possible to draw a clear relationship 
between democracy and cultural patterns. For example, it can be claimed that 
religion is a particularly strong political culture, because it is socially powerful and 
can have considerable impact on the beliefs, values and actions of its adherents, but 
it does not have a constant relationship with democratisation (Potter, 1997:29). 
 
Since the 1990s, “orientalist” scholars have argued that the Middle East’s apparent 
failure to democratise is related to the political culture of the Muslim world and 
Islam and that there is a negative correlation between a strong religious culture and 
democratisation. The literature that disproves such a premise is vast; however, it is 
sufficient here to note briefly the critiques put forward by John Esposito and John 
Voll (1996) and Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996). According to Esposito 
and Voll (1996) the three fundamental principles of Islam can be, and often were, 
subjected to undemocratic interpretations, nonetheless, there is no political or 
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cultural determinism driving such developments (1996: 24-27). Eickelman and 
Piscatori (1996), furthermore, analyse different political arrangements and political 
initiatives that spring from those diverse interpretations and invoke Islamic 
symbolism to reinforce their democratic identity. 
 
Potter (1997) suggests that focusing on religion as a causal factor in democratisation 
is problematic because doing so implicitly leads to the treatment of religions as 
“monolithic, when their core doctrines are typically subject to a variety of 
interpretations, and as immutable, when they are notoriously revisionist in the face 
of the changing circumstances and political currents” (1997: 29). Generally, any 
assessment of political culture is likely to be hampered by this dynamic 
characteristic, being likely to capture the phenomenon for only a “moment in time” 
and therefore be unable to determine definitively whether the political culture is a 
determinant of, or a result of, the prevailing political structures and stage of 
economic development.  
 
 6. Transnational and International Engagement  
 
The final explanatory factor proposed by Potter (1997) is transnational and 
international engagement. International interactions; that include war, foreign aid, 
loans, military action, diplomatic relations, the work of intergovernmental 
organisations such as the United Nations, can create an impact from outside, beyond 
the control of the state, which propels that state into beginning the process of 
democratisation (Sørensen, 1998). In some cases, such interactions may require that 
a state instigate certain reforms as a condition for receiving financial or military aid. 
For example, countries such as the U.S. and international agencies such as the 
World Bank played a role in creating liberal democracies in Asia during the 1980s 
by exerting pressure on the existing authoritarian systems that were dependent on 
external agencies for loans, aid and trade, the most notable example is the 
Philippines (Potter, 1997:31).  
 
Similarly, global developments beyond the control of the state - such as 
“international trade, the movement of labour, media and communications networks, 
advanced technology and the cyber world or international organisations such as 
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AMNESTY International or Oxfam can influence populations directly and prompt 
new thinking, a reassessment of accepted beliefs and an awareness of what is 
happening elsewhere in the world which can stimulate the beginning of 
democratisation and consolidate its progress, effectively creating demand from 
below and influencing domestic class structures and social divisions” (Potter, 
1997:30)  
 
In summary, the above discussion has established that Potter’s (1997) six 
explanatory factors may be identified as prerequisites for a democratic transition, 
that is, an alteration in the political system of a country towards Dahl’s (1971) 
criteria of greater participation, contestation, and civil and political rights. However, 
these six factors are not necessarily sufficient for democracy to take root. Nor is 
there any formula establishing to what degree each factor on its own is required, or 
exactly what each must look like in any and every context. The factors may be 
interdependent: for example, the strength of civil society is related to the degree 
and format of economic development; international actors might strengthen civil 
society or use their economic muscle to pressure elites towards democratising 
reforms. A political culture that is conducive to democracy might result from early 
reform processes becoming embedded or consolidated, or it might encourage civil 
society to be bold in demanding that elites be more accountable. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether all factors need be present for a political society to transition to 
the democratic state, which of them might be most important, or in what order they 
might be most effective. 
Still, despite these apparent weaknesses, Potter’s (1997) conditions do offer a 
framework through which this study can assess whether the political reform process 
that has taken place in Kuwait during the period 1992-2013 can be understood to 
be democratising. In specific, the study can examine the influences of Potter’s six 
preconditions for democratisation after the reforms were instigated in order to 
assess whether any or all of these are in place, and if so, are being enhanced as a 
result of the political reforms. In order to further elaborate on the theoretical 
approach of this study, it is important to review the theoretical explanations of the 
absence of democracy that specifically look at the Middle East, not least because 
the six explanatory factors outlined by Potter (1997) and the theoretical approaches 
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from which they are derived have their origins in studies principally of European, 
African and South American experiences.  
 
The next section reviews these main regional approaches and focuses on the 
concepts that are most useful for understanding the particular case of Kuwait. This 
will help in adding another layer to the theoretical frame of the study in so far as it 
can help in the final conclusion of whether the political reforms constituted a 
process of democratisation or regime survival.   
 
 
2.4   Regional Approaches to the Study of the Absence of Democracy in the 
Middle East 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, 
and the subsequent spread of democratisation through Eastern Europe, scholars 
have noted that the Middle East has appeared to be resistant to democracy and has 
remained dominated by authoritarian political regimes (Haerpfer et al., 2009). The 
events of the Arab Spring, representing a break from this trend and indicating the 
yearning towards democracy by the people of the Middle East, have not shaken the 
roots of authoritarian regimes lending this literature more importance as the need 
to understand the conditions and processes of a transition to democratisation is vital. 
 
The discussion in this section presents an overview of the debates that dominated 
this literature and that offered a variety of explanations for the absence of 
democracy and the persistence of authoritarian rule in the Middle East. This will 
serve as a precursor of investigating the case of Kuwait allowing for a regional 
contextual perspective to supplement Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy and 
Potter’s (1997) six criteria for democratisation. Four broad approaches can be 
identified within this literature: cultural, structural, including the “rentier” state, 
civil society and political liberalisation; each focusing on a particular dominant 
factor as an explanation to what appears to be a resistance to democracy and an 
absence of progress towards democratisation in the Middle East.  
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2.4.1   The Cultural Approach  
 
This approach attributes the absence of democracy in the Middle East to the 
incompatibility of Arab culture, and more specifically Islam, with democracy. The 
cultural debate takes two forms, the first argues that only Western countries provide 
a good grounding for democracy and that Islamic law and doctrine is considered to 
be deeply illiberal, helping to create a climate that is hostile to democracy. For 
example, Samuel Huntington (1991a:22) relates a country’s religion to its ability to 
transition, arguing that there has always been a “strong relationship between 
Western Christianity and democracy”. Conversely, Huntington observes that “no 
Arab leader had the reputation of supporting democracy” and that Islam and 
democracy are “inherently incompatible”, because Islam is a comprehensive 
religion that does not distinguish religion from political institutions and emphasises 
the role of the community over the individual, the individual being one of the main 
pillars of liberal democracy, (1991a: 28). Huntington (a1991) himself does however; 
suggest that there are limits to the cultural obstacles in any society because culture 
is dynamic and prone to change from one generation to another. Accordingly, he 
assumed that wealthy Middle-Eastern countries, such as the Gulf monarchies, 
would be in the “political transition zone” in the 1990s, resulting in democratisation 
(Huntington, a1991:31). Paradoxically, Huntington (1991b), ultimately, leaves the 
possibility of Islam’s compatibility with a democratic future open. 
 
The second form of the debate argues that there is nothing inherently anti-
democratic in non-Western cultures, and those cultures cannot be argued to be 
hostile to democracy. Some scholars have gone further in this respect taking the 
position that it is not Islam per se that is inhibiting the spread of democracy. Rex 
Brynen et al. (1995) consider that political culture rather than religion alone “has 
considerable utility as an explanatory variable, but only if it is dealt with in a 
nuanced way, sensitive to the effects of history, social structure, and context” 
(Brynen et al., 1995:  7). They argue that both authoritarian and participatory 
aspects are present in the political culture of the Middle East, but with the 
participatory aspects being “expressed in the Islamic principle of shura , the bond 
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of obligation between the ruler and ruled, (represented by the bay’a), and in 
traditions of accountability, and in (limited) participation in tribal decision-making”. 
Therefore, it cannot be argued that Islam is in itself completely incompatible with 
democracy; and notions of democracy, regardless of their source, can be seen well 
established in Islamic political discourse (Brynen et al., 1995). Mark Tessler (2002), 
furthermore, argues that Islamic beliefs cannot be proved to have had a large impact 
on political behaviour in the Arab world. In the same critical vein, P. Kumaraswamy 
argues that an anti-democratic stance, rather than being inherent in Islam, has been 
imposed over the centuries by those who interpreted Islam, the ulema, or scholars 
(2006). One such example is the strict and conservative Sunni Wahabi 
interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia, which had severe repercussions on the 
development of the political system and the role of women in Saudi Arabia society 
as well as other parts of the region and beyond.  
 
Cultural aspects outside religion have also been examined in order to identify their 
impact on the absence of democracy in the Middle East. Michael Hudson (1995) 
suggested that looking at elements such as group identities, orientations towards 
authority, and principles of justice and equality are equally important to understand 
the political community and political culture. The Middle East’s relationship with 
the West is seen as another element that hindered the transition to democracy. 
Bernard Lewis criticised the way in which democracy was being imposed in the 
Middle East, suggesting that local resistance to democracy arises from its status as 
having been ”from the West in a box” with its “Westernised rules from above [so 
that] it failed to fit in with the Middle Eastern and Islamic societies” (2002: 62). In 
addition, Lewis (1993:5) argues that the issue does not lie in Islam as a religion in 
itself, even though Islam emphasises the sovereignty of God over the society and 
the people, but in the radicalised Islamic ideologies namely the “Islamic 
fundamentalists” who sees those bonding their faith and being secularised as misled 
by “foreign infidels and Muslim apostates”, not only that but also the issue lies in 
“Foreign powers”. However, Lewis (1993:6) explains that, both the fundamentalists 
and the West are concerned with securing their own interests. Therefore if 
democracy was of benefit to them, the Islamist fundamentalists would adopt it and 
the West will encourage it and ignore their record of abusing democracy and human 
rights. For the Islamists this would be an opportunity to “govern by Islamic rule if 
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they gain power” and for the West they keep them as their allies. Brynen et al. 
(1995) also emphasise that democratisation has been complicated by colonisation 
and the conflict between the West and the Eastern Muslim world.  
 
Furthermore, Marek Hanusch, criticised the scholars that claimed that Islam is a 
“an intrinsically repressive religion where an allegedly lower value attached to 
personal freedoms goes hand in hand with fewer democratic institutions”(2013: 
315). He acknowledges, “Muslims are rather pro-democratic” and the correlation 
between Islam and lack of democracy is false because those scholars do not 
consider the characteristic of the economy and the politics of Middle Eastern states; 
they tend to neglect other variables. Those neglected factors are: the natural 
resources in particular oil and secondly “the coercive power of the states.” The use 
of these two factors was apparent during the Arab spring. Those countries with oil 
wealth supported and also encouraged the repressive countries to use violence 
against any civil movement calling for democratisation and the removal of the 
autocratic rulers.  He concludes that in the Middle East “Religion is not the 
constraint; it is politics and economy.”(ibid.,319). 
 
In a similar vein, David Smock et al. (2002) supports the views of Hanusch (2013) 
and indicate that historical, political, cultural and economic factors rather than 
religious factors are the variables hindering democracy in the Middle East. They 
emphasis that prophet Muhammad in Medina created a non-authoritarian climate 
that is irrelevant to the ones found in the Middle East, and which claim to follow 
that of Medina and to be purely Islamic, because Islam acknowledges the principle 
of Shura consultation as a “the source of democratic ethics in Islam” Smock et al. 
(2002:1). 
 
Meanwhile, Smock et al (2002) do not completely neglect the fact that it is the 
‘conservative Muslim’ scholars who tend to suppress and silent the democratic 
voices in the Middle East because they think it is a Western agenda towards 
controlling the Muslim world, on the other hand Smock et al (2002) acknowledges 
that there are the ‘reformists Muslims’ who are responsive and accept changes in 
the Middle East and encourage the “continuity of the basic Islamic tradition” but 
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not the Sharia because its historically conditioned, unless it was reinterpreted to be 
more responsive to the “changing  needs of modern society”.  
 
Smock et al. (2002:4) offered an example between theory and practice on how Islam 
as a religion is being interpreted according to countries’ own benefit and interest 
and the extent to how it can be abused and misused.  In the case of Taliban in 
Afghanistan, the rise of ‘political Islam has made the concept of Islamic sovereignty 
central to Islamic political theory and that concept is often presented as barrier to 
any form of democracy”. The Qur’anic concept of sovereignty is universal, 
transcendental, indivisible, inalienable, and truly absolute. God the sovereign is the 
primary lawgiver, while agents such as the Islamic state and the Kkalifa (God’s 
agents on earth) enjoy marginal autonomy necessary to implement and enforce the 
laws of their sovereign. At the theoretical level the difference between the modern 
and Islamic conceptions of sovereignty is clear but operational implications tend to 
blur the distinction.” Smock et al. (2002:4) add “regardless of where sovereignty is 
placed theoretically, in practise it is the state which exercise it and not God.” In the 
case of Taliban in Afghanistan “even god was supposedly to be sovereign” in reality 
it is “the Taliban that was sovereign, Mulla Omar ruled, not God.” The issue 
accordingly is not in sovereignty as in reality whether it is a democratic country or 
in a Muslim state “sovereignty is a human”.  So the issue is “how to limit this 
sovereignty”. Thus Democracy and its principles in this regard do limit human 
sovereignty. In addition to that the notion of “Islamic governance is interpreted by 
different Islamic scholars, and hence it is not nearly as immutable as they content” 
Smock et al. (2002:5). 
 
Thus Smock et al. (2002:7) argue that despite the repressive nature of the Middle 
Eastern states, women and youth movements are trying to counterbalance the power 
of the authoritarian regimes to effect change. However they emphasise that the U.S 
and the West should empower and foster civil society besides putting economic and 
political pressure on the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East to “encourage 
fundamental change.” 
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The political culture approach suffers from several flaws. The overreliance on Islam 
as an explanatory factor is problematic by itself since one cannot rely on the narrow 
reading of the Islamic doctrine itself due to the diversity of Islamic doctrines and 
the lack of a monolithic understanding of Islam even within the Muslim community 
itself. The approach displays also other methodological limitations such as the one 
highlighted by Brynen et al., (1995) in that cultural attitudes do not only impact on 
political realities but are also influenced by the political context and it is often 
difficult to establish the direction of causality. A further set of methodological 
challenges is posed by the difficulties of gathering appropriate and sufficient data, 
which can account for attitudinal variations across countries, classes, gender age-
specific and communal groups in the region, thus substantially inhibiting the use of 
culture as an explanatory factor for political behaviours. The political culture that 
characterises the environment of a state is of importance in terms of whether it 
values and promotes democratic ideals and practices or not, however the reliance 
on this one factor can be of limited value. That explains why Scholars like Anderson 
(1995) have summarily rejected the approach, suggesting that other methods of 
investigation, such as studying the historical process of state formation and the 
contemporary impact of political economy, or structural aspects of the economy 
and the political system, are more reliable than studies of political culture.  
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2.4.2   The Structural Approach  
 
The explanations offered by structural theorists emphasise the role of structural and 
economic factors in explaining the absence of democracy and the lack of political 
development, stressing the process of economic development and its impact on 
class structures and political institutions of Middle Eastern societies. Extensive 
quantitative research has shown that there is a “strong positive relationship between 
democracy and wealth” (Brynen et al., 1995:14). In the structural approach, wealth 
is usually associated with modernisation, which helps to break down the power 
dominance of old authorities and forces political change onto societies, via higher 
education, social satisfaction, and the creation of a less “conflictual political 
environment” Brynen et al., 1995). A new complex society is developed, leading 
to the growth of an autonomous bourgeoisie, which, as Richard Waterbury (2001) 
argues, played a role in the development of democratisation in Europe. Yet, the 
Gulf Monarchies including Kuwait are very wealthy as a result of the massive 
accumulation of oil revenues. There is then a question as to why this major increase 
in wealth has not led to a process of democratisation.      
 
Some scholars argues, that the structure of the society in the Middle East plays a 
role in blocking the presumed positive effects of wealth on democratisation. Iliya 
Harik (2006) argues that in the Middle East, the elements essential for the process 
of democratisation differ from those in Western Europe because the population is, 
to a greater extent, financially dependent on the state. Post-independence welfare 
policies, combined with statist development policies, have shaped political 
economies that revolve around state-bourgeoisies, rather than autonomous 
industrial bourgeoisies. The middle classes that have developed in these societies 
are dependent on, or captive to, the state, inhibiting the rise of liberal challengers to 
the power of the state and state institutions. According to Simon Bromley (1997) 
and Korany et al. (1998), the key determinant of this pattern of development has 
been the rent derived from oil and hydrocarbons. 
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The concept of the ‘rentier state’ was first introduced by Hossein Mahdavy (1970) 
to describe Iran under the Shah. The concept derives from definitions of 
“differential” and “absolute ground rent” in classical Marxism (Jenkins et al. 2011: 
5). In its original formulation, the concept characterises states where a substantial 
portion of national revenues originates from the rent obtained by selling indigenous 
resources to external clients (Mahdavy, 1970). Since the 1980s, other scholars have 
pointed out that there is a strong relationship between Arab oil wealth and the 
absence of democracy. According to Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (1987), 
the oil-producing countries have developed as ‘rentier’ states, in which rents are 
derived from external resources that require little or no domestic labour. Oil 
production and exports permit a distributive state that releases the government from 
any demand for political participation, because the oil wealth is used to buy the 
citizens’ loyalty and consensus (Ross, 2001). The provision and allocation of 
services by the state allows it to expand its repression without exacting taxation 
from its citizens (Herb, 2005). ‘Rentier state’ scholars such as Ross (2001) and 
Belbawi and Luciano, (1987) also argue that the absence of taxation leads to an 
absence of political participation, given that, historically, countries which depend 
on taxation usually offer larger political participation to their citizens.  
 
Mehran Kamarava (2011:270), further elaborates that “rentierism” has had two 
significant consequences for the political economy of the Middle East. Firstly, it 
“has curtailed the degree to which society has been able to obtain autonomy from 
the state, thus undermining the possibilities of democratisation from below”. 
Secondly, “rentierism” “has kept the potential for greater economic and industrial 
development in check, instead perpetuating the very unproductive practices that 
keep “rentierism” alive” (Kamrava, 2011:270). The state, thus, does not demand 
any kind of revenue or tax from the society and society in turn puts very little 
pressure on the state beyond the distribution of the rent (Kamrava, 2011:271). 
Rather, it engages in rent-seeking practices which require maintenance of the 
“political status quo and their passive compliance”. According to Kamrava, this 
type of transfer of resources to society creates a submissive populace, or what he 
termed a “dependent pool of societal clients” which include all social classes from 
civil servants and public employees (bureaucrats, teachers, physicians working in 
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governmental hospitals) to large urban labour groups and unions (Kamrava, 
2011:271).   
However, he points out that while this was the case in 1960s and 1970s in the 
Middle East, the collapse in the oil revenues due to the oil output falling from a 
high of 31 million barrels per day in 1979 to 18 million in 1982, and the fall of the 
oil price by 50 per cent in the mid-1980s created new pressures on the ‘rentier state’ 
(2011: 272). With their ability to distribute sufficient rent to satisfy a large part of 
their rapidly growing populations under threat, the states were forced to search for 
new “survival strategies”, which he identifies as oppression of the opposition and 
“reinvigorated authoritarianism” while simultaneously introducing political 
reforms as part of their survival strategies.  
 
Attributing the absence of democracy in the Middle East solely to the impact of oil 
wealth and the resultant social contract appears to be too deterministic and one 
dimensional. Also, these societies are neither passive nor docile; otherwise there is 
no justification for the high levels of repression and suppression of civil and 
political freedoms that are prevalent in Arab oil-states. Thus this causal association 
between “rentierism” and lack of democracy is debatable and uncertain. Brynen et 
al. acknowledge that the “rentier” state model exaggerates the link between oil 
wealth and authoritarianism, ignoring other historical and cultural contexts. 
(1995:16). 
 
In this vein, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla (2010), Mohammed Hachemaoui and Michael 
O’Mahony (2012) and Benali Meliha Altunisik (2014), specifically questioned the 
umbilical connection between authoritarianism and the ‘rentier’ state and suggest 
that the debate is marred by biases and paradoxes that approximate the ‘orientalist’ 
approach to the study of the Middle East. Abdulla in a similar fashion to Kamrava, 
suggests also that the ‘rentier’ state model, while useful for the early years of Gulf 
economic development, is anachronistic today (2010:4). He argues, “This theory is 
responsible for reinforcing the exceptionality view which asserts that the Arab Gulf 
States possess unique economic and socio-political attributes that are rarely found 
in any other comparable group of states”. However, the accumulated impact of the 
processes of nation-building, regional conflict, media and technology 
advancements, economic globalisation and relentless foreign pressure, have 
43 
 
combined to remove the primacy of the oil/security logic which underpins ‘rentier 
state’ theory and provided an impetus for massive socio-economic transformations 
and new political demands.  
 
Altunisik (2014: 75-92) also agrees that the “rentier” state theory needs to take into 
account the changes of circumstances of the oil economy. However, she indicates 
that regimes have built not just economic but also ideological alliances and 
coalitions with other social forces, which partly explain their on-going ability to co-
opt society in spite of relative economic difficulties, and that researchers should not 
underestimate the impact of external interventions in the geo-politics of the region 
upon domestic political environments. For instance the wars in Syria, Libya and 
Yemen are such glaring examples of how civil resistance to bring down 
authoritarian regimes can become much more complicated and exceedingly violent 
when the interests of other regional and international state actors are brought to the 
fore. 
 
2.4.3   Civil Society Approach 
 
Scholars, such as Mustapha Al Sayyid (1995) studying the concept of civil society 
and its relevance and applicability to the Middle East offer two diverse arguments; 
some argue that civil society does not exist while others propose that it does exist 
but it is weak and its role in initiating and pushing for political reforms from below 
is unsatisfactory. Those who argue that civil society does exist in the Middle East 
and that Islam has not been an obstacle to its development take a historical 
perspective pointing to the flourishing of CSOs in the Middle East at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Ibrahim 2004:39). By 1950 more than 3,000 CSOs could be 
identified across the Middle East. According to Saad Eddin Ibrahim(2004), their 
role evolved in response to regional circumstances, with activities directed both at 
developmental issues such as welfare and education and at specific political issues 
such as opposition to Ottoman rule and later Western colonialism. Ibrahim posits 
that their most significant role historically was in supporting Middle Eastern 
independence movements. Moreover Ibrahim (2004), Tim Niblock (2005) and 
Bryne et al. (1995) have all argued that the region’s associational life has served to 
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protect the household and the market from the state and as a means for conflict 
resolution. 
 
Additionally, the work of Walid Kazziha et al. (1997), demonstrates that CSOs 
played a visible regional role after the achievement of independence, as the 1970s 
and the 1980s witnessed a growing interest in the idea of democracy among many 
intellectuals who had lost faith in their old beliefs and advocacy of nationalism, 
socialism and state control, and opted to search for new solutions to what they 
described as the “ills of all Arab society” and their regimes (1997: 10). He 
elaborates that the failure of Ba’ath party in Iraq and the collapse of Nasserism 
catapulted the region to search for new tools such as democracy and liberalisation 
to achieve their ambitions of national and social revival. During that period, civil 
society activists called for liberal reforms aimed at restructuring the relationship 
between the state and the society; they actively established a number of 
organisations aimed at achieving these goals, such as the Arab Human Rights 
Organization.  
 
Moving to the end of the twentieth century and the new millennium, Ibrahim  (1995) 
argues that some CSOs in the Middle East continue to operate and are able to do so 
even in the most restrictive political and legal environments and they should not be 
entirely discounted. This point is extremely important because the work of CSOs 
in the region is lost in the midst of its comparison to Western style CSOs and also 
in the lack of full understanding of the strict environment they operate in which 
exceedingly constrains their influence. However, as Kazziha et al. (1997) points 
out Middle-Eastern CSOs failed to penetrate the lower level of society with ideas 
of democracy, and asserts that they failed to do so because the aim of the majority 
of the CSOs was to gain access to the political regime and sharing power with the 
rulers without challenging them or even initiating reforms within imposed limits 
(1997:13).  
 
The failure to widen the social base of the CSOs is also indicated by Amy 
Hawthorne who attributes the weakness of CSOs in the Middle East to an “inability 
to attract a large proportion of the population, due to the fact that social, economic, 
and political life in the Middle East revolves around family, clan and tribal ties” 
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(2004:11). Therefore, the kind of “voluntary citizen activity that works beyond 
these primary relationships” and that can challenge the settings of the authoritarian 
rule and shift the political realm from it to that of society and finally lead to 
democratisation has not developed in the Middle East (Hawthorne, 2004:11). 
Hawthorne acknowledges that “the zone of civil society in Arab countries can be a 
source of democratic change”, but it is not inherently one because similar to 
Kazziah’ argument, she observes that “ the CSOs in the Middle East consist of 
associations that do not oppose the status quo of their countries, and they only 
sponsor conservative reforms “ (Hawthorne, 2004: 5).   
 
Ghasan Salame (1994) also describes Arab civil society as seeking to advance 
“democracy without democrats”, arguing, as Francesco Cavatorta and Azzam 
Elananza have done, that CSOs’ commitment to democratic politics have too often 
been instrumentalist rather than normative, and are influenced by the prevalent 
authoritarian environment, and sometimes they are guided by pro-government, or 
illiberal groups rather than a reformist agenda (2008:564). A good example of such 
associations is the professional associations or the unions that are considered by 
Hawthorne as “arms to the state”, because the majority of their members are 
employees of, or dependent on, the government for their economic survival who 
would rather keep the status quo intact than seek political reforms (2004:11). 
Hawthorne (2004) points also to the Chambers of Commerce as being part of these 
CSOs that are served well by their dependency on the government through 
economic privileges and business opportunities, in return for their loyalty. 
Moreover, Hawthorne explains that the regimes in the Middle East “have 
neutralised groups whose activities are deemed too sensitive by applying a 
combination of sticks (the threat of repression) and carrots (funding and political 
protection)” (2004:11).  
 
These regimes do not tolerate the fact that any other institution may have more or 
even similar power; therefore, they tend, by various means, to supervise those 
associations and limit their activities by burdening them, for example, with legal 
rules and regulations, and thus they remain weak and under the control of the 
government, or in the case of the Chamber of Commerce, they typically become an 
instrument for the ruler’s power. The difficulty of bringing change and reform from 
46 
 
below through the CSOs in the region, as detailed above, is a significant factor in 
the lack of progress in the region towards democracy. And as the Arab Spring 
indicates, even when civil society erupts against these regimes the outcomes are not 
necessary a move towards democracy, primarily because other conditions are not 
primed to utilise the opportunity such as political parties, CSOs, unified national 
agenda and unified national leadership, as well as the role of press and the media, 
which for so long has been controlled and censored by the regime. 
 
This brings us to the other group of scholars, who suggest the non-existence of civil 
society essentially because of the persistence of primordial identities. They argue 
that unlike European civil society, Middle-Eastern associations have not been based 
on voluntaristic identities (being rather based on familial ties such as tribes, religion, 
or city vocations such as guilds). Furthermore, as Augustus Richard Norton (1996) 
stresses, the issue here is that the very nature of primordial and religious associating, 
as the basis of political and civil life, makes it very hard to foster a climate of 
difference and acceptance of difference.   
 
The reasons for this assumed non-existence of civil society in the Middle East are 
themselves subject to debate within this group of scholars. These can be grouped 
under two main explanations. The first, as already indicated above in the discussion 
of political culture, suggests that Islam constrains democratic development through 
its emphasis on community versus individual rights. Additionally, because Islam 
acknowledges only divine sovereignty it inhibits the development of an 
autonomous public sphere and also notions of individual autonomy and citizenship.  
 
The second explanation, represented by Ian Lustick, posits that post-colonial Arab 
states promoted their own ideological hegemony, effectively making their own 
legitimacy the “national culture” of the political community, reducing the capacity 
of civil society to legitimately challenge the state (1999:30-47). “Alternative agents 
such as religious authorities, tribal leaderships, private sector bodies, and latterly 
political parties and CSOs, were either co-opted or excluded, turned against one 
another by a state eager to bestow privileges in exchange for loyalty” (Murphy, 
2011: 963). In such a situation, politics becomes largely deferential, patriarchal and 
marked by a lack of trust, and individuals are forced to retreat behind “primordial 
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walls of solidarity”, reinforcing partisan interests rather than voluntaristic civil 
associations (Sadiki, 2000: 71-95).   
 
In summary, despite the presence of two strains of thought on the existence and/or 
non-existence of civil society, there is an apparent tendency in the literature to 
accept that some form of civil society does exist and have managed to survive 
government’s restriction and control. However, it lacks autonomy and remains 
weak and only active to a certain degree and cannot move beyond the limited space 
set deliberately by government in order to maintain the status quo. In this manner, 
one can see the issue is not that these CSOs have not developed but that they have 
developed in a manner that reflects the structuring of the relation between state and 
society being based on primordial, fragmented and segmented identities, and that 
these over time, instead of declining in importance, have become the only structures 
through which civil society can operate and dialogue with the state. This can only 
limit and restrict the role that CSOs are able to play as the engine for 
democratisation from below.  
 
2.4.4   Liberalised Autocracy 
 
The concept of “liberalised autocracy” derives from a broader set of literature that 
examines the political liberalisation process which has taken place in some parts of 
the Middle East and attempts to find another explanation for the region’s weak civil 
society and its difficulties in moving towards democatisation (Brynen, 1995). 
Simon Bromley (1997) has argued that the Middle East has witnessed some 
political reforms and opening up of its political systems, but that this did not mean 
a substantive change in regime or a reduction in authoritarianism. Rather, Middle 
Eastern countries had encountered what scholars such as Brumbergh (2002) 
identified as “political liberalisation”, deliberate actions taken by the authoritarian 
regimes to provide sufficient change to satisfy popular or international demands 
and allow the ruling elites to retain power. More specifically, Bromley observes 
that although Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, the Palestinian 
proto-state and Kuwait have experienced degrees of liberalisation, these cannot be 
considered democratisation (Bromley, 1997). 
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Bromley (1997) identifies these regimes as ‘liberalised autocracies,’ which he 
argues allow some “political freedom and political competition not because they 
are committed to democratic change” but because they want to avoid the severe 
costs of confronting social crises with their own people, viewing “limited reform” 
as “less costly”. Similarly, according to Brumberg (2002: 56) the political system 
of “liberalised autocracy” is characterised by “guided pluralism, controlled 
elections, and selective repression”, thus by allowing a certain limited degree of 
liberalisation and civic activism it permits the channelling and easing of potential 
pressure from below while allowing the repressive regime to survive essentially 
unchanged even if confronted with external pressures from the international 
community or internal pressures from their own society. The “liberalised autocracy” 
in the Middle East tends to create a condition in which they allow for the partial 
opening of the political space while on the other hand they confine the CSOs and 
limit their abilities and activities and do not allow them to work independently from 
the state. Some rulers have “liberalised” and passed reforms from above and 
allowed parliamentary elections and political participation as an outlet for their 
people to freely express themselves and welcomed associational life; however, they 
limited their power. Therefore, free and fair elections, and effective political 
participation did not take place, nor was associational life strong enough to play an 
active political role. 
 
Notably, these scholars make a distinction between political liberalisation and 
democratisation and recognise differences in both processes. Brynen et al. (1995:3) 
argue that democratisation “entails an expansion of political participation in such a 
way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control 
over public policy”.  Political liberalisation, on the other hand, is a process designed 
to secure the status quo in the face of pressure for change, it “involves the expansion 
of public space through the recognition and protection of civil and political liberties, 
particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage in free political 
discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interests.” O’Donnell and 
Schmitter further elaborate that political liberalisation is “the process of redefining 
and extending rights” such as freedom of movement, the right to be defended in a 
fair trial and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens (1986: 7). 
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Individuals tend to demand rights once they are no longer suppressed by the regime 
in question, and this stimulates other groups and leads to a widening of the “space 
for liberalised action”.  
 
They further stress that there is no “necessary or logical sequence to this process”; 
it is dependent on the regime’s response, and, if the demands are not threatening to 
the regime, over time the liberalised practices will become institutionalised. 
Liberalisation is seen as necessary but not sufficient for a move from an 
authoritarian regime to democracy; if there is no liberalisation, democratisation 
“risks degenerating into mere formalism” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 9). On 
the other hand, political liberalisation without democratisation can be a means 
towards a very different end and can indicate not the beginnings of the road to 
democracy, but quite the opposite: the shoring up of the authoritarian regime as the 
lack of institutionalised accountability can allow political liberalisation to be easily 
manipulated by governments (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 9). 
 
As Huntington notes, “liberalising authoritarian regimes may release political 
prisoners, open up some issues for public debate, loosen censorship, sponsor 
elections for offices that have little power, permit some renewal of civil society, 
and take other steps in a democratic direction, without submitting top decision 
makers to the electoral test.” (Huntington, 1991b: 9).  And even when elections do 
take place, they do not always represent true democracy. For example, Brynen et 
al. (1995: 4) suggest that elections, which are perceived as a “way of expanding 
political participation in government decision making”, can be held under partial 
franchise or fraud and are therefore not always representative of the citizens.  
 
Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone (2004.83) are also in agreement that the 
Middle Eastern countries have witnessed a degree of political liberalisation, 
although it does not resemble that of Western democracies. They argue that the 
liberalisation process has taken place gradually in the Middle East, initially starting 
under the Ottoman Empire and continuing under colonial dominance (1920s to 
1950s) and into the modern age. They further indicate that some countries, such as 
Egypt in the 1980s, encountered “different waves of political liberalisation and de-
liberalisation”. Their liberal reforms and policies indicated the “renewal of the 
50 
 
limited democratic experiences” but the trend fizzled out in the second half of the 
1990s. However, despite emphasising these historical periods of liberalisation, 
Aliboni and Guazzone conclude that “the liberal policies had been stalled, 
withdrawn or circumvented in most countries and it had become apparent that Arab 
regimes have failed to democratise and, in some cases, have become even more 
repressive and unaccountable” (2004 :83). In their opinion, a number of states have 
instead managed to present liberalised images to the outside world, while in fact 
they are “ruled by modernised elites able to manipulate façades democratic 
institutions in order to stay in power”. According to Aliboni and Guazzone 
(2004:83), liberalised autocracies exist in states such as “Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan Kuwait and Bahrain”, and operate alongside “the more ‘traditional’ secular 
or religious authoritarian regimes” in Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia.” 
Finally, they conclude that “in today’s Arab world there are neither democratic 
systems nor democratising regimes: there are instead many kinds of autocracy, each 
functioning differently within the general framework of authoritarianism”. 
 
These scholars including, Mehran Kamvara (2011) and Marsha Posusney (2005) 
explain the resilience of these autocratic regimes while deceptively appearing 
democratic at times in two ways: manipulation of the political system and political 
institutions and resorting to the state’s coercive means  (Bronwlee, 2005).  Kamrava 
(2011) explains that governments resort to broadening the state’s inclusiveness 
through institutional devices such as the parliament that works as both a “safety 
valve” and an “institutional mechanism”, beautifying the image of the authoritarian 
regime and strengthening authoritarian elites while enabling the state to respond to 
threats. Meanwhile the social actors in those states are marginalised and oppressed 
if they threaten the regime, and civil society is consequently weakened (2011: 346). 
However, he argues that democratisation is not totally out of sight in the Middle 
East because even these superficial changes will have an impact in the future (2011: 
347).  
 
Posusney (2005) in turn, argues that regimes manipulate political institutions 
through elections to ensure that they do not really serve democratic functions, but 
instead reinforce the regime’s own control and political domination. She argues that 
the Middle East has witnessed changes, but in many cases these have been 
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somewhat nullified, as the rule of law was weak and elections have not been free 
and fair, hence, these changes have permitted what she termed a resilient 
authoritarianism. Thus, she suggests that authoritarian rulers may frequently 
manipulate elections in the Middle East, which appear to promote political 
liberalisation to produce a loyal parliament (2005: 91). These elections can also be 
a tool to convey legitimacy to the regime and gain popularity and they can represent 
a strategy used by a regime to ensure their own survival rather, than to encourage 
democratisation, meaning that they fail to meet the criteria of supporting modern 
political democracy. In such circumstances, the executive holds power, while the 
legislative and judicial branches are weaker and controlled. Although opposition 
parties will exist, their access to the media is limited and does not extend to their 
campaign activities; votes for certain groups could be forced or interfered with, to 
the advantage of the executive, and gerrymandering can occur. 
 
However, although Posusney (2005) seems to present a pessimistic account of the 
election process in the Middle East, she - following her examination of elections in 
some Middle Eastern countries from the 1960s to 2000s - emphasised, just as 
Kamrava (2011), that the mere fact of holding elections may allow democratisation 
to occur gradually through providing a space for the struggle to manifest itself by 
and giving the opposition the opportunity to weaken or defeat the authoritarian 
regime. Elections are a forum for whole segments of society to discuss their future; 
they stimulate political mobilisation, for the very presence of the views of the 
opposition in the domestic media increases public awareness and activates criticism 
of the regime. Posusney (2005) thus terms those states, which hold elections, 
however limited, “pseudo-democracies”. Her case studies show that “prolonged 
periods of controlled contestation” carry the hope of a move towards 
democratisation, such as is being seen in Mexico and Senegal. The process appears 
weak in the beginning but then strengthens and starts to challenge the authoritarian 
rulers. Posusney, therefore, believes that through the election process, moderate 
Islamists and secular opposition movements can produce a gradual erosion of the 
ruling elites’ powers (2005: 95). She considers that the “institutional change” 
exemplified in elections, no matter how limited and manipulated, is the key to a 
transition to democracy, as the elections represent the core arena for multiple parties 
to work against the authoritarian rule until it diminishes. She further argues that the 
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factors adopted by the modernisation theorists and the civil society literature are 
not sufficient enough to explain the changes in the Middle East, and that the role of 
elections must be taken into account (Posusney,2005).   
 
On the other hand, Jasson Brownlee attributes the resilience of an authoritarian 
regime to its willingness to react violently against opposing groups that may 
threaten its rule; it is not the culture of the Arab and Islamic world, nor political 
forces in the region that cause democratisation to fail, but the “regime’s ability to 
suppress that ensures it retains power” (2005: 43). The regime establishes “coercive 
organisations” to protect itself, which explains, to an extent, the failure of some 
opposition movements in Middle Eastern states, especially when compared to such 
movements in other parts of the world. Brownlee examined four cases in which the 
regime’s coercive apparatus and it’s willingness to act violently against the 
opposition ensured regime survival: Syria (1982) Iraq (1991), Tunisia (1987) and 
Libya (1993), (2005: 44).  
 
Whether these authoritarian regimes are maintained as a consequence of a regime’s 
manipulation of political institutions (like elections) to ensure they do not serve 
democratic functions but rather reinforce the control/political domination, or 
through the use of coercive means, the end result is the same: little progress towards 
democratisation. Eva Bellin (2005: 37) notes the Middle East adheres to a 
“powerful political coercive apparatus” that has been strengthened with oil 
revenues and by the security concerns of the West, thus making the transition to 
democracy much more difficult to achieve. However, the uprisings of the Arab 
spring have challenged the notions of Arab “exceptionalism” to democratisation 
but also indicated that the conditions or processes necessary for that transition are 
not present as yet due primarily to the weakness of civil society and its associations. 
In summary, this discussion is important for the study of Kuwait especially in terms 
of identifying and separating the two processes: political liberalisation, ending with 
liberalised autocracies, or democratisation. Thus, political reforms that have taken 
shape over the years in several Arab countries are better understood as liberalised 
autocracies where the ultimate power still rests in the state and its institutions while 
democratisation entails a shift away from the dominance of the state and an 
increased role of civil society and its representative institutions, civil and political. 
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This will help the study to make its final conclusion of how to understand the 
political reforms in Kuwait: either a transition to democracy or regime survival.  
 
 
2.5   Conclusion 
The literature review indicated the divergent definitions of democracy–the 
presumed end condition of democratisation - and the lack of consensus among 
scholars of what constitutes democracy. However, Dahl (1971) offers a way to 
assess the meaning of political reforms in Kuwait by testing whether they are 
expanding the realms of participation, contestation and civil and political liberties. 
Thus, democracy is understood in this study to mean a political system that 
encompasses participation, contestation and civil and political rights, so that 
democratisation becomes a trajectory of political reform towards those objectives.  
 
The review also demonstrated that there is no agreement among scholars about the 
environment creating the conditions for democratisation, and no suggestion that any 
condition is sufficient and/or necessary for democracy to take root. However, the 
work of Potter (1997) proposes a synthesis of what he considers the most useful 
aspects of the combined contributions of the three main Western democratisation 
theories (modernisation, structural and transitional) uniting them in one scheme that 
emphasises six explanatory prerequisites for the democratisation process: economic 
development, societal divisions, conducive political institutions, a vibrant civil 
society, a sympathetic political culture and transnational or international 
engagement. The study, thus, privileges Potter’s (1997) schemes as these 
“prerequisites” provide a useful set of “conditions”, which can be used to assess 
whether a country is democratising. More specifically, it is possible to examine the 
extent to which any or all of these prerequisites have been existent in Kuwait prior 
to 1990 or as a result of the political reforms in the period under investigation, 
thereby examining the outcomes of the reforms and identifying the reasons for these 
outcomes. Moreover, we can assess the outcomes of the reforms in terms of the 
extent to which they have enhanced the democratic credentials of Kuwait by 
expanding participation, contestation or civil and political rights. 
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The review of literature on the absence of democracy in the Middle East situates 
Kuwait within a region specific context, which allows comparisons to be made with 
other states with some of the same characteristics. This literature suggests that 
economic development processes have been distorted in oil-rich states with a 
resulting tendency to reinforce distributive (as opposed to allocative) functions of 
the state, and thus creating an alternate social contract to that of democratic states. 
In this social contract, the social categories, which one might expect to grow with 
modernisation and to challenge the dominance of the state, specifically the new 
middle classes, instead are dependent on and supportive of the regime in power. 
Societal divisions – rather than creating challengers to a ruling capitalist class – are 
‘managed’ by that class through the distribution of rent.  
 
The literature also illustrates that pressure for democratisation from below has also 
been weakened by the domination of civil society by the state. Civil society in the 
region is neither autonomous nor strong enough to hold the state accountable or to 
push for democratic reform. Whether this is due to an unsympathetic political 
culture, regime manipulation of institutions, or straightforward regime coercion, is 
disputed. Political culture is a dynamic phenomenon anyway and the combinations 
of the three factors are likely to be country and historically specific. Again the one 
factor determining the trajectory of events is limiting and deterministic as state and 
society is neither static nor stagnant, and this allows for the possibility of change 
especially as these three factors interact and produce changed and/or more 
favourable circumstances that can enhance the democratisation process. 
 
Finally, the literature suggests that examinations of political reforms in the region, 
which purport to be democratising, may lead to the discovery that these are 
strategies for regime survival, which deliberately inhibit democracy. Through 
manipulation of political institutions such as parties, elections, or civil society 
organisations, regimes seek to bolster their legitimacy, to co-opt allies, to counter 
transnational or external pressures for political reforms, and to disempower 
potential competitors for power by implementing political reforms which liberalise 
the political system without surrendering to any of the criteria for democracy–
greater participation, contestation or significant civil and political rights. 
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In the following chapters, the study examines the political reforms in Kuwait within 
a theoretical frame that adopts Dahl’s (1971) definition of the meaning of 
democracy to ascertain to what extent these reforms have enhanced political 
participation, expanded civil and political liberties and provided meaningful and 
effective contestation. Potter’s (1997) scheme of the six conditions (economic 
development, political culture, state and political institutions relationships, and civil 
society, societal division and transnational and international engagement) is used to 
determine whether these conditions have been promoters and or hindrances to 
democratisation. This structures the analysis within this particular frame in order to 
arrive at both theoretical and substantive understanding of the process of political 
reforms in Kuwait.  
 
The analysis starts in the next chapter by providing an overview of the democratic 
narrative of the state-society institutional relationship prior to 1990 and an 
assessment of the status of Kuwait's political system against the criteria of 
democracy (participation, contestation and political and civil rights) and the role of 
Potter’s (1997) six prerequisites in this political account.  
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Chapter Three: An Overview of Al Sabah Rule and State-Society 
Relations Prior to 1990 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter analyses the dynamics of state–society in Kuwait prior to 1990 which 
produced a particular political system; one that is underpinned by the Al Sabah 
family and oil wealth on the one hand, while on the other manifesting a much more 
interactive relation between state and society as compared to other Gulf monarchies. 
Kuwaiti citizens have enjoyed a far greater open political system and participatory 
politics, albeit with limited influence on policy outcomes, process of government 
and most importantly without producing a discernible shift in the balance of power 
between state and society.  
The discussion in this chapter is organised into two main sections: the first section 
focuses on the manner of consolidation of Al Sabah rule through looking at the use 
of tradition, patriarchal and segmented identities and loyalties as the base of their 
rule, in addition to the increased role played by the oil wealth and the subsequent 
widening base of Al Sabah rule. The second section discusses the structure of 
political participation in its two different formations: the pre independence form, 
shifting between consultative and elected form, and the parliamentary form post-
independence, with a focus on the latter. The successive national assemblies elected 
during the period 1962-1986 will be discussed in terms of their contribution to 
institutionalising political participation and how the relation between the state and 
the society evolved.   
Most importantly, the discussion shows how Kuwaitis, since the early days of the 
rule of Al Sabah, demanded a political role and a share in political power, with this 
aspect remaining unaltered, even with the consolidation of an oil economy and the 
rechanneling of unprecedented levels of oil revenues into hands of the citizens. The 
insistence of citizen on the right of representation and a share in political power has 
been an important part of the structuring of political power and a major source of 
tension and confrontation between the ruling family and the citizens. Thus by 1990 
the system had developed in such a way that demonstrates a contradictory process, 
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where increased participation and contestation is evidenced with a number of 
Potter’s (1997) conditions present; especially economic development, a relatively 
favourable political culture and a representative National Assembly. Nonetheless, 
the relation of state-society remained skewed towards the dominance of Al Sabah 
ruling family. What follows is a detailed discussion of how this came about.   
 
3.2   The Concentration of Power in the Hands of Al Sabah Family  
State power in Kuwait has been organised around the rise of Al Sabah as the 
undisputed ruling family rather than through the rise of a capitalist class, as is the 
case in most developed countries. Kuwait shares this feature with other Arab Gulf 
Monarchies where ruling families such as Al Saud in Saudi Arabia, Al Thani in 
Qatar, Al Khalifa in Bahrain, Al Nahyan in United Arab Emirates and Bin Saeed in 
Oman represent the dominant political force, and the development of state power 
and political structures have been closely tied to their rise. Oil wealth in all these 
states has facilitated the consolidation of that power and gave the ruling families 
the means to build state apparatus and create alliances and vested interests among 
the various social forces (Zahlan, 1998).  
Two internal factors played a major role in consolidating and maintaining Al Sabah 
rule: first, cultural elements including tradition, patriarchal loyalties and segmented 
identities, and second, the oil wealth. The following analysis examines how these 
factors served to uphold Al Sabah rule and allowed them to control both the 
mechanisms of political participation as well as the oil economy, and by doing so 
undermined the general conditions necessary for democratisation as suggested in 
Potter’s (1997) scheme. 
 
3.2.1   Tradition, Patriarchy and Segmented Identities    
 
Before the promulgation of the constitution of Kuwait in 1962, Al Sabah’s political 
ascendancy and power was based on agreement and negotiations with key social 
forces, namely leading merchants and tribal leaders (Crystal and Al Shayeji, 1998). 
Abu Hakima (1967:108) notes that Sabah Al Sabah, first ruler of Kuwait, was 
58 
 
chosen following the traditional method prevalent in 1756. This, as observed by 
Schlumberger was the first legitimising factor and has been a consistent part of Al 
Sabah family rule in order to “ensure regime maintenance” (2010: 11). What makes 
tradition an even stronger force is the indirect impact of religion on it. Al Sabah 
like other rulers in the Arab region invoke religion and Islamic values as embodied 
in them and more importantly representing and legitimising their rule based on 
tradition and accountability to God rather than the people’s will (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1990). This traditional agreement between ruler and ruled was not 
devoid of conflict and antagonism, as shall be seen in section 3.3. Kuwaitis insisted 
on political participation, early on, and long before independence.  
With the promulgation of the Constitution in 1962, Al Sabah rule was given a legal 
institutionalised basis where their legitimacy extended beyond the traditional 
agreement/unwritten contract between ruler and ruled, to a very formal institutional 
one; “Kuwait is a hereditary emirate held in succession in the descendants of the 
Mubarak Al Sabah” as stipulated in Article (4), while ultimate power resides in the 
Amir as envisioned in Article (107), whereby "The Amir may, by Decree, dissolve 
the National Assembly”.  Al Sabah have been able to use and abuse this power over 
the years in order to maintain their autocratic rule and undermine the process of 
democratic government as envisioned in the constitution.   
The second factor in the legitimatising process has been the patriarchal/paternalistic 
approach that emphasises the concept of the ‘one family’ Al-Osra Al-wahida, thus 
assigning to the Amir the role of father/head of the family. On the one hand this 
powerful patriarchal notion does not dismiss the presence of divisive and discordant 
divisions but makes the ruler both the “arbiter” as well as the “unifier” among the 
plethora of interests. This is actually a popular concept in the Arab region as well 
as other Gulf rulers. It is a concept that has been much emphasised by Al Sabah 
whenever they address the people and deliver speeches. Neither the Constitution 
nor the massive socio-economic changes that transformed Kuwait from a fishing 
and pearling economy into a modern oil economy have changed the manner in 
which Al Sabah perceive their relation with their people and the manner that the 
Amir addresses Kuwaitis. Al Sabah hold onto this concept, as much as do other 
Gulf rulers, primarily because this gives them the ultimate power as the 
indispensable ruler, without whom chaos will reign (Richards and Waterbury, 1990: 
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317-319). The concept of national unity constitutes an important prerequisite in 
Potter’s (1997) scheme for the process of democratisation. As will be further 
evidenced in the discussion, Al Sabah cultivated segmented identities and sustained 
social cleavages as opposed to promoting national unity, suggesting a perceived 
importance of these divisions in regime maintenance and survival. 
The third factor that played a role in consolidating and maintaining Al Sabah rule 
is the manner of manipulation, and sometimes the encouragement, by Al Sabah of 
these segmented identities despite their rhetoric of ‘one family’. In other words the 
augmentation and perpetuation of societal cleavages has aided Al Sabah, in 
maintaining their relevance and centrality to the political system (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1990: 320-321). There are in particular four major cleavages that have 
impacted directly on the functioning of state power as follows:   
 
Demographic schism      This first cleavage between Kuwaiti citizens and non-
Kuwaitis manifested through the large expatriate community living in Kuwait. The 
oil economy created a major layer of segmentation in the society in the form of a 
massive expatriate community making Kuwaitis a minority in their country. The 
demands of an oil economy and the increased economic activities attracted a large 
number of foreign workers from the Arab region and beyond. Over the years the 
number of non-Kuwaitis increased from a level of 93 thousand in 1957 (around 45 
per cent of population) to 1.227 million (around 72 per cent of the population).  
(Khouja & Sadler, 1979).  There was also more than a six fold increase in their 
numbers from 1965 to 1990, while the Kuwaiti population experienced just over a 
two-fold increase in the same period  (KCSB, 2013). Foreign labour has more 
significance in terms of their contribution to the labour force; in 1957 they already 
constituted a large share of around 70 per cent rising to 86 per cent in 1985 (El 
Katiri, Fattouh & Segal 2011: 6).  
 
This situation is not unique to Kuwait; other Gulf States have similar demographic 
dilemmas. As pointed out by Anh Longva (2005), this aspect has been absent from 
studies of democratisation in Kuwait and she points out to the particular impact of 
a rightless majority population on how the privileged minority population 
conceptualise and perceive their political rights. In other words the minority 
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population not only is dependent economically on them but also dependent on them 
for its identity (in Dresch & Piscatori 2005:118). This dichotomy has served Al 
Sabah well in providing a tool to create a special status for Kuwaitis privileging 
them vis á vis the larger community in the population. In addition to instilling fear 
and anxiety about the migrant population especially those of Arab origin in order 
to decrease the chances of alliances or political identification especially as they 
share the same Arab-Muslim cultural characteristics. 
 
The Bidun  (without or stateless)    This is a large resident population that benefited 
from the same social and economic rights as Kuwaiti citizens but remains outside 
the political process despite the fact that they form the bulk of the Kuwaiti army. 
They consist of four main groupings: residents of tribal origin, residents who did 
not apply for citizenship after independence, Arab residents, especially Iraqis, who 
were recruited in the 1960s and 1970s in the army and police, and children of 
Kuwaiti mothers with stateless or foreign fathers (Azoulay, 2014). As a 
consequence of the Iran–Iraq war and the 1985 attempted assassination of the then 
Amir Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah (a bomb detonated in one of his cars), the Bidun 
status changed from that of legal residents without nationality to illegal residents 
because it was thought that many Iraqis escaping Iraq used the ambiguous status of 
the Bidun to blend in, and Al Sabah needed to crack down on that possibility and 
also giving them a chance to further discriminate and criminalize the Bidun (Al 
Najjar, 2014). The positioning of Kuwaiti citizens in opposition to and as rivals to 
non-Kuwaiti citizens has been a tactic successfully employed by Al Sabah as 
Kuwaitis have adopted and internalised the rhetoric of fear and distrust of Bidun 
and the expatriate community, further adding to their status as the privileged 
minority.   
 
Religious division   Even though there is no major religious division in Kuwait, as 
is the case in Bahrain, between Shi’i and Sunni, heightened sectarian identification 
and inter-communal tensions have occurred at various points between the Sunni 
majority and the Shi’i minority (KTS, 2008). The Sunni–Shi’i division as described 
by Crystal (1990) was not only a religious division against the Shi’a, “it was a 
discrimination exercised at different levels: economic, in which there were 
sectarian division of labour; social, in which they did not inter-marry and had to 
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organise their own social services such as schools; and political, in which they could 
not access the ruler except through his secretary” (Crystal, 1990: 40). Inter-
communal tensions, when they have arisen, usually stem from major events in the 
wider Gulf region, e.g. the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and subsequent Iraq 
Wars: Iran-Iraq war 1981-1988, the First Gulf war 1991 and the Second Gulf war 
2003. Controversially, on occasions some Sunnis have questioned Shi’i loyalty to 
the state; a charge most Shi’i resent deeply.  
 
Urban and tribal cleavage     This has been particularly beneficial to Al Sabah 
especially to counter balance the power of the urban educated wealthy merchants. 
Urban Kuwaitis are the long-established sedentary group, notably the merchant 
families who are considered Kuwait’s original people, Asil, or the first settlers 
(Crystal, 1990). The tribal segment consists largely of Bedouin tribes who settled 
in Kuwait in different waves, mostly during the twentieth century and they make 
up approximately half of Kuwaiti citizens. Citizenship and naturalisation were 
granted to some members of the Bedouin tribes without rigidly enforcing the 
strictures of the 1959 Naturalisation Act. The urban, Asil, are the most effective in 
the social and political life in Kuwait constituting the “nucleus of the commercial, 
social and political life of the country” (Al Yahya, 1993: 1). The tribal groups tend 
to be more pro-government due to the fact that since 1961, with the rise of Iraqi 
threats to Kuwait, the Amir, Sheikh Sabah, embraced the Bedouins and made them 
his governmental allies (Crystal, 1990:89), (Al Fadalah, 2012). Crystal suggests the 
Amir initiated a process of “incorporating tribes as political allies, focusing on 
offering them Kuwaiti citizenship and encouraging them to join the army and the 
police” (1990:88). With the establishment of the National Assembly in 1963, the 
process required tribal members to run as candidates, who were themselves first 
elected by means of ‘tribal primaries’, known as Al Intikhabat Al Farei’yah (Al 
Fadalah, 2012), This led to the rise of tribal electoral power, in turn alienating the 
Opposition and more importantly weakening and dividing it. 
These four cleavages have, on the one hand, facilitated the maintenance and 
consolidation of Al Sabah rule while simultaneously undermining the development 
of an overarching unifying identity, as the chapter evidences. These segmented 
identities have been consolidated and even formalised in the political process and 
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used to counter each other for the benefit of Al Sabah. Although Kuwaitis have a 
strong sense of pride of being Kuwaiti citizens, the Opposition have failed to build 
on that and the politics of opposition is riddled with fragmentation, thus serving and 
benefiting Al Sabah rule foremost. Potter’s (1997) scheme indicates that societal 
divisions are a general positive condition that trigger democratisation as they allow 
for competing social forces to press for their concerns and interests, however, in the 
case of Kuwait they have acted as impediments to institutionalising democratic 
practices. The prevalence of segmented political agendas, none of which are 
capable to either counterbalance the power of Al Sabah or unify a majority behind 
them have bolstered Al Sabah’s power and predominance. Oil wealth, as the next 
section shows, was also used to bolster Al Sabah rule. The combined effects of 
these two elements have produced power structures that served regime maintenance 
and thus in terms of Potter’s (1997) scheme undermined the transition to democracy.  
 
3.2.2   Oil Wealth and the Consolidation of the Power of Al Sabah 
 
The discovery of oil in 1938, and its emergence as the major source of income, 
underpinned both the massive socio-economic transformation of Kuwait and the 
rule of Al Sabah. The analysis in this section highlights this complex role of oil as 
both a facilitator of economic development and an impediment to the evolution of 
a democratic system of government.  Specifically, oil wealth allowed Al Sabah to 
transform the socio-economic base through massive public investment programmes 
and massive redistributive policies.  At the same time, this gave them the power to 
demarcate and control the parameters of political participation and the level of 
involvement of the citizens in the decision-making process. This led to the 
inevitable tension between a political system that seeks to maintain and manipulate 
segmented identities and social-economic cleavages within a modern oil economy, 
and the need for expanded spaces for civil and political expression rising from 
pressures from below.    
 
In this manner Potter’s (1997) emphasis on the role of economic development as 
one of the driving forces for the emergence of democracy holds some relevance to 
Kuwait in the sense that its particular economic development being both beholden 
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to oil revenues and state expenditures have in fact acted as a hindering force while 
simultaneously creating highly educated, politically aware and engaged citizens 
demanding and insisting on their right to participate in the decision making process. 
The discussion below details this significant and extensive role of the state that 
allowed Al Sabah to consolidate their power and to closely control public space. 
 
1. State Led Economic Development  
   
Oil income that started off accruing to the state in modest amounts, from mere 
thousands grew into billions within a few decades as a result of the quadrupling of 
the price of oil in 1974 (due to the impact of the Arab oil embargo of 1973) making 
the state increasingly wealthy, having a vast income as well as control of most of 
the economy (Assiri, 2007). The price of oil jumped from a mere 1.63 USD per 
barrel in 1962 to 11 USD in 1974, and continued to rise steadily until reaching a 
high of 35.52 USD in 1980 followed by slight fluctuations until the drastic low of 
1986 when it dropped to a mere 13.53 USD and continued fluctuating for the rest 
of the period, hovering around an average of 18 USD (Cordesman, 1997). It was 
these fluctuations that focused the attention of OPEC on the need for diversification 
of the economy of oil-based states and Kuwait’s development plans adopted 
diversification as its major economic strategy from early on.  However, little 
progress was seen in this period towards achieving this goal, as the oil sector 
remained the major source of income. 
 
The value of Kuwait exports, as seen in Table 3.1, was 1.6 billion USD in 1970, 
jumping to 17 billion USD 1976. The impact of the drop of oil price in the eighties 
is seen in the value of exports reaching its lowest value of only 6 billion USD in 
1990. Oil exports averaged 91 per cent of total exports for the period 1970-1990.  
Table 3.1: Value of Petroleum Exports 1965-1991 (billions USD) 
 Year Value of Total 
Exports 
Value of Petroleum 
Exports 
Petroleum Exports 
to Total Exports 
(%)* 
1970 1,655 1,582 96% 
1971 2,507 2,412 96% 
1972 2,989 2,834 95% 
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1973 3,810 3,574 94% 
1974 10,963 10,566 96% 
1975 9,184 8,593 94% 
1976 9,846 9,090 92% 
1977 9,754 8,918 91% 
1978 10,427 9,557 92% 
1979 18,404 17,294 94% 
1980 19,842 18,935 95% 
1981 16,300 14,229 87% 
1982 10,961 9,066 83% 
1983 11,574 10,069 87% 
1984 12,280 10,996 90% 
1985 10,597 9,451 89% 
1986 7,251 6,378 88% 
1987 8,264 7,523 91% 
1988 7,758 6,840 88% 
1989 11,476 10,432 91% 
1990 7,042 6,385 91% 
1991 1,088 874 80% 
            *Calculated by the author. Source: OPEC, 2005; OPEC, 1991. 
 
Until 1962, the recipient of oil income was the Amir of Kuwait, however, this 
changed with the promulgation of the Constitution, which declared formally 
(Article 21) that all revenues belong to the state rather than the ruler per se. In 1975 
Kuwait nationalised the country’s oil industry, and in 1980 placed it under the 
control of the Kuwait Petroleum Company. Despite this technical change the real 
power over this fast growing wealth remained in the hands of Al Sabah as the 
government and high level positions are reserved for ruling family members. The 
immense power this gave Al Sabah is easily discernible in their pursuit to build and 
expand a modern state with its civil and security apparatus, investing heavily in the 
oil sector and expanding economic opportunities in the private sector especially in 
commerce, services, construction and real estate. The ruling family that was once 
financially dependent on the wealth of the commercial elites is now in control of 
substantial amounts of oil income and able to spearhead massive expenditures 
programmes. Consequently, the level of government expenditure grew from a mere 
135,285 million USD in 1965, leaping to 1.5 billion USD in 1976 and increasing 
steadily to reach over 6 billion USD in 1989, returning, post-liberation, to its high 
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expenditures of over 8 billion USD in 1991, as seen in Chart 3.1 . Also, the chart 
shows how the fluctuation in the oil price directly affected government spending as 
the years 1982-1988 show relatively little variation in expenditure between a low 
4.2 billion and a high 4.9 billion USD. 
 
Chart 3.1: Kuwait Government Spending 1965 – 1991 (billions USD) 
Source: OPEC, 1991 
 
Pressure on government finances, thus, started to appear in the eighties as a result 
of the fluctuation of the price of oil. However, during that time this did not present 
itself as a serious problem due to high levels of foreign reserves. However, this 
situation becomes much more complicated, in later years especially, in light of the 
Iraqi Occupation and the depletion of billions of dollars combined with the 
continued fluctuation in the price of oil. What is significant from the point of view 
of the relation of state-society is that changing these high levels of expenditure, and 
consequently reducing benefits accruing to the citizens (in order to reduce the 
budget deficit) becomes difficult, if not impossible, due to creating a mentality of 
entitlement. 
 
Kuwaiti government’s spending had many purposes but most importantly it aimed 
to support the state’s three main objectives; diversify the base of the economy, 
develop the skill base and channel oil revenues to the population. Some of the 
investments, especially those in infrastructure and social services can be considered 
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huge achievements that rapidly transformed the life of Kuwaitis. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to delve into the efficiencies of some of the investment 
programmes and the extent of the success of the state in achieving these objectives, 
but suffice it to say that the state was successful in achieving its third objective of 
channelling the oil wealth into the economy and in the process creating one of the 
most extensive redistributive functions of the state, thus achieving the ultimate 
objective of strengthening the political power of Al Sabah. However, it is important 
to note that the objective of diversifying the economy appears to be the least 
successful as dependency on oil exports averaged over 90 per cent of total exports, 
see previous Table 3.1. 
 
The following section expands on the manner and means of recycling oil income 
and its impact on interlocking the population in a dependent relation on the state, 
facilitating the dominance of Al Sabah over political and economic processes. 
Nonetheless, Al Sabah continued to be faced with mounting political pressures from 
the reformist elements of the Opposition for a share in power, thus demonstrating 
the complexity of finding answers concerning the relation of ‘rentier’ economy to 
hindering and/ or promoting democracy and the need to go beyond this concept to 
understand the complex dynamics of state-society.   
 
2. The Redistributive Function of the State  
      
The accumulation of massive amounts of oil revenues and the need to channel it 
into the economy, in order to use it as a legitimising tool for the ruling family, 
created an extensive redistributive function of the government. This extensive role 
is evidenced though four main channels: state sponsored employment, extensive 
public investments, public transfers and land purchases. 
 
State sponsored employment   This first channel stands among the most important 
redistributive channels, as the government is committed to providing employment 
to all Kuwaiti citizens. Article (41) of the Constitution stipulates that the state shall 
endeavour to make it available to every citizen and to make its terms equitable. This 
has been understood literally to mean that the government is obliged to provide and 
guarantee civil service employment to all citizens who want to work (El Mallakh, 
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1979).  Shorter working hours, often less demanding work, more public holidays, 
benefits and perks make the public sector more attractive for Kuwaitis than the 
private sector, thus more than 87 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens are employed in the 
public sector (ElKatriri, Fatouh & Segal, 2011). The government went as far as to 
create a special budget, the Complementary Funds Budget, to provide funds for 
government departments to employ newly graduated Kuwaitis should the 
department suffer from insufficient allocations (El Mallakh, 1979). This distorted 
the labour market and skill base of the economy whereby more than 95 per cent of 
the expatriate community is concentrated in the private sector (El Katriri, Fatouh & 
Segal 2011). 
Programme of public investment    This second channel has been massive and has 
transformed Kuwait’s public infrastructure and social services from non-existent to 
building roads, harbours, airports and providing electricity, water and other public 
works. The provision of social services was one of the earliest priorities of the state 
especially education and health (ElKatriri, Fatouh & Segal 2011). The expenditure 
on education resulted in the eradication of illiteracy among what was largely an 
illiterate population and the provision of an educational system accessible and free 
to all Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, which includes free books, school uniforms, 
meals, transportation and, for low-income families, a parental allowance (Crystal, 
1995). There was an emphasis on female education and targeting illiteracy among 
tribesmen by establishing an Adult Education system in 1960s. University 
education includes free dormitories, meals, sportswear, transportation and field 
trips (Al Mughni, 1993). Kuwait awards some of the Gulf’s most generous state 
funding to provide high-achieving students with scholarships to study abroad 
(Crystal, 1995). Higher education was encouraged with the establishment of Kuwait 
University in 1966, which since then has expanded significantly into a multi-faculty 
institution (Assiri, 2007).  
This emphasis on education also produced a highly educated and engaged 
population where Kuwait became famous early on for its newspapers such as Al 
Qabas and also its liberal thinkers and writers. This is also reflected in the critical 
and vocal national assemblies that Kuwait elected over the years. Potter’s (1997) 
scheme considers education an important ‘intervening variable’ mediating between 
economic development and democratisation. This suggests that the record of 
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Kuwait in education prior to 1990 provided an advantageous condition to challenge 
the authoritarian rule of Al Sabah.  However, the manner in which social divisions 
have been organised and manipulated, and the impact of the recycling of oil 
revenues in the economy creating layers of beneficiaries and vested interests that 
are tied to the state undermined the influence of this factor.  
Investment in health and medical infrastructure was also significant, establishing a 
comprehensive free public system that saw a rapid and consistent expansion of all 
types of health services; hospitals, clinics, dental clinics and other medical services 
progressing from virtually no infrastructure to an extensive network of services. 
This was accompanied with an equivalent expansion in medical staff across the 
varied specialities. One needs to bear in mind that such heavy investment in public 
infrastructure and services is also an indirect transfer to the private sector since 
there is no personal or corporate tax.  
Public transfers     This is the third mode of redistributing the oil income. Pensions 
have become the biggest single item of transfers as a result of the public sector 
being the main employer (ElKatriri, Fatouh & Segal, 2011). There are also varied 
and wide ranging transfers included under public transfers such as debt forgiveness 
to Kuwaitis (Assiri, 2007). These transfers became an essential part of the benefits 
accruing to Kuwaiti citizens.  Additionally, price subsidies constituted another layer 
of redistribution of oil revenues. The state increasingly expanded its expenditures 
on subsidies for a number of goods and services including electricity and water. 
This system causes an over use of the subsidised good and service and creates 
distortion and inefficiency in the economic system as seen in Kuwait where 
consumption of electricity per capita is the highest in the region; similarly, water 
subsidies are so high that the tariffs barely cover the cost of production (El Katriri, 
Fatouh & Segal, 2011). The list of subsidised items includes also housing loans for 
Kuwaitis, fuel and basic food items (Al Mughni, 1993). Such high levels of 
subsidies make it politically very hard to remove or reform, and subsequently 
harder to deal with the growing budget deficit. Public expenditures became highly 
politicised as it directly affect the level of benefits accruing to Kuwaiti citizens.     
Land purchases   This last channel played a very significant redistributive role 
during the 1950s till the 1980s. Land was bought at highly inflated prices, part of 
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which was sold back to the public at low prices, thus transferring wealth to both 
sellers and purchasers of land (El Katriri, Fattouh & Segal, 2011). However, land 
purchase lost its momentum and has been attributed partly to the decline in land 
available for purchase, but also due to severe criticism as it was seen as a highly 
inequitable redistribution of wealth (Crystal, 1992). The main beneficiaries of this 
method have been Kuwait’s wealthy traditional trading families who historically 
owned most of the land bought by the government (Crystal, 2009). In addition, 
Ismael found that the programme profoundly distorted land and property prices, 
and encouraged speculation (Ismael, 1993).    
As a result of the combined effect of expanded economic role of the state and the 
redistribution of oil revenues, the social structure of the society experienced a 
significant change. So the structure the ruling family was presiding over pre the 
discovery of oil is drastically different than the social structure that emerged after 
the consolidation of oil as the basis of the Kuwaiti oil economy. The impact can be 
seen in the widening of this social base and the transformation of the traditional 
social structure of three main social groupings (Al Sabah, leading merchants and 
labourers mostly engaged in pearling and fishing) into a more complex social 
structure. Al Sabah still sits at the top of the social pyramid with merchants divided 
into two strata, the upper middle class consisting of old merchant families who were 
able to exploit the economic opportunities associated with the oil era and increase 
their wealth and status significantly; and the lower middle class consisting of small 
shop owners, workshops and those who work in services, in addition to the new 
middle class associated with the expansion of state bureaucracy and education, 
including the professional class and state bureaucrats; while most menial labourers 
come from the expatriate community (Peterson, 2014). This economic positioning 
intersects with other primordial identities and religious affiliations that make the 
process of democratisation on the one hand harder to achieve while on the other 
allowing ruling elites an expanded space to manipulate and control, and 
consequently undermining and weakening civil society as a counter power to Al 
Sabah autocratic rule.   
In summary, the discussion highlighted that Kuwait’s oil wealth enabled vast 
economic development, with its associated changes in social structure, standards of 
living, economic and political aspirations, and most significantly the consolidation 
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of an already existing impulse among Kuwaiti citizens towards demanding their 
right in participating in the decision-making process. In that sense the environment 
has been conducive in allowing a transition to democratisation in line with Potter’s 
(1997) scheme. However, other factors were pushing in the opposite direction and 
were acting as inhibitors such as societal divisions. Potter (1997) emphasises the 
importance of societal divisions in society as a prerequisite to democratisation, 
competing socio-economic interests as well as ideological and political differences 
being salient characteristics of the evolution of Kuwait during this period. However, 
these were unable to present any unified political agenda demanding the support of 
a majority to challenge Al Sabah and force political reforms, primarily because the 
manner of the evolvement of the relation of state and society was based on each 
group ensuring their share of economic and fringe benefits rather than competing 
to implement political and economic national agendas.    
 
3.3   The Evolution of the Structures of Political Participation 
This section traces how Al Sabah has been able to manage and control Kuwaitis’ 
demands for political participation from the onset of their rule.  In comparison to 
other Gulf States, Kuwait is unique in terms of its historical experience and 
experimentation with political participation.  However, despite its early adherence 
to the principle of political participation, limited and controlled form of democracy 
has emerged in Kuwait in two discernible phases.   
The first is the phase prior to independence and the promulgation of the Constitution 
in particular during the period 1921-1939, which was dominated by attempts to 
establish a form of political participation, shifting between consultative to elected, 
while the post-constitution phase (1962-1990), ushered the era of representative 
democracy through the election of a National Assembly. The discussion shall show 
that both forms fell short in delivering expected results since the experience of 
Kuwait has been riddled with interference and control by the ruling family, 
weakening and damaging at every stage the democratic process by manipulating 
and encouraging social and economic divisions in the society. More importantly 
this discussion reveals that, contrary to the prevalent view espoused by ‘rentierism’, 
the society in Kuwait was politically very active, engaged and unwavering in its 
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insistence of a share in political power despite the massive redistribution of oil 
wealth and the increased benefits to all social classes.  
Also, regional politics impacted directly on the Kuwaiti democratic experience 
whether through the interference of Saudi Arabia, or the impact of the Palestine 
question (1948), Arab nationalism, (1950s), the Lebanese Civil War (1976), the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979) and the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (Al Dae’in, 2012).  
All of which have at some point impacted on Kuwait’s process of democratisation 
as shall be evident in the following discussion, thus further undermining the 
usefulness of the ‘rentier’ concept in providing deeper understanding of the 
contested and increasingly confrontational political space that typified the relation 
between Al Sabah and Kuwaitis. The two phases of political participation are 
analysed below and these will be assessed against Potter’s (1997) preconditions for 
a transition to democracy.  
 
3.3.1   The Pre-Independence Forms of Political Participation  
 
This first endeavour to formalise political participation in the pre independence 
period was earmarked by four major attempts shifting between consultative and 
elected; the 1921 Consultative Council, the 1938 Elected Council, the 1938-1939 
Elected Council, followed by the 1939 Consultative Council. This early 
experimentation with democracy shows the political awareness and the aspiration 
of Kuwaitis to share political power with Al Sabah as well as revealing the 
challenges associated with it.  
1. The Consultative Council Al Majlis Al Estishari 1921 
The formation of the council came after strong opposition from leading merchant 
families to the authoritarian tendencies of the previous three Al Sabah rulers 
(Sheikh Mubarak and his two sons, Sheikh Jaber and Sheikh Salem) specifically 
demanding reforms and a share in the decision-making process (Al Dae’in, 2012). 
Most importantly, these families had decided to give their approval to the new ruler 
only if he agreed to listen to them and form a Consultative Council. Consequently 
Sheikh Ahmad Al Jaber (1921-1950) responded by establishing an appointed 
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Consultative Council consisting of twelve members of Kuwait’s leading merchant 
families led by Ahmad Al Saqer  (Jamal, 2007).  
The Council was limited by its counselling function without any legislative role, in 
addition the ruler had the last say, since he was only obliged to refer to the council 
to seek their opinions and he was not obliged to respond to the council’s advice (Al 
Yousifi, 2013a). Assiri (2007) asserts that the council disintegrated by itself, only 
after two months from its establishment on 29 August 1921 because its members 
were appointed according to their wealth and prestigious positions in the society 
and not according to their ability, in addition they lacked unity and were unable to 
reach decisions according to majority vote. This could be also attributed to the fact 
that it was the first representative institution with no prior experience and/or the 
rivalry among these powerful families.   
The disintegration of the council did not dampen the aspirations of Kuwaitis for 
political participation. In the period between the dissolution of the 1921 Council 
and the formation of the 1939 elected assembly, Kuwaitis’ political activity became 
much more organised to the point that a national opposition movement called Al-
Shabibah (the Youth) was established, demanding political reforms (KPB, 2013). 
In addition, the merchants wanted to temper the ruler, Sheikh Ahmad Al Jabir, 
described as being a highly “autocratic self-centred person” who, at the time of the 
‘Great Depression’, proved unwilling to share the oil revenues that began flowing 
into the coffers of the government (Crystal, 1990: 47). Another secret movement 
supported by Iraq called the National Bloc or Al Kutlah Al Wataniyah was 
established in 1938 by twelve highly educated merchants (Al Adsani, 1939:26). The 
group demanded reforms in all aspects of life in Kuwait: health, education, 
migration, and economic as well as in Kuwait’s external relations with its 
neighbours such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia (KPB, 2013).  
Political activism during this period had become more challenging to Al Sabah than 
it had been previously, to the extent that the National Bloc printed secret leaflets in 
Iraq and published them in the Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian press in an attempt to 
raise awareness among Kuwaitis (Rabi, 2000). Being less financially dependent on 
merchant families as well as having British support bolstered the resilience of the 
Amir to reject the bloc’s demands (Crystal, 1990). However, Sheikh Abdullah Al 
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Salim Al Sabah, the Crown Prince at that time, fearful of the bloc becoming a threat 
urged the Amir to open up the political arena and consequently approved the 
formation of an elected council (Assiri, 1997). 
2. The First Elected Legislative Council 1938 
The Amir granted limited elections for a fourteen-member Legislative Council, 
known as Al- Majlis Al-Tashre’i. The elections were held on 28 June 1938 with the 
right to vote granted only to 150 elite merchant families while both the Shi’i and 
the tribal communities were excluded (Al Yousif, 2013a).  In addition, others were 
deprived of participating based on their profession such as pearl divers and 
fishermen (Crystal, 1990). The elected members came from leading merchant 
families and to show their appreciation for the support of the Crown Prince, he was 
appointed the president of the council on 2 July 1938 (Al Yousif, 2013a). 
Despite the elitist nature of this process in terms of both those who were allowed to 
vote and those who were elected, the council managed to draft a ‘Basic Law’, which 
can be considered Kuwait’s first constitution, derived from the Egyptian 
constitution (Assiri, 2007). The stipulation of the law included three important 
principles: firstly, it stated that the people are the source of power; secondly, it 
affirmed the role of the Council in the promulgation of laws, especially in 
organising the state’s budget and lastly, that the president of the Council represents 
the executive authority in the state (KPB, 2013). Thus, in theory, the basic law 
succeeded in limiting Al Sabah authority and provided the legal nucleus of a 
democratic system. 
This nascent experience was brought to an end by the Amir’s intolerance to the 
Council’s attempts to temper his autocratic rule through interfering in the Amir’s 
financial privileges, demanding the dismissal of two of his personal advisors and 
questioning his decision to grant petroleum concessions to Britain (Al Adsani, 
1939). In addition, the Council sought to introduce reforms to education and 
economy (Assiri, 2007). Subsequently, the Amir dissolved the Council, on 21 
December 1938; a decision supported by those who were economically and 
administratively affected by the reforms set by the Council, such as some of the 
merchants and Britain (Al Adsani, 1939). Also, some of those who were excluded 
from participating in the council such as the tribal leaders supported the Amir’s 
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decision (Crystal, 1990), while the Shi’i demonstrated in the streets in opposition 
(Al Shuaibi, 2013).  
 
3. The Second Elected Legislative Council 1938-1939 
The second elected legislative council was established on 27 December 1938, a 
week after the dissolution of the previous council. This time eligible voters were 
raised to 400 and the members of the council to 20  (Al Yousifi, 2013a). This 
council despite being weaker than the previous one attempted to work on an 
improved draft constitution derived from the ‘Basic Law’ that the first council had 
issued. However, its proposals were firmly rejected by the Amir, who wanted to 
maintain a strong grip on the Council’s tasks. The Council, subsequently, was 
marginalised and its function altered from a legislative to a consultative one (Al 
Adsani, 1939). 
The Amir’s announcement of the dissolution of the council on 7 March 1939 led to 
violent confrontations resulting in the arrest and detention of some of the Amir’s 
opponents on 10 March 1939 (Assiri, 2007). Muhammad Al Munayyis was one of 
the merchants who had encouraged Kuwaitis to resist the ruler’s autocratic decision, 
and consequently one of his supporters, Yousif Al Marzooq, was injured, while 
Muhammed Al Qatami died, and he himself was arrested, convicted and finally 
executed (KPB, 2013). Others were jailed or fled the country (Jamal, 2007). In 
addition, the Amir closed the National Bloc’s club and arrested its members (KPB, 
2013). Due to this incident, Kuwait built its first jail for political prisoners (Crystal, 
1990). This showed early on a willingness to use violence against opposition groups 
that were perceived as threatening to the Amir rule. As explained by Brownlee the 
resilience of an authoritarian regime is attributed to its willingness to react violently 
against opposing groups as the “regime’s ability to suppress, ensures it retains 
power” (2005: 43). This ability and willingness to suppress has served Al Sabah 
well on many other occasions, as the discussion will show. 
4. The Consultative Council 1939 
In an attempt to enhance his image after the violent incidents and to calm down the 
heightened public anger, the Amir decided to establish a Consultative Council Al 
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Majles Al Estishari on 12 March 1939 consisting of only fourteen members, four 
of whom were from Al Sabah family and the rest from leading merchant families, 
and it was chaired by the Crown Prince, Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah (AL Adsani, 
1939). The Council was weak in decision-making with no real authority. As a result, 
this Council faded away by itself, especially when its members started to withdraw 
from it one by one (Jamal, 2007). 
The period from 1939, following the dismantling of both the elected and appointed 
councils, until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1962, was devoid of any 
attempts to institutionalise political participation. This was facilitated by the 
growing influence of oil wealth and the prospect of sharing this wealth, which 
created vested interests in the stability of the system. Nonetheless, the period 
witnessed the establishment of many civil associations in the form of social clubs, 
the rise of an Opposition group called the Kuwait Democratic League Al 
Monathama Al Demoqratiyah Al Kuwaitiya, in 1954, that included in its ranks 
workers, devout Muslims, intellectuals and artisans and the Islamic Guidance 
Society, in addition to a growing cooperation between Kuwaitis and Arab 
expatriates espousing the idea of Arab nationalism (Smith, 1999). This Opposition 
accused the Amir of “running Kuwait as a family fiefdom” (Rush, 1987:5). Also 
some merchant families joined the Opposition movement and tensions intensified 
further with the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 leading to a rise in anti-
monarchist and anti-British feelings (Al Dai’en, 2012). The Amir first tolerated the 
Opposition but then he started to supress it by banning, censoring and arresting its 
members (Crystal, 1990). Once again repressive mechanisms were used rather than 
attempts at consensus building or developing mechanisms to diffuse tensions and 
differences.   
In summary, this first phase of structuring political participation in the pre 
independence period shows how fraught the process has been and how contentious 
the relation between the ruling family and the four councils was. Nonetheless, the 
discussion also shows the important point about the level of political awareness of 
Kuwaitis from early on concerning their right to share in political power. This could 
be attributed to the fact that Al Sabah were chosen as the ruling family and were 
not imposed, so leading merchant families and tribal leaders perceive an equal role 
for themselves in running the affairs of their Emirate. Despite that, Al Sabah 
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succeeded in limiting the influence of these councils and subsequently consolidated 
their power in a manner that separates them and puts them above any other social 
group. Additionally, Britain supported the authoritarian rule of Al Sabah in order 
to secure its presence and interests in the Gulf region indicating clearly the influence 
of transnational and international engagement (external factors) on the process of 
democracy. The following section moves the discussion to the second phase in 
structuring the relation between state and political institutions in the post-
independence period. 
 
3.3.2   The Post-Independence Parliamentary Form of Participation  
 
The roots of institutionalising a representative form of political participation 
through the election of a National Assembly came about through the efforts of Amir 
Abdallah Al Salim Al Sabah (r.1950-1965) (Crystal and Al Shayeji, 1998). The 
independence of Kuwait from Britain on 19 June 1961, as well as other major 
political changes in the Arab world: independence of most countries, superpower 
rivalry for regional supremacy, and Iraqi claims of sovereignty over Kuwait, forced 
the Amir to initiate top-down political reforms (Herb, 2016).  Henceforth, the Amir 
decreed on 26 August 1961 the election of the Constituent Assembly Al Majlis AL 
Tashri’ai, which was given the responsibility to write a constitution and to act as a 
provisional legislative assembly (Al Dai’en, 2012). The elections to the assembly, 
which were free and fair, were held on 30 December 1961(Jamal, 2007).  Seventy-
two candidates competed for the 20 elected seats. The majority of the elected 
members came from leading merchant families but also and significantly, three 
Bedouins and two Shi’ites were elected for the first time, in addition to one liberal 
nationalist, Ahmad Al Khatib, who became over the years a powerful opposition in 
the National Assembly (ibid.). In addition, the government appointed 11 members 
of Al Sabah, increasing the membership of the assembly to 31(Assiri, 2007). 
A dispute erupted while drafting the election law between the assembly’s members 
and the government over the issue of the number of electoral districts. The draft law 
divided Kuwait into 20 districts according to government preference (Al Mershed, 
2010). The number of electoral districts is very important in any election as it 
77 
 
reflects the composition and the demography of the districts and plays a role in the 
outcomes of the elections. The government insisted on dividing Kuwait into 20 
electoral districts while the opposition sought to make Kuwait one single district 
(ibid). The opposition argued such a division would be fairer, more representative, 
and suitable for a small country like Kuwait, with its small population (Al Dai’en, 
2012). In addition, a single district would unite the Kuwaiti citizens and protect 
Kuwait from fragmentation along tribal, familial and sectarian divisions. The 
government, for its part, argued that Kuwait was still in the beginning of its political 
experience with elections and that dividing it into 20 districts would facilitate 
monitoring and organising the elections (Al Mershed, 2010).  
The government’s insistence on doing so suggests its intentions to skew the 
outcomes of the elections in its favour and to create a pro-governmental assembly 
by inserting loyal supporters into the legislative, thereby guaranteeing itself the 
majority of votes. Eventually, Amir Abdullah withdrew the original law and a 
compromise was reached. The Amir approved issuing, Law No. 25 for the year 
1961 in which, Article (1) stipulated that Kuwait would be divided into 10 districts, 
with 5 elected MPs for each district. Article (9) restricted voting eligibility to males 
of 21 years old and above; Article (12) excluded from voting non–native Kuwaitis, 
naturalized citizens, members of police and armed forces, and women (KTS, 2008). 
This law served as the legal framework for the elections of 1963, 1971, 1973 and 
1975. It was amended three times, the first, before the 1981 elections in order to 
control the composition of the National Assembly. The latter amendments of 2006 
and 2012 shall be discussed in Chapters Five and Six respectively. 
The draft constitution, with its 183 articles, was ratified by the Amir on 12 
November 1962 and went into effect on 29 January 1963 with the first elections to 
the National Assembly (Al Najjar, 2000a). The promulgation of the 1962 
Constitution signalled the start of an arduous process endeavouring to formalise and 
institutionalise political participation. Article (6) of the Constitution describes 
Kuwait’s system of government as “democratic; sovereignty is vested in the Nation 
as the source of all authority”, yet Article (4) defines Kuwait as a heredity Amirate 
and hands the Amir the ultimate power over both the executive and the legislative. 
Article (52) stipulates that the executive is invested in the Amir while Article (107) 
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stipulates that he may, by decree, dissolve the national assembly. Moreover, the 
Amir is immune and his person is inviolable in accordance to Article (54).  
Jacqueline Ismael (1993) suggests that the National Assembly was “envisioned as 
a rubber stamp” for policies set forth by the ruling class as embodied in the 
executive. However, the National Assembly emerged with a stronger spirit of 
independence than its architects envisioned. This can partly explain the fraught 
relation that the National Assembly had over the years with Al Sabah, and the 
inability of the system, as envisioned in the Constitution, to develop a stable and 
effective legislative branch and hence promote the institutionalisation of democracy 
in the country. The other factor relates directly to the stipulation of Article (107) of 
the Constitution that gives the Amir the ultimate power and also stipulates the 
assignment of the key executive posts to Al Sabah family. Under these 
circumstances the process itself is legally bound and heavily skewed allowing for 
the tug of war between the elected assembly and Al Sabah ruling family.  
As the following discussion of the successive national assemblies of (1963-1990) 
demonstrates, there have been two competing visions of what this assembly is 
meant to be and achieve. Kuwaitis saw it as the political institution that symbolises 
their share in power and gives them a right to fulfil their constitutional obligations 
and be part of the decision-making process.  Al Sabah, as argued by Crystal, saw 
its role as a mean to “reinforce the division in the Kuwaiti politics between the 
ruling family and the rest of the people in which the right to rule and the highest 
posts were kept for Al Sabah whereas the assembly was open for everyone else” 
(Crystal, 1990:85). The discussion indicates that Al Sabah used their ultimate 
power of dissolving the assembly to impose their vision and by doing so they have 
undermined this experiment and stunted the development of what could have 
become a very effective institution for the functioning of a more democratic 
political system.  
The literature on democracy acknowledges the crucial fact that state domination 
over society undermines the possibility of transition to democracy. In a further 
example of this, some of the tactics and strategies used during the elections 
increased and augmented Kuwaitis segmented identities and loyalties and increased 
sectarian tensions in order to enhance the power and the relevance of Al Sabah as 
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the unifier among these diverse cleavages. And by doing so Al Sabah have in effect 
undermined opposition politics and the legislative arm of the state by segmenting 
political agendas of the various groups to reflect limited interests. Thus making the 
political process excessively partisan and parochial resulting in hindering the 
development of national unity; a significant precondition to democratisation as 
identified in Potter’s (1997) scheme. The next section reveals the impact of this on 
the process of democratisation and the prevalent political culture.     
 
3.4   The Successive National Assemblies 1963-1990 
The discussion of the successive national assemblies during the period 1963-1990 
is necessary in order to examine the relation between the state and this important 
political institution for transition to democracy. For Potter’s (1997) scheme, this 
relation is a significant indicator of whether the country is institutionalising 
democratic practices and establishing mechanisms for cooperation between 
executive and legislative bodies or if the ruling family is manipulating these aspects 
that denote the presence of a democratic system, such as regular parliamentary 
elections, for regime maintenance. The discussion also reveals the strength of/or 
lack of civil society in countering the executive power, another significant indicator 
in Potter’s (1997) scheme. The following analysis traces the development of the 
political participation by examining each National Assembly separately, and then 
draws a conclusion about the democratic process during this period. 
1. The First National Assembly 1963-1965     
The first elected National Assembly on 23 January 1963 set the tone for the 
relationship between this nascent political institution and Al Sabah. Despite the fact 
that this was Kuwait’s first experience with general elections, the level of 
participation (voter turnout standing at 85 per cent) showed voters’ enthusiasm 
towards the process and their general enthusiasm for political participation but the 
number of voters was limited to 16,889 voters (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2: Political Participation in the First National Assembly 1963 
Date of Election  Number of 
Electoral Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible voters 
Number of Voters  
 
 
23 January 1963 
 
10 
 
205 
 
16889 
 
14335 
Source: MOI,2017 
 
The assembly was proactive and some of its members were robust critics of the 
government’s economic policies as well as foreign policy (Al Shuaibi, 2013). 
However, it witnessed only two interpellations, one of which was addressed to a 
minister who was a member of the royal family (Rush, 1987). Both interpellations 
did not affect any kind of accountability; since the first was withdrawn and the 
second was a mere discussion of the issue, see Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Interpellations in the First National Assembly 1963 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs that Presented the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
 
1 
Mohammed Al Rasheed 
 
4 June 1963 
Minister of Social 
Affairs 
Abdullah Al Roudhan 
The Interpellation 
was withdrawn. 
 
2 
 
Rashed Al Tawheed 
 
22 February 1964 
Minister of Electricity 
and Water 
Sheikh Jaber Al Ali Al 
Salim Al Sabah 
The discussion of 
the interpellation 
took place. 
Source: KNA, 2016 
 
Despite this limited ability to hold the government accountable, the Amir, Sheikh 
Sabah III, who feared this emerging power, launched a campaign to discredit the 
assembly claiming that “it was a campaign to protect Kuwait from riots and to 
protect the ruling family position”(Crystal 1990: 85). The Minister of Interior and 
Defence, Sheikh Saad Al Abdullah, also joined the Amir in his campaign to ‘save’ 
Kuwait. In his public address, he argued that “the government was very lenient in 
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the past ... (but) now ...finds itself compelled to strike with iron for maintaining 
peace and order so that our people can live in happiness” (Crystal 1990: 85). Other 
repressive measures were also taken such as tightening public freedoms and civil 
rights, limiting the registration of clubs and associations as well as closing down 
many publications (Crystal, 1990). The tension was heightened when the Amir 
imposed restrictions on the local press and closed down two newspapers and also 
expelled many expatriates from the country (Jamal, 2007). Consequently eight 
progressive members of the assembly resigned followed by the resignation of the 
chairman of the assembly (Rush, 1987). Subsequently, eight pro-governmental MPs 
were elected to replace those who had resigned (Al Shuaibi, 2015).    
 
The above restrictions and imposition of control over the First National Assembly, 
together with limitations on civil society organisations and the media left Kuwait at 
this juncture with both a non-independent national assembly and a civil society that 
suffered from the state’s intrusion. However, the mere introduction of elections and 
the creation of the National Assembly can be regarded as positive developments 
towards democratisation from the point of view of Potter’s (1997) scheme, despite 
the preponderance of the state. 
2. The Second National Assembly 1967-1970      
In his determination to avoid a similar strong assembly, the Amir used two main 
strategies to ensure a more pliant assembly for the second round of parliamentary 
elections. As mentioned earlier, “Al Sabah had been involved in a process of 
incorporating tribes as political allies in order to widen the loyal base of their rule 
and to use them as a counter force for the Opposition” (Crystal, 1990: 88). The 
tribes were already offered citizenship in return for joining the army and the police 
(Fadalah, 2012). The government’s attention to the tribes now shifted to ensuring 
“electoral loyalty and a process of political re-tribalisation commenced” (Crystal, 
1990: 88). This process required the tribes to run candidates for the assembly, who 
were first elected through tribal primaries (Al Fadalah, 2010). The Amir’s second 
strategy focused on the “breaking down of the clan loyalties by replacing them with 
smaller family loyalties and another larger tribal loyalty” (Crystal, 1990: 89). 
Subsequently, the elections manifested their rising electoral power and the 
alienation of the Opposition. 
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The election held on 25 January 1967 was contested by 222 candidates, eligible 
voters increased significantly by 59 per cent to reach 26,796, however, voter turner 
was 66 per cent, a huge reduction from the 85 per cent turnout of the previous 
assembly, see Table 3.4. As a result of the machinations described above, the 
presence of a progressive opposition was reduced to only four members, but they 
were very vocal with their protestations that the election was fraudulent and not 
representative of the citizens (Assiri, 2007).  
 
 
 
Table 3.4:  Political Participation in the Second National Assembly 1967 
Date of Election Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Number of 
Voters 
 
25 January 1967 
 
10 
 
222 
 
26796 
 
17590 
Source : MOI,2017  
 
Anger spread in Kuwait as it transpired that these protesting members were correct 
and the election had not been transparent, and cases of fraudulent behaviour, ballot 
stuffing and miscounting in favour of government candidates occurred (Jamal, 
2007). Thirty-eight candidates signed a petition arguing that the government had 
forged the elections (Al Shuaibi, 2011). Moreover, seven elected members 
boycotted the assembly’s sessions in protest (Al Dai’en, 2012). The assembly 
subsequently remained weak and had no real active role or any impact on the 
political process throughout its term, witnessing only one interpellation, which 
ended up being withdrawn (see Table 3.4). The year 1967 was labelled as Senat Al 
Tazweer, meaning the ‘year of fraud’ due to the interferences of the government in 
the election (ibid.). 
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Table 3.5: Interpellations in the Second National Assembly 1967 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
 
1 
Sulaiman Al Douwaikh 
Hamad Al Ayaar 
Nasser Al Osaimi 
 
3 November 1968 
Minister of   
Justice 
Khalid Aljassar 
Some of the MPs requested 
forming a committee to 
investigate the issues that 
were discussed during the 
interpellation. However, no 
agreement was reached so 
the interpellation was 
withdrawn 
Source: KNA, 2016 
 
The government’s blatant interference and manipulation of the divisions in the 
Kuwaiti society was intended to limit the constitutional role and the effectiveness 
of the assembly as a counter balance to executive power. Thus the actions of the 
ruling family were pushing Kuwait further away from institutionalising democracy 
while at the same time appearing as champions of democracy by allowing elections 
to take place.  
3. The Third National Assembly 1971-1975        
Due to the weakened position of the previous assembly, as a result of government 
interferences, the election to the Third Assembly held on 23 January 1971 had a 
lower number of candidates standing at only 183 (Al Shuaibi, 2011). Despite the 
fact that eligible voter numbers were much higher than previous elections, 
increasing by 50 per cent and standing at 40,246, only 20,785 voted, so the turnout 
was lower, at 51 per cent (see Table 3.6).  Assiri argues, “the low number of voters 
is related to their anger at the government’s meddling in the previous elections of 
1967, and being hesitant that the government may once again interfere and 
manipulate the elections” (2007:137). 
 
Table 3.6: Political Participation in the Third National Assembly 1971 
Date of Election Number of 
Electoral Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Number of 
Voters 
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23 January 1971 
 
10 
 
183 
 
40246 
 
20785 
Source: MOI,2017 
 
Two major interrelated regional events took place during the term of this assembly, 
the Arab-Israeli war, October 1973, and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices as 
a result of the Arab embargo in response to the support America and the West 
offered Israel in the war. The price of oil between October 1973 and January 1974 
increased fourfold from 3 USD to 12 USD (The Guardian, 2011). This sudden and 
massive increase in oil price provided Al Sabah with further financial independence 
and an opportunity to achieve greater economic prosperity, changing the whole 
dynamics of the Arab region, shifting the economic and political importance to 
Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states, ushering a new era earmarked by the 
dominance of oil as the major factor that underpinned Arab Gulf States and the 
politics of the region.   
In the meantime, to ensure control over the results of election, the government 
passed a law amending the electoral law, which resulted in some gerrymandering 
by reconfiguring some of the districts to the benefit of certain social groups, in 
particular, the tribes (Al Dai’en, 2012). The assembly witnessed three major 
interpellations that focused on the economy and oil revenues through twice 
questioning the Minister of Finance and Oil, on the first occasion the assembly only 
discussed the issue while on the second and third occasions the ministers survived 
the vote of no confidence, attesting to the influence of the government in the 
assembly, see Table 3.7.  
Table 3.7 Interpellations in the Third National Assembly of 1971 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the Interpellations 
1 Khalid Al Fouhaid 
 
Minister of 
Finance and Oil 
The discussion of the 
interpellation took place but no 
decision was made 
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Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the Interpellations 
8 December 1973 Abdularahman  
Salim Alateeqi 
2 Sami Al Monias 
Abdullah Al Naibari 
Ali Thounayan Al 
Qanim 
19 March 1974 
Minister of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Khalid 
Soulaiman Al 
Adsani 
The discussion of the 
interpellation took place and a 
request for a vote of no 
confidence was presented but 
the minister survived the vote: 
13 voted for and 20 refrained. 
33 MPs were in attendance 
3 Adbullah Al Naibari 
Ahmad Al Nafisi 
Salim Al Marzooq 
21 May 1974 
Minister of 
Finance and Oil 
Abdularahman 
Salim Alateeqi 
The discussion of the 
interpellation took place and a 
vote of no confidence was 
presented but the minister 
survived the vote: 19 for, 1 
against and 13 refrained. 33 
MPS were in attendance. 
Source: KNA, 2016. 
The relation between this assembly and government continued in a similar vein to 
the previous assemblies with the influence of the executive far exceeding the power 
of the assembly to counterbalance it effectively.     
4. The Fourth National Assembly 1975-1976          
The Fourth Assembly was elected on 27 January 1975. Voter turnout was 60 per 
cent and with a much lower number of registered voters, standing at 31,848 and 
number of candidates at 255, exceedingly low in comparison with the previous 
assembly, as seen in Table 3.8. This assembly lasted a year and a half only. Even 
though the assembly did not witness any interpellations, its members were vocal 
and focused on arguing significant matters such as press laws, oil treaties, stock 
market regulations, financial planning, price controls and state corruption (KNA, 
2015b). Most importantly, the assembly was unflinchingly vocal in criticising the 
Amir and his family (Assiri, 2007). In addition, the assembly had strong ties with 
opposition forces outside Kuwait in countries such as Oman, Bahrain and Palestine, 
which embarrassed the Kuwaiti government and affected its relation with many 
countries (Crystal, 1990). Crystal points out that Saudi Arabia might have also 
played a role in the dissolution of the assembly due to “their opposition to the very 
concept of parliamentary democracy” (Crystal, 1990:89). The Saudis “consistently 
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have urged Kuwaiti rulers to crack down on their opponents” because they are 
afraid of its impact on their own country (Tétreault, 2000:92).   
 
Table 3.8: Political Participation in the Fourth National Assembly 1975 
Date of Election Number of Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Number of 
Voters 
 
 
 
27 January 1975 
 
10 
 
255 
 
         52993 
 
31848 
Source: MOI,2017 
 
On 29 August 1976, the Amir used his constitutional power to dissolve the 
assembly unconstitutionally as its suspension lasted over four and a half years 
(KNA, 2015b). Although Article (107) of the Constitution gives the Amir the power 
to dissolve the assembly by decree in which the reasons for dissolution are indicated, 
he is bound to hold the election for the new assembly within a period not exceeding 
two months from the date of dissolution. If the election is not held within the said 
period, the dissolved assembly shall be restored to its full constitutional authority 
and shall meet immediately as if the dissolution had not taken place. 
The imbalance in the relation between the Amir and the assembly is evident in the 
fact that the dissolution lasted over four years and assembly members did not use 
their constitutional right to meet “as if the dissolution did not take place”.  This is 
an indication that either the assembly was too weak or too fearful to exercise what 
was rightfully given to it by the Constitution in the face of Al Sabah. However, the 
Amir fulfilled his constitutional obligation by providing four reasons to justify the 
suspension of the assembly. Firstly, he put forward procedural criticisms, such as 
the delay in issuing and implementing laws within an appropriate period of time, 
and wasting the time of the assembly through debating marginal issues and 
attacking the ministers. Secondly, the Amir claimed that members of the assembly 
were putting their own interests above the interest of the country whilst using their 
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positions for personal benefits. Thirdly, he pointed to the critical conditions that the 
Gulf region was going through and which needed to be urgently addressed. Lastly, 
he suggested, “Kuwait needs a democratic system derived from its own tradition 
and heritage.” (Assiri, 2007:129).  
In addition to dismissing the assembly, the Amir suspended some of the provisions 
of the Constitution, in particular four articles relating to political and civil rights 
and closed down five newspapers, and dissolved the councils of five public 
associations that had issued a declaration against the Amir, including the Teachers 
Association, Writers Association, Independent Club or Istiqlal Club, Press 
Association and Lawyers Association (Al Mdaires, 2010). These repressive 
measures were meant to weaken and silence the Opposition and restrict political 
and civil rights and freedoms. The result was four years and a half of a complete 
absence of institutionalised political participation.  
Due to the absence of the assembly, the Opposition turned to mosques as an 
alternative venue for expressing their political demands. For example, members of 
the Opposition held frequent meetings at a Shi’a mosque the Al Sahaba’an where 
the liberal opposition leader, Ahmad Al Khatib called for the restoration of the 
democratic system in Kuwait (Al Mdaires, 1999). Subsequently the Imam of the 
mosque, Abbas Al Mahri, was deprived of his Kuwaiti citizenship along with 
eighteen members of his family, after which they were all deported to Iran, however, 
after the 1990 Gulf War, they were given back their citizenship (Al Shuaibi, 2013). 
Such repressive measures combined with the lengthy absence of the National 
Assembly aimed at weakening and silencing the Opposition. Anti-democratic 
influences from outside Kuwait’s borders especially from Saudi Arabia have had 
an impact too. The Saudis expressed active support for the Amir’s repressive 
posture towards the Opposition, as the Saudi regime was afraid that the successful 
establishment of an independent National Assembly would trigger demands for 
similar changes within Saudi Arabia itself (Crystal, 1990).  
Saudi Arabia’s attitudes and perceptions have had a negative impact on the 
promotion of democratic values in Kuwait and other Gulf Monarchies. Conversely, 
as Anoush Ehteshami (2003: 57) argues in his evaluation of the impact of the 
Iranian revolution, apart from “exporting its Islamic revolution” Tehran was in the 
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1980s a model for “political reforms,” and therefore the revolution was regarded as 
a threat to the traditional tribal rulers of the Gulf monarchies. According to Falah 
Al Mdaires (2010), the Iranian revolution affected “the internal political situation 
of Kuwait” in a manner that encouraged Sheikh Jaber to restore the National 
Assembly. Thus in an unexpected move, the government declared that elections to 
the Fifth National Assembly would be held on 23 February 1981 (Jamal, 2003). 
Such action indicates that under certain circumstances a return to even the 
semblance of democracy can be a better protection to the regime than the mere 
dependency on repressive means. The disparate influences on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
on the one hand and Iran on the other, attests to Potter’s (1997) emphasis on the 
impact of transnational AND international engagement as either hindering or 
promoting the process of democracy. In this instance, because of events in Iran, the 
Amir chose to open up the political system and return to parliamentary life, albeit 
after the Amir used two tactics to ensure a pliable assembly as the following 
discussion shows.  
5. The Fifth National Assembly 1981-1985     
Four and a half years after the suspension of the Fourth National Assembly, the 
fifth elections were held on 23 February 1981. The number of candidates was much 
higher than usual at 447 and voter turnout was at its highest, at around ninety 
percent of the total registered of 42,005, quite a jump from the previous election, 
see Table 3.9. Prior to the elections, Sheikh Jaber used two tactics to manipulate 
and influence the outcomes of the elections. The Amir’s first tactic involved 
forming a commission to amend the electoral Law No (25) of the year 1961 and 
alter the number of the constituencies from ten to twenty-five and decrease the 
number of representative/candidates of each district from five to two only (Crystal, 
1990). The second tactic was to offer large numbers of Bedouins who were 
migrating from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, first-category citizenship, in order to make 
them eligible to vote and run for office (Al Fadalah, 2012). Mary Ann Tétreault 
(2000:105) observed that the new “voters were geographically concentrated…[as] 
a result of intentional and epiphenomenal settlement patterns that have produced 
significant, though far from universal, residential segregation in Kuwait, not only 
by tribe but also by sect, income group, age cohort, nationality, and marital status”.  
The amendment of the electoral law was a top-down measure aimed at weakening 
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the electoral chances of the “liberal and left opposition and reduce the size of other 
voting blocs such as urban, Shi’i and larger tribes, though not of the tribes per se 
while simultaneously consolidating Al Sabah control over the assembly.”(Tétreault, 
2000:172). 
Table 3.9: Political Participation in Fifth National Assembly 1981 
Date of Election Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
 
Number of 
Voters 
 
 
23 February 1981 
 
25 
 
447 
 
42005 
 
37689 
Source: MOI,2017 
The amendment directly affected the composition of the assembly by producing a 
Sunni religious conservative body of legislators. Tribal forces won 27 seats while 
the liberals lost heavily. Once again accusations of government interference 
appeared, as had been the case in the 1967 elections (Crystal, 1990). The emerging 
conservative Islamist composition of the assembly consisted of two main streams 
of Sunni Muslims: the Al Ikhwan Al Mosalemain (Muslim Brotherhood) of the 
Social Reform Society (SRS) Jame’yat Al Eslah Al Ejtemai’i and the Salafiyyin of 
the Islamic Heritage Society Jame’yat Al Torath Al Islami (IHS) (Al Mdaires, 2010). 
 
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyyin had a radical religious agenda 
focused on social and religious issues. They worked against women suffrage, 
passed a bill restricting naturalisation to only Muslims. Furthermore, in 1982 they 
moved to tighten public freedoms and called for banning Christmas celebrations, 
and had a proposal to force Kuwaiti women to wear the veil (Al Mdaires, 2010). In 
1983 they also banned alcohol for the diplomatic community (Crystal, 1990). In 
addition, they spread their power and their ideas outside the assembly; they won the 
elections of the Student Union, Teacher’s Association, half of the Cooperative 
Councils (Kuwaiti subsidised supermarkets) and dominated the Municipality 
Council and many other clubs (ibid.). 
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More than that, the conservative Sunni Islamists were persistent in their demand for 
a change to Article (2) of the Constitution, which the government was not in favour. 
The article states that Shari’a (Islamic law) is a one of the sources of Kuwaiti 
legislation (law), the Islamists wanted a change in which the Shari’a would become 
the one and only main fundamental source of law instead of being one of the sources 
of legislation and law (Al Mdiares, 2010). The Shi’i did not support their Sunni 
counterparts in this proposal. Tétreault attributes the Shi’a refusal to change Article 
(2) to the fact that the Shi’a are a “minority group and the likelihood that any 
interpretation of Shari’a chosen to guide Kuwaiti law would discriminate against 
their tradition” (2000: 58). 
 
This assembly was highly controversial as a result of the amendment of the election 
law and the gerrymandering of the electoral districts that produced a more 
conservative assembly dominated by Islamists and tribal forces. The assembly 
engaged unsuccessfully in three marginal interpellations as two of the 
interpellations were withdrawn while the third was dismissed, as seen in Table 3.10. 
The ineffectiveness of this assembly, due primarily to its focus on a religious 
agenda, becomes more glaring when one takes into account that little discussion 
took place during its term of one of the major economic crises of the country, 
namely, the collapse of Souq al Manakh; the technically illegal and unofficial stock 
market. One reason could be that Souq al Manakh was dominated by several older 
wealthy Kuwaiti families who themselves had strong influence on the assembly and 
government policy and/or the nature of the composition of the assembly and its 
religious agenda. This stock market emerged after the small crash of the official 
market in 1977 when the government, after bailing out the affected investors 
introduced stricter regulations. With oil revenues at their highest, new found wealth 
flooded the market creating a new appetite for investment that led to unofficial 
trading to what became known as Souq al Manakh.  (SOURCE) 
Table 3.10: Interpellations in the Fifth National Assembly 1981 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting 
the Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the Interpellations 
1 Khalifa Al Jeri Minister of Health The Minister refused giving any 
information therefore the 
Legislative Committee in the 
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27 January 1982 
Abdulrahman Al 
Awadhi 
assembly sent a report about the 
interpellation’s main issues to the 
Constitutional Court. The Court 
decided that the assembly keep 
the report and that the topic of the 
interpellation was over 
2 Mishari Al Anjeri 
Khalid Al Sultan 
Khalid Al Joumai’an 
30 November 1983 
Minister of Social 
Affairs 
Hamed Al Roujaib 
The interpellation was 
withdrawn by the MPs who 
requested it and the assembly 
accepted their request on 20 
December 1983 
3 Ahmad Al Tokhiam 
1 May 1984 
Minister of Electricity 
and Water 
Khalaf Al Khalaf 
The interpellation was 
withdrawn by the MP who 
requested it and the assembly 
accepted his request 
Source: KNA,2016 
In August 1982, the bubble burst when a dealer presented a post-dated cheque that 
bounced (Hijazi, 1982). By September, the Ministry of Finance shut down the Souq 
and its investigation revealed a value of worthless outstanding checks of 94 billion 
USD (Lewis, 1983). Consequently, the government devised a complicated set of 
policies embodied in the Difficult Credit Facilities Resettlement Programme. The 
implementation of the programme was still incomplete in 1990 when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. The repercussions of this collapse reverberated across the Gulf region and 
the whole banking system in Kuwait. The debts left all banks in Kuwait insolvent 
except one bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, which survived intact. The 
government had to bail these banks out too, setting a precedent that many traders, 
investors and consumers expect the government to do in times of crisis (ibid.) 
Such prevalent attitudes expose the dichotomy of the society; economic 
dependency on the state on the one hand while simultaneously aspiring for political 
control and power and a larger role in decision-making process. This financial 
turmoil coupled with the prolonged Iran-Iraq war and the deepening of sectarian 
tensions in Kuwait and the entire Gulf region caused high levels of apprehension 
and anxiety. Consequently, the government, in its desire to limit the Islamist control 
of the assembly, supported the secular and liberals against the Islamists in the 
following election; a classical example of the shifting patronage to different 
political groupings in accordance to the needs of regime maintenance.  
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6.  The Sixth National Assembly 1985-1986    
The election for the Sixth Assembly was held on 20 February 1985 with a huge 
reduction in the number of candidates, from the high 447 of the previous election 
to 231 candidates; however, voter turnout was high, at just over 85 per cent of the 
number of registered voters of 48,368 (see Table 3.11). 
 
 
Table 3.11: Political Participation in the Sixth National Assembly 1985 
Date of Election Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of Eligible 
Voters 
Number of 
Voters 
 
20 February 1985 
 
          25 
 
231 
 
56848 
 
48368 
Source: MOI,2017 
 
The results of the elections returned the progressive Democratic bloc led by Ahmad 
Al khatib with a total of thirteen seats. To limit the influence of the Islamists the 
government backed Al Khatib, who lost his seat in the 1981 election (Crystal, 
1990). The Islamists were reduced to six seats while the Shi’a won four seats and 
the tribal representatives won twenty-one seats (Al Mdaires, 1999). This assembly 
was very vocal as the adverse and costly financial and economic consequences of 
the collapse of the Souq al Manakh became more evident. Debates over its collapse 
became more pointed at the government. Also as a consequence of the collapse, the 
assembly actively sought to fight corruption on many fronts. It declined many 
governmental projects, compelled the Minister of Justice to resign, opening the 
doors to the questioning of the Minister of Oil and forcing his resignation, which 
was rejected by the government (KNA, 2015b).   
 
The assembly requested the dismissal of both the Minister of Interior and Minister 
of Oil many times. Al Sabah during this critical time of the Iran-Iraq war were 
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highly concerned with Kuwait’s internal security and demanded that Kuwaitis show 
national solidarity and more attention to this external threat than to the internal 
issues with which the assembly was concerned about, especially the questioning of 
ministers and the criticism of the ruling family (Assiri, 2007). The assembly 
witnessed 5 interpellations; the interpellation of the Minister of Justice and Awqaf 
was withdrawn as the minister resigned while the rest of the interpellations were 
presented in the same day and were not discussed due to the dissolution of the 
assembly, see Table 3.12.  
Table 3.12: Interpellations in the Sixth National Assembly 1985 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
1 Mubarak Al 
Douwailah 
Hamed Al Joua’an 
Dr. Ahmad Al Rubai 
 
16 April 1985 
Minister of Justice 
and Awqaf 
Salman Aldouaij Al 
Sabah 
The interpellation was 
discussed and a vote of no 
confidence was 
requested. However, the 
minister resigned 
2 Mohammed Al 
Morshed 
Faisal Al Sane’i 
Ahmad Baqer 
 
24 June 1986 
Minister of Transport 
Eissa Al Mazidi 
The interpellation was 
not discussed because the 
assembly was dissolved 
on 2 July 1986 
3 Khamees Oqab 
Sami Al Monais 
 
24 June 1986 
Minister of Finance 
Jasem Al Khorafi 
The interpellation was 
not discussed because the 
assembly was dissolved 
on 2 July1986 
4 Mishari Al Anjiri 
Abdullah Al Nafisi 
Jasem Al Qatami 
 
24 June 1986 
Minister of Oil and 
Industry 
Sheikh Ali Al Khalifa 
Al Sabah 
The interpellation was 
not discussed because the 
assembly was dissolved 
on 2 July 1986 
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5 Rashed Al Johailan 
Ahmad Al Shourai’an 
 
1 July 1986 
Minister of Education 
Dr. Hassan Al 
Ebrahim 
The interpellation was 
not discussed because the 
assembly was dissolved 
on 2 July 1986 
Source : KNA, 2016  
 
 
The request of four interpellations on the same day caused a tense political 
atmosphere in June 1986 and the Amir consequently dissolved the assembly and 
called for communication with the public via the ministers and the diwaniyyas 
arguing that those “institutions are more representative of citizens than the 
assembly” (Tétreault, 2000: 67). This shift to the informal gathering of the 
diwaniyya as a substitutive to the constitutionally guaranteed elected representative 
of the people is a clear sign of Al Sabah’s unwillingness to share power and 
unwillingness to allow the MPS to carry out their duties as stipulated in the 
Constitution. 
 
The term diwaniyya refers to an informal gathering of family and friends that takes 
place in private houses but is a quasi-public event because “outsiders” attend 
regularly in order to discuss different issues and the daily concerns of Kuwaitis. 
Several scholars; Neil Hicks & Ghanim Al-Najjar (in Norton, 1995) and Tetreault 
(2011), denote the diwaniyya as part of Kuwaiti civil society due to the role it plays 
during elections as candidates cannot run for office or win without visiting the 
diwaniyyas in their local districts, where they can meet with the voters, present their 
electoral agenda and discuss their main concerns. Its importance increased during 
times of assembly suspension especially this latest one, as it became the main access 
route to the authorities as well as the place to debate and air opinions on political, 
economic and social issues. Thus the Amir’s move to restrict political participation 
to the diwaniyyas did not stifle dissent. Dahim Al Qahtani (Journalist), observes 
that “from a positive point of view, I would say that it led to the organising of 
political blocs and to confronting the one-man rule…. Monday’s dawaween 
enabled also the flourishing of youth’s political role” (Interview, 2013).  
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This traditional gathering place, by creating a space for political debate, became a 
source of bottom-up pressures for reforms. As emphasised by Potter (1997) and 
Niblock (2005), civil society institutions are significant conduits for 
democratisation and the diwaniyyas in Kuwait became such a conduit, especially in 
the absence of the National Assembly. This retreat from the constitutional 
institution and reverting to the traditional meeting place of ‘diwaniyya’ angered 
many Kuwaitis and increased the tension between state and society. Hamad Al 
Abdullah (assistant professor at Kuwait University) assesses the impact of the 
suspension of the Sixth National Assembly as follows: 
The suspension has a very negative impact on Kuwait’s political life:  firstly, 
it makes the articles of the constitution idle, secondly it makes the legislative 
branch of the state idle also, and thirdly it maintains the upper hand of the 
executive branch while keeping the public and the parliament absent. More 
importantly during such periods of suspensions we have a one –man rule and 
one man makes all the decisions (Interview, 2013). 
Al Abdullah elaborates further on how the suspensions of the elected assemblies 
limits the ability of the people to monitor the government’s performance and 
holding it accountable, commenting that 
We have already seen what that led to. It led the government to making many 
mistakes, to corruption, to mismanagement of public funds and finally we 
were invaded by Iraq in 1990. In addition, it led to widespread frustration 
among people when their freedoms were restricted, besides issuing the law of 
banning public gatherings and meetings. I believe that such suspensions also 
lead to consolidating opposition and increasing public pressure and demands 
for bringing more political reforms (Interview, 2013).   
The assembly remained absent until the government was forced to respond to 
mounting bottom-up pressure and popular demands to restore the assembly and 
return to constitutional life. However, the Amir responded to these pressures not by 
reinstating the National Assembly but by establishing instead Al Majlis Al-Watani 
National Council, a consultative body, which was interrupted in 1990 due to the 
Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait (Al Jasim, 1992).  
7.  The National Council Al Majlis Al Watani 1990 
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The importance of discussing the creation of Al-Majlis Al-Watani in 1990, despite 
its very short life (two months) lies in the fact that it exposed the ruling family’s 
determination to prevent a return to the stipulations of the Constitution, thus 
demonstrating astounding reluctance to relinquish their absolute control on the 
process of government and decision-making. Ironically the pressure that was 
mounting on Al Sabah to restore the National Assembly came mostly from the 
diwaniyyas which the Amir, Sheikh Jaber, identified as a legitimate source of 
political activism, as indicated above. The Opposition used their weekly gatherings 
in the diwaniyyas effectively, thus successfully mobilising Kuwaitis to support the 
demand for the restoration of the National Assembly. Their efforts had resulted in 
a petition signed by 30,000 Kuwaiti citizens, approximately 48 per cent of the 
citizens who are eligible to vote and run for the office (Assiri, 2007). Sheikh Jaber 
accused his opponents of “being provocative and irresponsible”; the Opposition 
responded by criticising the government, defending their strategy of mobilising 
large numbers of citizens to make public demands on the Amir as the only way to 
reinstate the Constitution and the parliament (Tétreault, 2000: 76). 
Eventually, the government represented by the Crown Prince and the Prime 
Minister, had to respond to the mounting pressure and called for a national dialogue 
with prominent Kuwaiti figures to avoid the escalation of an already tense situation 
(Assiri, 2007). Subsequently, Sheikh Jaber called for the election of a new council 
calling it Al Majlis Al Watani (Al Mdaires, 1996). The Council was composed of 
fifty elected representatives, while Sheikh Jaber appointed an additional twenty-
five members (Karam, 1995). Thus it was an assembly, which had integrated both 
mechanisms of election and appointment in order for Al Sabah to have more control 
over it.   
Sheikh Jaber set the agenda for the council by making it a consultative body, 
empowered only to offer advice and appraise Kuwaiti’s previous experience with 
elected representation. The Amiri decree stated specifically that it was “designed 
for a transitional period during which it will have a special assignment of evaluating 
the country’s previous parliamentary experience and proposing controls for the 
future parliamentary process so as to avert a third crisis” (Assiri, 2007:131). 
Muhammed Al Jasim, however, suggests that the National Council was a strategy 
used by the government to escape mounting public pressure and as a substitute for 
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the National Assembly by advocating that “this would be the best substitute for the 
citizens instead of the National Assembly” (1992:104). 
The Opposition showed its disapproval of what they saw as the Amir’s cosmetic 
reform and encouraged the people not to run or vote for the Council (Jamal, 2007). 
Consequently, Sheikh Jaber ordered the police to arrest and detain some individuals 
who were active in this opposition (Karam, 1995).  However, this action angered 
many Kuwaitis and he was forced to release them. The press remained under 
censorship and the government pursued its plans to recruit candidates to run for the 
Council (Assiri, 2007). The government claimed voter turnout was 60 per cent of 
eligible voters while the opposition refuted this and insisted voter turnout was as 
low as 40 per cent and that the government had inflated the number to give some 
legitimacy to the newly established Council (Karam, 1995). The official numbers, 
as seen in Table 3.13, indicate that the number of eligible voters was over 62 
thousand, a huge jump from previous elections, while the number of those who 
voted was around 39 thousand approximating the declared 60 per cent voters’ 
turnout that was claimed by the government (Assiri,2007).  
 
Table 3.13: Political Participation in the National Council 1990 
Date of Election Number of 
Candidates 
Number of Eligible Voters 
 
Number of 
Voters 
 
10 June 1990 
 
348 
 
62123 
 
 
38683 
Source: (Assiri, 2007) 
 
Assiri suggested that the larger numbers of voters came from external districts 
(outside Kuwait city) while the number of voters from the internal areas (the Kuwait 
city) was low (2007: 103).  Furthermore, he indicates that those who voted might 
have been forced to vote in order to avoid the wrath of the government. However, 
in less than two months, this highly contested move by the government came to an 
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abrupt end when the Iraqi President Saddam Husain invaded Kuwait on 2 August 
1990. 
To summarise, the discussion above of the five assemblies elected during the period 
1963-1985 indicate the difficulties the elected assemblies faced in sharing political 
power with Al Sabah and in becoming an effective legislative arm of the state. 
These difficulties stem from the fact that Al Sabah succeeded in creating structures 
of segmentation and divisions that made it much harder for a unified national 
agenda to emerge and press for reforms. These diverse segments pushed for their 
own parochial interests and concerns and as such guaranteed that Al Sabah 
remained the only unifying force, maintaining dominance over both the economic 
and political processes.  Moreover, Al Sabah resorted to manipulations and ploys 
to affect the outcome of elections and the composition of the National Assembly to 
suit the needs of the ruling elites. But that did not stifle the Opposition or silence 
the National Assembly and hence the need remained, on some occasions, to use 
their ultimate power by dissolving the National Assembly twice during this period.  
Nonetheless, the discussion showed also that Al Sabah despite their immense power 
could not always ignore bottom-up pressures or depend solely on repressive 
measures and means to secure regime survival, as indicated by the establishment of 
the National Council of 1990. Although that fell short of the demands of Kuwaitis 
for a return to the National Assembly, the move was an appeasement to the people 
and gave the semblance of support to peoples’ need to participate in the decision-
making process. As Potter (1997) and Diamond (1992) indicate that for 
democratisation to take root a shift away from the dominance of the state over 
society must occur. In this sense, one can conclude that by 1991, the situation in 
Kuwait can be best described as a constant tug of war between the National 
Assembly and a very strong state dominated by Al Sabah family. 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
Several conclusions can be made taking into consideration both Potter’s (1997) 
conceptual scheme and Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy. As can be noted 
from above, Kuwait on one level fulfilled Dahl’s interpretation of what democracy 
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means: participation, contestation, and civil and political liberties. Nonetheless, 
these existed in a restricted and heavily controlled form leading sometimes to total 
suppression of these three elements. Therefore this period can be described as an 
attempt to institutionalise democratic practices but ended up creating a political 
system that suffers from stagnation and impasse with a highly contentious relation 
between state and society, specifically between Al Sabah and the National 
Assembly.  
In regards to Potter’s (1997) scheme, while none of his six prerequisites seemed to 
present themselves unambiguously in Kuwait, the evolution of the system showed 
that these factors were essentially present at some level and operating, but not 
necessarily in the exact fashion suggested by Potter (1997). For instance economic 
development, a strong trigger for democracy had a dual conflicting effect, on the 
one hand, consolidating the power of the regime while on the other hand creating a 
highly educated and urbanised society demanding reforms from below.   
Societal divisions are considered an important precondition for democratisation as 
it creates opposing interests and concerns, which citizens eventually resolve 
through competing for elections, and where an overarching national identity unites 
them despite these differences.  The Kuwaiti society prior to 1991 certainly presents 
a complex picture of segmented identities and divisions along tribal, 
citizenship/immigrant, sectarian religious (Shi’a/Sunni) and class lines. However, 
historically these divisions were fostered and manipulated by Al Sabah in order to 
divide and rule by pitting various groups against each other and thus maintaining 
their central and dominant position over society, and most importantly resulting in 
no single group being strong enough to challenge their rule. The national unity that 
Potter (1997) posits to bridge the various social forces and foster democratisation 
was not achieved in Kuwait on the eve of the Iraqi Occupation. Al Sabah had been 
extremely successful in their consolidation of these divisions to the detriment of the 
process of democratisation.   
As for Potter’s (1997) precondition concerning the institutional relation of state and 
political institutions, the establishment of Kuwait’s National Assembly and the 
holding of the first elections in 1963 held the potential to be supportive of 
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democratisation and the development of a broader political culture that fosters 
democratic values and ideas. In theory, the institution of the assembly should have 
led to democracy through a change in the balance of power between the state and 
its citizens, devolving at least some power to the latter. However, the Amir retained 
ultimate authority in both the legislative and executive spheres, resulting in a 
system in which the legislature was unstable and ineffective, and unable to 
consolidate democratic processes in the functioning of the state.  
The National Assembly was used by the regime to maintain its own rule, as 
manifested by the dismantlement of the assembly at key junctures when its 
members appeared working towards genuine independence or serious opposition to 
the regime. Having said this, however, the fact that conflict was so evident and so 
persistent across the post-independence period and up until 1990 suggests that some 
of the political forces that came into existence through this process were more 
robust than the ruling elites had anticipated. This is positive both in terms of the 
development of political institutions, and in its signalling of a certain level of 
political culture conducive to democratisation.  
The importance of civil society in controlling the excess of the state and in 
promoting democracy is acknowledged in most of the literature concerning 
transitions to democracy (as discussed in Chapter Two) since without these bottom-
up pressures, the state becomes too omnipotent. Kuwait experienced a flourishing 
of civil society associations pressing for a range of reforms in the system.  However, 
their ability to mobilise and organise was curtailed by the state mechanisms of 
control and repression. In addition, the emergence of the National Assembly as the 
central political institution counter balancing the power of the state also undermined 
the role of CSOs as the Assembly became the focal point of political opposition. 
However, the diwaniyya, proved to be an effective mechanism for the continuation 
of democratising pressure from below by providing Kuwaitis as well as the 
Opposition with an outlet to debate important issues and demand reforms, 
especially during the lengthy period of the dissolution of the Fifth Assembly.  
The presence of vocal opposition, the high levels of turnout at certain elections and 
the popularity of the diwaniyya indicated the existence of a nascent democratic 
political culture at some level in the society prior to 1991. Yet, as discussed, 
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political culture prior to the Iraqi Occupation was frequently subject to repressive 
strategies to suppress its spread beyond a certain limited sphere. On the other hand, 
the very existence of the National Assembly and its importance to Kuwait citizens 
as evidenced in their continuous support through engaging in the elections is an 
indication of a political culture in favour of democracy. This political institution, 
despite its instability and being continuously under the threat of dissolution has 
been instrumental in maintaining pressure on the ruling family.    
The last of Potter’s (1997) preconditions for a transition to democracy is the impact 
of regional and international factors whether promoting or arresting the process. 
For instance, in the pre-independence era Britain played a negative role, supporting 
the Amir’s repressive and autocratic rule in order to protect the interests of the 
Empire. Saudi Arabia also supported and encouraged the Amir to maintain an 
autocratic rule for fear of contagion if the democratic experience of Kuwait was 
successful. Kuwait’s insecure position towards the constant claims of Iraq over 
Kuwaiti territory was a factor in hindering democratisation as fear and the need to 
control the Opposition inside Kuwait was heightened. Events such as the Iran–Iraq 
war (1981-1988) or when pro-democracy groups in Kuwait found support across 
borders from countries such as Oman and Bahrain heightened tensions increasing 
the regime’s tendency to repress certain groups especially the Shi'a, fuelling 
sectarianism in Kuwait. One can say that transnational and international factors 
were more skewed towards hindering the democratisation process rather than 
promoting it prior to 1991.  
The final conclusion is that bottom up-pressures have been present in the society 
despite the constraints and restrictions and repressive measures imposed by the state.  
However, these were unable to produce an effective challenge to the autocratic rule 
of Al Sabah primarily due to the success of Al Sabah in consolidating societal 
divisions and maintaining their dominance and their role as the ultimate source of 
power over society. Thus we see that the socio-economic environment indicates the 
presence of the six preconditions for a transition to democracy in Kuwait, albeit, 
with conflicting influences as promoters/obstructers of democratisation, in 
particular economic development and the relation of state and political institutions, 
as both impacts of prompting and obstructing democracy exist side-by-side.  
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The following chapters will determine whether Kuwait has moved beyond this 
conflicting environment in the post-liberation period to a clearer path towards 
democratisation in light of the four political reforms. The next chapter starts off the 
analysis with a focus on the first two reforms: restoration of the National Assembly 
in 1992 and the separation of posts of Crown Prince and Prime Minister in 2003.  
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Chapter Four:  The Political Reforms of Post-Liberation Kuwait 
and Process of Democratisation 1992-2003 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
During the period 1991-2003 two major political reforms took place, the restoration 
of the National Assembly in 1992 and the separation of the posts of Crown Prince 
and Prime Minister in 2003. This chapter focuses on revealing the circumstances 
that led to the implementation of these two reforms and evaluating their impact on 
the process of democratisation, in particular whether a shift away from the 
domination of the state and Al Sabah ruling family occurred in favour of the 
National Assembly and the civil society. It is important to note that even in the 
weakened form of the existence of Potter’s (1997) prerequisites for democratisation, 
as the previous chapter suggested, the period post-liberation offered an opportunity 
to move Kuwait forward in its quest for democracy. This is primarily due to the 
changed political circumstances, as a result of the Iraqi invasion, that allowed 
Kuwaiti Opposition to exert immense bottom-up pressures demanding reforms of 
the political system as they attributed the temporary loss of the legitimacy of the 
Kuwaiti state and Al Sabah rule to the absence of democracy and lack of 
transparency. Moreover this legitimacy was only restored due to the loyalty and 
support of the Opposition, pledging allegiance to Al Sabah while in exile in Saudi 
Arabia, notwithstanding the Western led military coalition liberating Kuwait from 
Iraqi forces on 26 February 1991. 
 
That potential trajectory, nonetheless, did not materialise; this chapter focuses on 
the reasons and the impediments that prevented that eventuality. The discussion 
proceeds as follows: firstly, it provides the context for understanding the reasons 
for the assembly’s restoration, looking at the challenges that faced Al Sabah after 
the liberation of Kuwait and how they engendered and shaped these reforms. 
Secondly, it examines the post-liberation national assemblies individually, 
assessing whether they have widened participation, supported contestation and 
increased civil and political freedoms (Dahls’ three elements that defines 
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democracy). Thirdly, the chapter explores the opportune circumstances presented 
to Al Sabah that led to the separation of the offices of Prime Minister and Crown 
Prince, relying in this section upon interviews conducted with prominent Kuwaitis 
with personal insight into this process. Lastly, the institutional relation between the 
State and the National Assembly is evaluated against Potter’s (1997) scheme with 
the aim of assessing if the restoration of the Assembly was a trigger towards a 
substantial change in the balance of power between the National Assembly and the 
ruling elites or if it was merely cosmetic. The chapter concludes that the manner of 
the managed reforms by Al Sabah ruling family continues to indicate a reluctance 
to share power and intent on maintaining dominance, thus suggesting that the 
restoration of the Assembly represented an effort by the regime to maintain the 
semblance of a liberalised autocracy rather than a trajectory toward democratisation.  
 
 
4.2   The Challenges Facing Kuwait on the Eve of Liberation  
On the eve of Kuwait’s liberation from the Iraqi invasion, by the Western led 
coalition, which took place on 26 February 1991, Kuwait faced a multitude of 
challenges: post war physical reconstruction, economic recovery, and political 
crises. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be only on discussing the 
political crisis. In particular, the two interrelated challenges of restoring the 
damaged legitimacy of Al Sabah and coping with bottom-up pressures as well as 
international Western pressure to implement political reforms.  
 
It is important to note that the short-lived Iraqi invasion of seven months coincided 
with a point at which the political system in Kuwait was under strain due to the 
ruling family’s increasing reliance on repressive force; institutions of political and 
civil society were either not functional or were prohibited. Regional hegemons such 
as Saudi Arabia continued to show themselves ideologically opposed to the concept 
of democracy, with attendant influence on Kuwait. Moreover, Iran’s Islamic 
revolution gave Kuwait’s government great cause for concern. At the same time, 
however, there was a growing internal civil political activity through the informal 
mechanism of the diwaniyyas that had grown through the 1980s, marking increased 
bottom-up pressure for reforming the political system. As discussed in Chapter 
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Three, the establishment of the National Council, Al Majlis Al Watani, of 1990, was 
a manoeuvre by the Amir, Sheikh Jaber, to pacify Kuwaitis and mitigate their 
specific demand for the restoration of the National Assembly. Such were the 
domestic circumstances when the Iraqi invasion occurred on the 2nd August 1990, 
which only increased the level of frustration and anger towards the ruling family as 
Kuwaitis held Al Sabah responsible for the invasion.  
 
It is quite significant, then, that despite the failure of Al Sabah ruling family to 
protect Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion, Kuwaitis opted to stand by the ruling family 
and accept their return to Kuwait, allowing them to restore their legitimacy. This 
testifies to the success of Al Sabah in making themselves the most significant focal 
point of the political system, its ‘unifying’ force and its ‘arbiter’. Yet, Kuwaitis also 
were under the illusion that in exchange for their loyalty, Al Sabah would be more 
accommodating in implementing political reforms, especially the restoration of the 
assembly, which has been dissolved since 1986.  As expressed by Shafeeq Al 
Ghabra, (Professor at Kuwait University), Kuwaitis believed that a democratic 
political system and a functional assembly would have protected Kuwait from the 
trauma of invasion and the consequent temporary loss of independence as well as 
the physical destruction wrought on the country (Interview, 2013).  
 
The lack of transparency and absence of the assembly had left most Kuwaitis totally 
unaware of the real dangers looming from the Iraqi regime.  Most people did not 
know about the extent of the danger of the Iraqi threat because censorship had 
banned any mention of it in local newspapers and broadcasts (Tétreault, 2000).  For 
Kuwaitis, then, the invasion “marked a failure of the system itself” and signalled 
the danger of censorship and reliance on a small “closed group controlling the 
decision making process” (Tétreault, 2000: 87). Thus, a “greatly intensified 
pressure to democratise was brought to bear on Al Sabah family both by the 
traditional Opposition and by the Kuwaiti resistance movement that developed 
during the Iraqi occupation in the wake of the invasion” (Hudson, 1991: 410). 
 
The aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait was a golden opportunity to ameliorate 
the tensions that had characterised the relationship between the State and society, 
as seen in Chapter Three, by strengthening the democratic process, primarily 
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through the restoration of the National Assembly.  The Opposition used the Iraqi 
invasion and the pressure exerted by the U.S. on Al Sabah as an opportunity to call 
for a democratic transformation in order to weaken the grip of Al Sabah on political 
power and edge Kuwait towards becoming a functioning democracy. On the surface, 
there was reason in the early 1990s to believe that this was the trajectory that Kuwait 
was embarking upon as the following section suggests. The discussion firstly 
focuses on the main challenge faced by Al Sabah while in exile and the immediate 
aftermath of liberation: the restoration of the legitimacy of their rule and secondly 
on the external Western pressure exerted mainly by the U.S. to reform the political 
system. 
 
4.2.1   The Restoration of the Legitimacy of Al Sabah Rule 
 
Aseel Al Awadhi (first female elected to the National Assembly 2009 and a lecturer 
at Kuwait University) expressed,  “Kuwaitis blamed the royal family for making 
political mistakes leading to the Iraqi invasion”, in particular, she stressed that “the 
suspension of the Assembly for more than six years and the autocratic nature of Al 
Sabah rule as the major causes of the Iraqi aggression” (Interview, 2013). Her 
assessment resonates with other testimonies of the growing criticism of the 
government, and the popularity of the view that “Kuwaitis are responsible and can 
rely upon themselves without the direct participation of their rulers” (Rabi, 2000: 
158). At that time, “In Kuwait itself, the population was more adamant than ever 
that from that point on it should be involved in the shaping of the country's future. 
The Kuwaiti public wanted the unconditional reinstatement of the national 
assembly” (Ehteshami, 2003: 60). Thus, restoring the Assembly was the most 
crucial demand put on the ruling family by Kuwaitis while they were still in exile 
in Saudi Arabia.   
 
The path towards restoring the legitimacy of Al Sabah was paved by the two Jeddah 
meetings held in October 1990 and January 1991. Their main aim was to 
consolidate the support for the Kuwaiti government in exile as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Kuwaiti people and dispel the claims by the Iraqi regime that 
it was acting on behalf of Kuwaiti Opposition showing that Kuwaitis rejected these 
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claims and refused to cooperate with the Iraqis” (Ismael, 1993: 172). Kuwaitis were 
united in their support for Al Sabah and their rejection of the Iraqi invasion. For 
example, Ahmad Al Sadoun, one of the prominent opposition leaders and speaker 
of the 1985 assembly, refused to cooperate with the Iraqis and did not participate 
in setting up a provisional government, while others from the Kuwaiti embassy in 
London showed their support for Sheikh Jaber (Ismael, 1993: 172). Still, Al Sabah 
family was concerned enough by the Iraqi claims that the government sought to 
counter them through a public demonstration of loyalty. 
 
Accordingly, Al Sabah organised the first Kuwaiti People’s Congress in Jeddah, 
13-16 October 1990, to demonstrate public loyalty to the Amir from more than 
1,200 delegates representing Kuwaiti elites and the Opposition (Crystal and Al 
Shayeji, 1998). To achieve this end, the Crown Prince, Sheikh Saad made a deal 
before the meeting with two opposition leaders, Ahmad Al Sadoun, and Abd Al 
Aziz Al Saqr, president of Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Tetreault, 
2000). Both the Crown Prince and Abd Al Aziz Al Saqr made “conciliatory 
speeches at the meeting” and the Congress’s final announcement stressed, firstly, 
the unity of the Kuwaiti people behind the government in exile as their sole 
legitimate representative and the rejection of all Iraqi claims against Kuwait and 
secondly, the ruling family promised and responded to the demands of the 
Opposition to “consolidate Kuwait’s democracy under the 1962 constitution” by 
restoring the assembly (Rabi, 2000: 158).  The Crown Prince also “agreed to set up 
a consultative committee that would include members of the Opposition in the 
decision making process undertaken by the government in exile” (Tetreault, 2000: 
85).  
However, in the second Jeddah meeting in January 1991, shortly before the start of 
Kuwait’s Liberation War, promises to restore the assembly and initiate political 
reforms were all postponed, under the pretext of “purging Kuwaiti society of 
collaborators and infiltrators” and the “threats to national security from presumed 
Iraqi moles planted among Kuwaitis” (Tetreault, 2000: 86). This led the Opposition 
to raise concern about the government’s intentions to keep its promises, seeing this 
new stance as a tactic to delay the elections promised at Jeddah I. Al Sabah also 
announced their intention to impose martial law as soon as Kuwait was liberated 
108 
 
and subsequently the government in exile imposed a three month period of martial 
law, starting from the first day Kuwait was liberated on 26 February 1991 (Ismael, 
1993).  
The government also established a “security committee” chaired by the Crown 
Prince (who returned to Kuwait six days after Kuwait was liberated) in order to 
implement martial law. The Amir, Sheikh Jaber returned on 14 March 1991 in what 
was described by Ismael as “marking the return to Al Sabah rule” (Ismael, 1993). 
Ahmed Nafisi, stated “Martial law may be necessary in Kuwait for the next few 
months to re-establish order in the country, but that decision ought to be made by a 
national unity government, not the discredited Al Sabah family”. He added that the 
Jeddah meetings’ promises to initiate democratic reforms after the liberation of 
Kuwait were all hampered by martial law which was, according to him,  “used to 
crack down on the resistance movement, to suppress liberties and to lay the 
groundwork for a dummy assembly: in other words, as a means to perpetuate 
monarchic rule” (Nafisi, 1991). 
In response, the Opposition strongly criticised the ruling family. Ahmad Al Khatib 
called the “Crown Prince and Prime Minister a liar” (Tetreault, 2000: 86). The 
Opposition regarded the government’s tactics as a betrayal of the Jeddah meetings 
so they called for the resignation of the Cabinet and the formation of a “government 
of national salvation that includes secular nationalists alongside Islamists” (ibid.). 
Aggravating the situation further, the Opposition were excluded from any of the 
committees planning for the post-liberation period. “The Kuwaiti self–organised 
committees planning for re-entry were superseded by a regime–imposed gatekeeper 
who cancelled most of the arrangements they had so painstakingly worked out” 
(Tetreault, 2000: 85). The tug of war over the process of political reforms was 
resolved through pressure by Western allies, spearheaded mainly by the U.S. The 
next section elaborates on how transitional and international engagement acted in 
this instance as a condition that promoted the democratisation of the system. 
 
4.2.2   International Western Pressure for Democratisation 
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A number of international factors have always been at play in Kuwait’s politics as 
seen in Chapter Three. This remained the case in the period that followed the 
liberation of Kuwait in 1991, with an increased interest by Western allies led by the 
U.S. It is important to note that the administration of President George H. W. Bush 
faced a profound difficulty in selling the Liberation War to the American public; a 
difficulty exacerbated by the perception of Kuwait as undemocratic. The American 
senate vote in support of the war of liberation of Kuwait (declared on Iraq on 16 
January 1991) was very close, 52 to 47; even some of those who voted for the war 
called for a new democratically elected regime in Kuwait arguing that America had 
“no real national interest in restoring Kuwait's rulers”, and that since the state was 
not democratic, it might be preferable to promote elections backed by the United 
Nations rather than reinstating Al Sabah rule (Yetiv, 2002: 259). Subsequently, Al 
Sabah hired several American public relations firms, spending more than 11 million 
USD, as they “understood full well that perceptions of Kuwait as non democratic 
were damaging” (ibid.). Such efforts were aimed at altering Kuwait's image as a 
state that lacked democracy and treated women as second-class citizens.  
The predicament that Al Sabah faced, with the resilience and insistence of Kuwaitis 
on political reforms, gave Western governments, and especially the U.S., the 
opportunity to press for reforms: particularly in light of the ruling family promises 
made at the two Jeddah meetings. According to Salem (2007: 5), “The U.S. 
government had no choice but to press Al Sabah family to commit itself to a 
restoration of the National Assembly, so Washington could justify its military 
interference in Kuwait to Congress and its own public”.  This, combined with the 
“perception the world is watching Kuwait” (Tetreault, 2000: 87) assisted Kuwaitis 
in their demands for reforms and in forcing Al Sabah to keep their Jeddah promises 
to restore the National Assembly and hold elections. For instance as explained by 
interviewee (3) (an ex-member of the National Assembly) it was the focus and 
pressure of Western media on post–liberation Kuwait, that helped shed light on 
Sheikh Jaber and his government’s complete disregard for their promises and their 
suppression of the pro-democracy forces in Kuwait  (Interview, 2013). 
 
The oppressive measures as observed by Tetreault, (2000) included accounts of 
disbanding public gatherings by the police force as well as attacks by death squads 
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on two prominent opponents of the regime. The U.S. continued to stress the 
importance of political reforms; in late March 1991, President George H.W. Bush 
sent a letter to the Amir, Sheikh Jaber, urging him to implement the necessary 
reforms to the political system. This was further stressed upon when James Baker, 
the U.S. Secretary of State, visited Kuwait on April 1991, and stated that, “The U.S. 
will be able to support Kuwait politically if it introduced reforms” (Ismael, 1993: 
179). The Opposition saw Baker’s visit as an opportunity to reiterate their demands 
and pressure Sheikh Jaber to initiate reforms, thus, on the same day of his arrival in 
Kuwait, they “called for a press conference to gain international support for their 
demands” (ibid.). 
 
The relationship between Kuwait and the U.S. was strengthened after the First Gulf 
War. On the one hand, Kuwait became more dependent on the Americans to secure 
its borders against Iraqi and Iranian threats, while on the other hand, the U.S. 
wanted to protect its economic interest and establish a base in the Gulf region 
(Marakis, 2016). This gave the administration of George H. W. Bush leverage over 
Al Sabah due to the necessity of keeping the American public and the Congress on 
the side of the president’s actions in order to implement its military option for the 
liberation of Kuwait (Yetiv, 2002). In this circumstance, the transitional and 
international engagement factor aided the pro-democracy movement to achieve 
their main goal of restoring the National Assembly.  
 
 
4.3   The First Political Reform: The Restoration of the National Assembly  
The restoration of the National Assembly, in 1992, was meant to be the first major 
step towards democratising the political system, particularly in conjunction with 
the subsequent reform of the separation of the offices of Prime Minister and Crown 
Prince, in 2003. Interviewee (4) (member of the National Assembly) states, “There 
is an agreement among Kuwaitis that the restoration of the assembly in 1992 was 
only initiated to reinstate the damaged legitimacy of the royal family and was made 
possible due to international pressure exercised on Kuwait after the liberation as 
well as internal pressure, rather than the Amir’s conviction of the merits of political 
reforms” (Interview, 2013).  Similarly, Al Ghabra notes,  “The royal family are not 
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convinced that democracy is the right form of governance for Kuwait so the reform 
was only a matter of legitimacy… Al Sabah lost their country for seven months ... 
so they did not think that holding onto the Constitution is the best form of 
governance, but to them it is the best way to hold onto power” (Interview, 2013).  
 
The delaying tactics used by Al Sabah before restoring the Assembly support both 
Interviewee (4) and Al Ghabra’s views. The post liberation period did not 
immediately witness any implementation of the promises offered by Sheikh Jaber’s 
government during the two Jeddah meetings. As a result, in April 1991, the 
Opposition submitted to Sheikh Jaber a declaration signed by eighty-nine notables 
asking the government to fulfil its promise in restoring the Assembly. In addition, 
they demanded freedom of press, the establishment of an independent judiciary and 
the appointment of capable individuals to the Cabinet (Rabi, 2000). Interviewee (6) 
(ex-minister), rebuking the ruling family for failing to fulfil its Jeddah promises, 
states, “Al Sabah were actually reluctant to share power and responsibilities with 
the Kuwaitis and they wished to continue with the same old pre-invasion policies” 
(Interview, 2013). 
 
The period between the return of Sheikh Jaber to Kuwait from exile in March 1991 
and the restoration of the assembly in October 1992 can, therefore, be best described 
as an attempt by Al Sabah to hold onto their power rather than concede immediately 
to the agreement reached at the two Jeddah meetings. Al Sabah, after liberation, 
“continued to rule by themselves; and govern through patron-client contacts and 
tribal and familial values” (Rabi, 2000: 160). In addition, they used the 
reconstruction projects intended to repair the country’s damaged infrastructure and 
state expenditures to “regain popular support” hence continuing the same pattern, 
as seen in Chapter Three, of using oil wealth as a major source of legitimising Al 
Sabah rule and co-opting the various social forces (ibid.). 
 
To exacerbate the political atmosphere further, the Amir formed a new Cabinet on 
20 April 1991 that included a number of the same ministers who were accused by 
the Opposition of being responsible for the occurrence of the Iraqi invasion in the 
first place (Jamal, 2007). Specifically, this Cabinet witnessed the return of the 
ministers of Defence and Interior to their positions (Crystal and Al Shayeji, 1998). 
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On the other hand, Al Qahtani explains the ruling family sought to appear as a 
popular government representing the Kuwaiti people through reducing the number 
of Al Sabah in the Cabinet from seven to five, while including nine ministers who 
were not from the ruling family (Interview, 2013). In a manoeuvre to appear 
conciliatory, Sheikh Jaber also appointed representatives from across the political 
spectrum and that was meant to be a “national salvation government” (Rabi, 2000: 
160). However, as described by Ismael the government’s act was a “cosmetic 
reshuffle” of numbers because Al Sabah kept the “major sensitive portfolios of 
ministries while the rest of posts went to senior civil servants and technocrats.” She 
added that this was “a shuffling of posts that preserves power for the ruling Sabah 
family” (Ismael, 1993:179). Thus, Al Sabah’s impulse towards authoritarian rule 
did not appear to have been tempered by the experience of exile in Saudi Arabia 
and loss of legitimacy for seven months as a result of Iraqi invasion, nor did the 
bottom-up pressures from pro-democracy forces seem to cause substantial change 
in their perspective or behaviour towards the process of democratisation of the 
political system. 
 
The leaders of the Opposition accurately viewed this as a resumption of the 
strategies employed by the ruling family during the establishment of the 1990 
National Council (discussed in Chapter Three) and as a delaying tactic to obstruct 
movement towards democratic reforms (Jamal, 2007). The main task of the Cabinet 
was the consideration of issues related to elections, including the central question 
of who may vote. The pro-democracy groups wanted suffrage extended to women, 
and there was also pressure for expanding voting rights to so-called second-class 
citizens (i.e., those whose families were not citizens in 1920) (Al Yousifi, 2013b).   
In contrast to the historically restrained policy of Al Sabah and their aversion to 
using heavy-handed methods, the government during this period, February-May 
1991, used violence against the vocal Opposition; a sign of apprehension about 
losing control and power and a desire to silence and scare the pro-democracy forces. 
Abdulaziz Al Sultan (from an elitist merchant family) emphasised that “the 
government could not tolerate the Opposition and was reluctant to introduce 
reforms and accused Al Sabah of forming death squads to kill members of the 
Opposition” (Ismael, 1993:179). On 2 February 1991 these death squads targeted 
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Hamad Al Jouan, who survived an assassination attempt but became wheel chair 
bound (Al Watan, 2009).  While on 8 March 1991 they targeted Hussain Al Banai 
and killed him; both men were spokesmen on behalf of Kuwaitis who had remained 
in Kuwait during the invasion (Ismael, 1993).  It is important to note that Hamad Al-
Jouan was a member of the 1985 National Assembly, in which he was involved in 
questioning Sheik Salman Al Douiaj Al Sabah, the Minister of Justice and 
Administrative Affairs, for exploiting public money and investing funds for the 
benefit of his youngest son Sheikh Douiaj (Al Watan, 2009). In addition, he was 
also appointed by the assembly in 1986 to open investigations against Kuwait’s 
Central Bank on the charge of financial corruption. This incident was among the 
reasons Sheikh Jaber dismissed the 1985 National Assembly (ibid.). Al-Jouan’s 
wife, two months following the assassination attempt, April 1991, spoke at a 
conference in Washington DC, about “the climate of fear and violence that persisted 
in Kuwait” after the liberation (Tetrault, 2000: 87). 
Despite the ruling family’s recourse to the use of violence and heavy-handed tactics, 
pressure for reform continued to build up from below, including street protests. In 
the end the Amir had to change his approach in response to the determination of the 
pro-democracy groups and the failure of state sponsored intimidation tactics as well 
as the international pressure exerted through the U.S. Sheikh Jaber, on the 2nd of 
June 1992 declared that the election for the Seventh assembly would be held on 5 
October 1992. This was the trigger of the start of a new era in Kuwait’s process of 
democratisation that resulted in the election of four successive national assemblies 
during the period under discussion. The following is a detailed discussion and 
assessment of these assemblies and their institutional relations to the state.  
4.4   The Successive National Assemblies 1992-2003 
The purpose of this section is to examine the four successive elected assemblies,  
(1992, 1996, 1999 and 2003), against Dahl’s criteria of political participation and 
contestation of free and fair elections in order to make an assessment whether the 
political reform of restoring the assembly denoted a move towards democracy. The 
analysis focuses on showing the level of interest in this political institution (number 
of candidates and voters and voter turnout), the fairness of the electoral process and 
the main issues and debates that the assemblies engaged in during their terms and 
how effective they were in holding the government accountable. 
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4.4.1   The Seventh National Assembly 1992-1995 
 
The Amir’s eventual commitment to reinstating the National Assembly resulted in 
holding elections on 5 October 1992 for the Seventh Assembly under international 
monitoring and without government interference. U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait at 
that time, Edward W. Gnehm Jr., commented on the day of the elections, “What 
happened here today was critical for establishing participatory democracy in 
Kuwait” and praised the Kuwaiti government for holding fair and free elections, 
saying, “We felt the government did very well managing the election without 
interference in the election process itself”  (Fineman, 1992). 
Only 278 candidates contested the 25 constituencies for the 50-seat assembly.  
Voter turnout was 83 per cent and the numbers of eligible voters nearly doubled, 
increasing from the 48,368, in the Sixth Assembly, to over 81,440; a positive sign 
of increased political participation after the long absence of the assembly, see Table 
4.1. Nonetheless, this was still a low number of eligible voters as women were still 
excluded at this stage from the process of political participation as well as Kuwaitis 
working in the police, army and security services and those who had been citizens 
for less than 20 years. Thus, although political participation and organised 
competition, through fair and free elections were taking place, a large segment of 
the Kuwaiti population is still excluded, giving democracy a limited meaning in this 
context.   
 
Table 4.1: Political Participation in the Seventh National Assembly 1992 
Date of 
Election  
Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Voter Turnout 
 
5 October 1992 
 
25 
 
278 
 
81440 
 
83% 
Source: MOI,2017 
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Election results clearly signalled widespread support for the Opposition, giving it a 
majority bloc of 34 deputies (Rabi, 2000). The most noticeable change in this 
election was the increase of the Islamist Sunni candidates, who gained a significant 
number of seats totalling 19 (Katzman, 2001: 112).  In terms of the division along 
tribal/urban lines the assembly saw the tribal districts represented by 26 delegates, 
while the urban districts by twenty-four members (Assiri, 2007). The 34 seats 
gained by oppositional political figures were equally divided between the secular 
and Sunni Islamist trends, both of which shared the goal of “fundamentally altering 
Kuwait’s social and political fabric” (Fineman, 1992) but in two opposite directions. 
The former is focused on secularising the country while the later on Islamising it. 
During the elections, the Islamist candidates and independent candidates supporting 
the Islamist blocs stated that they aimed for a gradual change intended to make 
society comply with the Sharia code of Islamic law (Al Mdaires, 2010). This 
included opposing women’s political rights and “making Kuwaiti society more 
devout”, as Ismail Shatti, (ICM leader) emphasised “We want only to implement 
sharia according to the Constitution, which accepts Al Sabah as the ruling family” 
(Fineman, 1992). Thus, Sunni Islamists in the assembly did not make any attempt 
to oppose, or question Al Sabah and the political status quo in Kuwait (Katzman, 
2001). The concerns, therefore, over the rise of Islamic conservatives as a source 
of threat to the rule of Al Sabah were unfounded.  Also, the Islamist bloc failed 
again to achieve its long-term goal of altering Article (2) of the Constitution. 
Essentially, this assembly was very active in challenging the government on many 
fronts. It opened investigation into the causes of the Iraqi invasion; reviewed the 
expenditures of the Ministry of Defence; inspected financial corruption; held 
investigations of the government’s investment policies and reviewed all Amiri 
decrees promulgated during the six years of dissolution of the Sixth Assembly (Al 
Yousifi, 2013b). Nonetheless, this assembly witnessed only one Interpellation as 
shown in Table 4.2.  Its power stemmed from its composition and the nature of the 
elected representatives rather than from a shift of power in favour of the National 
Assembly.   
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Table 4.2: Interpellations in the Seventh National Assembly 1992 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
1 Mofarej Nahar 
 
8 February1995 
 
The Minister of 
Education  
Ahmad al Rubai 
A vote of no confidence 
was agreed upon. The 
minister survived the 
vote: 17 ‘for’ and 21 
‘against’ while 4 
refrained from voting. 
43 MPs were present 
Source: KNA, 2016  
 
 
4.4.2   The Eighth National Assembly 1996-1999 
 
The elections for the Eighth Assembly were held on 10 July 1996. The number of 
candidates was 230. The number of eligible voters was over 107,169, which was 
25 per cent higher than during the 1992 elections, while turnout was also relatively 
high at 83 percent, see Table 4.3. This shows the importance of this political 
institution to Kuwaitis and the emphasis they put on political participation. The 
results of the election show the Islamists’ candidates winning 17 seats (5 Shi’i and 
12 Sunni), liberals won only 4 seats, while the pro-government, well known as 
Nowab Kadamat, won 30 seats  (Constituent service MPs) (Crystal and 
Shayji ,1998). 
 
Table 4.3: Political participation in the Eighth National Assembly 1996 
Source: MOI,2017 
Date of 
Election  
Number of 
electoral 
districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of eligible 
voters 
Voter turnout 
 
 
7 October 1996 
 
25 
 
230 
 
107169 
 
83 % 
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This assembly managed to achieve one significant reform in passing a law banning 
tribal primaries (Law number 9/1998). Article (45) of the Election Law 25/1981 
provides that “everyone who organises or participates in the preparation and 
arrangements of ‘auxiliary elections’ can be imprisoned for up to five years.” The 
law also defines these as “elections managed and performed in an unofficial manner 
before the time determined for the [official] elections in order to select one or more 
from among persons that belong to a certain group or sect”. The government, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, had encouraged these primaries, as it increased the 
chances of predicting who would win and also increases the influence of the tribes 
as a counter balance to the urban elites. However, the government allowed this law 
to pass as it was under pressure from Opposition MPs to abide by the stipulations 
of the Election law. Interesting this assembly was dominated by tribal elements but 
only four voted against it which is an indication that there was an agreement with 
the government on passing it as interviewees (1&2) (ex-members of the National 
Assembly) eluded to (Interviews, 2013). 
This assembly witnessed four major interpellations as seen in Table 4.4. The most 
significant was the questioning of the Minister of Finance, Sheikh Ali Al Salim Al 
Sabah as this assembly was affected by the economic problems associated with the 
low prices of oil, and the government’s struggle with expenses besides debating the 
introduction of taxes on citizens (Al Yousifi, 2013b). Despite these difficulties, 
interviewees (3) (ex-member of the National Assembly) and (4) (a member of the 
National Assembly) stressed that neither the assembly nor the government have 
been able to debate constructively a way forward to manage oil revenues as well as 
to stem the tide of pervasive corruption and mismanagement of the economy 
(Interviews, 2013). The assembly requested four interpellations but non was 
effective in holding the government accountable; the Cabinet resigned before a vote 
of no confidence and on the second occasion of a vote of no confidence the 
assembly was dissolved, see Table 4.4 below.  
 
As indicated by interviewees (5) (ex member of the National Assembly) the 
assertion of this assembly of its right to question and hold the government 
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accountable is unwelcomed by Al Sabah, as they saw it affecting their authority 
(Interview, 2013). The dissolution of the Assembly on 4 May 1999, unlike the 
previous cases of 1976 and 1986, followed the constitutional requirements of a legal 
dissolution (KNA, 2011a). In accordance to Article (107) of the Constitution, the 
ruler called for new elections within the required period of sixty days. However, in 
the intervening time, Sheikh Jaber issued many decrees, one of which offered 
women their full political rights (Tétreault, 2012). However, it was taken as a top-
down reform without the involvement of the National Assembly and was rejected 
once it was presented to the Ninth Assembly for ratification. The question of 
women’s rights, and the passing of the bill granting them full political rights, in 
2005, is discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
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Table 4.4: Interpellations in the Eighth National Assembly 1996 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of 
Interpellations 
1 Sami Al Monais 
Ahmad Al Molaifi 
Moshari Al Osaimi  
5 July 1997 
The Minister of 
Finance  
Mishari Al Roudhan 
The interpellation was 
only discussed  
2 Mohammed Al Olaim 
Waleed Al Tabataba’ei 
Fahad Al Khana’a 
27 January 1998 
The Minister of 
Information  
Sheik Saud Al Nasser 
Al Sabah 
 
Some MPs asked for a 
vote of no confidence 
but the government 
resigned one day after 
the request  
3 Hussain Al Qallaf 
1 June1998 
The Minister of 
Interior 
Sheikh Mohammed Al 
Khalid Al Sabah 
 
The government asked 
for  a private  session 
but the MP withdraw 
his request  
4 Abbas Al Khadari 
20 April 1999 
The Minister of Justice 
and Islamic Affairs   
 Ahmed Al Kulaib 
The interpellations 
were discussed and two 
votes of no confidence 
were presented on the 
same day. However, a 
decree was issued 
dissolving the 
assembly 
Source: KNA,2016 
 
4.4.3   The Ninth National Assembly 1999-2003 
 
The elections were held on 3 July 1999, and resulted in an outcome in which the 
liberals dominated the assembly (Roberts, 2011). During the electoral campaign, 
the government experienced some difficulties in dealing with the contentious tribal 
‘primaries’; specifically, it was under popular pressure to stop them. Despite the 
passing of the law declaring these primaries illegal, as discussed in the previous 
section, many tribes continued to hold primaries, with one tribe publicly 
announcing the date and location of its ‘primary’. This put the government in the 
120 
 
awkward position of having to potentially support the ruling of the Eighth 
Assembly, which it had dissolved on 4 May 1999, and thus weaken the tribes, on 
whose support the government relied in the assembly.  
 
As the government hesitated, those opposing the ‘primaries’ as part of the election 
process accused the government of double standards, conspiracy, and impotence in 
failing to apply the law. “With the outcry mounting in volume, and the first two 
primary results not to their liking, the regime changed course by taking the matter 
to the public prosecutor, who immediately summoned for questioning all those 
participating in the forbidden primaries”(Al Najjar, 2001: 479). In response a 
prominent tribal chief who was standing for election called for a public meeting of 
tribes to form a united position against what he described as an attack on tradition 
and heritage; against such a background of distrust, many candidates launched 
vitriolic attacks on the government and/or individual ministers (ibid.). Those 
opposed to the primaries accused the authorities of impotence in failing to clamp 
down on this illegal activity, while those in favour accused the authorities of 
interfering in the electoral process.  
 
The government, while dealing with the controversy swirling around the ‘primaries,’ 
had to contend with public criticism coming from members of the ruling family 
itself as “at least five members of the ruling family expressed concern about 
mismanagement of the country, criticising the government’s monopoly of power 
and demanding more commitment to democratic reforms” (Al Najjar, 2001: 480). 
He added that “some even went as far as demanding separation between the posts 
of the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince, an extremely sensitive issue within the 
ruling family’s inner circles, and a long standing demand by the Opposition.  
Another spoke about major political reforms, stressing the need to legalise political 
parties and arguing that future governments should be formed by the winning 
parties, with only three ministries of the ruling family”(ibid.) These differences in 
views show that the ruling family was diverse and challenges from inside it could 
be problematic to the overall power and dominance of Al Sabah. It also indicates 
the presence of enlightened and liberal tendencies within the family, which can help 
promote the process of democracy in the country. As interviewees (4), (5) and (6) 
indicated these voices do not represent a united and well-formed agenda and could 
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simply be interpreted as inter-family rivalry rather than advocating democracy 
and/or stirred by a particular issue such as the case in tribal primaries (Interviews, 
2013). 
 
On the electoral field itself, the number of candidates was 287 while there was a 
slight increase in the number of eligible voters to 112 882 and turn out was high at 
83 per cent (see Table 4.5). The election results returned 11 seats for Independents 
and 11 for Secular/Liberals while the Islamists won 13 seats (7 Sunni and 6 Shia) 
and the tribal forces won 15 seats (Assiri, 2007). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Political Participation in the Ninth National Assembly of 1999 
Date of Election Number of 
electoral 
districts 
Number of 
candidates 
Number of eligible 
voters 
Voter Turnout 
 
3 July 1999 
 
25 
 
287 
 
112882 
 
83% 
 
Source : MOI, 2017 
 
      
Al Najjar in his assessment of the election results describes the government as 
surprised by the loss of 11 of its preferred candidates, as it had assumed their seats 
to be guaranteed; in his view, “the election results were a clear indication of public 
dissatisfaction with both the government and the previous assembly” (2000: 481). 
He added that the government was “seriously misled” when it assumed that the 
early dissolution of the 1996 assembly would increase the number of the pro-
government MPs in the subsequent election (2002: 481). The government was not 
alone in being displeased with the results. The Islamists groups were also 
disappointed with the number of seats they gained; the Islamists’ votes were 
scattered and divided between the ICM and the Salafist, which benefited the liberal 
independent candidates (Al Mdaires, 1999). 
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The political tension between the Ninth Assembly and the government continued. 
This time, the confrontation began with a conflict over the election to the key 
assembly posts: speaker/chairman of the assembly, deputy speaker, and members 
of the major committees (Al Najjar, 2001). The conflict over the position of the 
chairman, in which the choice was between Ahmad Al Sadoun and Jasim Al 
Khorafi, lasted for three months; finally the government asked the Constitutional 
Court to resolve the impasse; the Court favoured Al Sadoun (Assiri, 2007). A 
second conflict erupted when the Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad, was only offered 
two weeks to form the new Cabinet in consultation with the already frustrated MPs; 
a process that, according to the Constitution, must involve speakers from previous 
assemblies. On 7 July 1999, 46 members of the assembly “issued a statement 
pledging cooperation with the government, yet demanding that the new government 
should not include any ministers likely to cause confrontations with the assembly; 
several MPs asked by the Prime Minister to join the new cabinet refused to do so” 
(Al Najjar, 2001: 483). A third conflict occurred over the necessity to address the 
60 laws that the government had issued during the time of the suspension of the 
Eighth Assembly; a process that, according to the Constitution, must also involve 
speakers from previous assemblies. The majority of the MPs in the Ninth Assembly 
refused to acknowledge the validity of these laws because “they thought this would 
jeopardise the separation of powers and implicitly condone the usurping of 
legislative power by the executive” (ibid.).  
 
In his evaluation of the Ninth Assembly, Assiri (2007: 141) described it as  “weak 
and lacking strong opposition”. It only held 40 sessions, either because the 
government was absent or because the MPs boycotted the sessions. This view is 
confirmed by some of the interviewees, in particular interviewee (4) and (6). They 
stressed that the weakness of the National Assembly became too obvious during the 
time of the Ninth Assembly as the tug of war between the government and assembly 
made it extremely ineffective and exposed further the structural problem of the lack 
of balance of power between the elected body and Al Sabah (Interviews, 2013). 
Interviewee (2) reaffirmed this view indicating, “the assembly is only a show of 
democracy because in reality it is weak” (Interview 2013). 
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The assembly requested eight interpellations, but these continued to be ineffective 
in holding the government accountable. As seen from Table 4.6, three ministers 
(Minister of Electricity and Water, Minister of Finance and Minister of State Affairs) 
escaped the vote of no confidence as the government could always rally enough 
MPs behind it and the government to avoid a vote of no confidence resigned before 
the questioning due date. Another interpellation was removed while the assembly 
accepted a minister’s promise to investigate the issue raised by the interpellation 
and lastly, the assembly refused to investigate the issue raised by the interpellation. 
Table 4.6:  Interpellations in the Ninth National Assembly of 1999 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
1 Marzooq Al Hobaini 
Mussalam Al Barrak 
Waleed Al Jouri 
28 October 2000 
The Minister of 
Electricity and 
Water 
Adel Al Subaih 
A vote of no confidence 
was presented. The 
result was in favour of 
the minister: 19 voted 
‘for’, 26 ‘against,’ while 
3 refrained. 48 MPs 
were present. 
2 Hussain Al Qallaf 
27 January 2001 
The Minister of 
Justice  
Sa’ad Al Hashel 
The government 
resigned in 29 January 
2001, two days after the 
interpellation was 
presented 
3 Hussain Al Qallaf 
 
24 November 2001 
The Minister of 
Justice and Awqaf  
Ahmad  Baqer 
 
The interpellation 
referred to the 
Legislative and Legal 
Committee. The 
committee report was 
discussed with the result 
that 25 MPs agreed with 
the conclusions (out of 
43 present MPs). The 
interpellation was 
removed from the 
agenda  
4 Hassan Joher 
3 March 2002 
The Minister of 
Education  
Dr. Musa’ad Al 
Haroon 
The assembly agreed to 
a promise made by the 
Minister to hold 
investigations on any 
illegal issues 
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5 Mubarak Al 
Dowailah 
Mussalam Al Barrak 
26 May 2002 
 
The Minister of 
Finance and 
Planning 
Dr. Yousif Al 
Ibraheem 
A vote of confidence 
The result was in favour 
of the minister: 22 “for” 
while 21 were against 
and 3 refrained. 46 MPs 
were present. 
6 Hussain Al Qallaf 
26 May 2002 
 
The Minister of 
Electricity and 
Water  
Talal Al Ayarr 
 
The assembly refused a 
proposal by 6 MPs to 
form a committee to 
investigate the issues of 
the interpellations. The 
vote 23 ‘for’, 30 
‘against’ 
7 Abdullah Al Naibari 
11 January 1003 
The Minister of 
State’s Affairs  
Muhammed Dhiaf 
Allah Sharrar 
 
A vote of no confidence 
was presented. The 
result 15 supported the 
vote for ‘no confidence’ 
while 30 voted ‘against’. 
The minister survived 
the vote 
8 Ahmad Al Shurai’an 
28 April 2003 
The Minister of 
Defence 
 Sheik Jaber Al 
Sabah 
The MP presenting it 
withdrew the 
interpellation 
Source: KNA, 2016  
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4.4.4   The Tenth National Assembly 2003-2006 
 
The elections were held on 5 July 2003 and witnessed an increase in eligible voters 
and a significantly high turnout nearing 90 per cent of eligible voters 136,715, 
whereas the number of candidates was 246: lower than the previous assembly (see 
Table 4.7). These are all signs of the continued interest of Kuwaitis in political 
participation and their commitment to the National Assembly as a counter power to 
Al Sabah, despite its inability to hold the government accountable. 
 
Table 4.7: Political Participation in the Tenth National Assembly 2003 
Date of 
Election 
Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Voter Turnout 
 
5 July 2003 
 
25 
 
246 
 
136715 
 
89.7% 
Source: MOI,2017 
 
The electoral campaigns in the run up to the 2003 election were particularly fraught 
and challenging to both the candidates and the government. While some candidates 
accused each other of bribery, others accused the government of interfering in the 
elections either directly or indirectly through influencing voters’ opinions. As 
asserted by Assiri (2007), the accusation of misuse of funds for political purposes 
was grounded in reality, as at least one of the candidates put out an advertisement 
recruiting 1000 media officers for his campaign. Doubts over the politicisation of 
money was heightened when the same candidate proposed that he would pay voters 
if they registered in his electoral district, besides paying them a bonus in the event 
he won the elections. The local press took the issue up criticising the government 
and claiming that the advertisement was a clear sign of buying electoral votes. The 
government, consequently, was forced to respond and the candidate was taken to 
court and stopped from participating in the elections.  
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The assembly witnessed a drastic change in its composition as liberal candidates 
lost many of their seats, whereas the Islamists won the majority of seats (Al Mdaires, 
2010). There were 18 members representing different Islamic blocs in addition to 
11 MPs sympathetic to Islamist ideas while tribal forces won 21 seats (Sharar, 
2010). Despite the very conservative nature of the assembly, its members were 
active in trying to hold the government accountable, the assembly witnessed seven 
interpellations and for the first time an interpellation was requested to question the 
Prime Minister (KNA, 2015). This was encouraged by the reform of the separation 
of posts of the Crown Prince from the Prime Minister (discussed in detail in the 
following section 4.5), and was described by Roberts as  “breaking the taboo of 
questioning a Prime Minister” (2011:96). The interpellations, however, had limited 
success: the Minister of Finance escaped the vote of no confidence while the 
Minister of Health resigned before the vote; three other interpellations were merely 
discussed, one removed, and the Cabinet resigned before the assembly had a chance 
to question the Prime Minister, see Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8: Interpellations in the Tenth National Assembly 2003 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of Interpellations 
1 Mussalam Al Barrak 
4 March 2004 
 
The Minister of 
Finance  
Mahmood Al Nouri 
 
A vote of no confidence 
was presented. The result 
was in favour of the 
minister : 21 ‘for’ while 
25 ‘against’ and 3 MPs 
refrained. 49 MPs were 
present 
2 Hussain Al Qallaf 
18 April 2004 
 
The Minister of Health  
Dr. Mohammed Al 
Jarallah 
The MP presenting the 
interpellation failed to 
gain the support of 10 
MPs to vote for a vote of 
no confidence 
3 Ahmad  Al Molaifi  
Ali Al Rashed 
21 November 2004 
The Minister of the 
State’s Affairs  
Muhammed Dhiaf 
Allah Sharrar 
The  ‘Audit Bureau’ was 
authorized to write a 
report on the 
interpellation’s main 
points 
4 Faisal Al Moslim 
Waleed Al 
Tabataba’ei 
21 December 2004 
The Minister of 
Information 
Mohammed Abou Al 
Hasan 
The Minister resigned so 
the interpellation was 
removed from the agenda 
5 Jamal Al Omar 
 
4 January 2005 
The Minister of Justice  
Ahmad  Baqer 
 
A discussion took place 
and the assembly agreed 
on some 
recommendations 
6 Dhaif Allah 
Bouramyah 
23 March 2005 
The Minister of Health  
Mohmad Al Jarallah 
A vote of no confidence 
was presented, however, 
on 11 April 2005 the 
minister resigned 
7 Ahmad  Al Sadoun 
Ahmad  Al Molaifi 
Dr Faisal Al Moslim 
17 May 2006 
The Prime Minister 
 Sheikh Naseer Al 
Sabah  
 
On 21 May 2006 the 
assembly was dissolved 
Source: KNA, 2016 
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This assembly did not serve its full term of four years. The new Amir, Sheikh Sabah, 
like his predecessors, used his ultimate power and suspended the assembly on 21 
May 2006, and called for new election on 29 June 2006 (to be discussed in Chapter 
Six). The dissolution was due to the increased tension and impasse between the 
MPs and the government in particular over the issue of amending the election law 
combined with increased bottom-up pressures through the activism of women and 
the youth. The events of 2005 and 2006 of the women’s political rights campaign, 
and the youth movement and its impact on the suspension of the National Assembly 
are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
In summary, the discussion of the four successive assemblies suggests that the two 
most important dimensions of defining democracy, political participation and 
contestation through elections continued to be present during this period, albeit 
constrained by interferences from the government and tainted by the accusations of 
corruption, and abuse of the principle of free and fair elections. A wide variety of 
accusations were levied at the elections of the various assemblies: buying votes, the 
tribal ‘primaries’, government favouring candidates over others and providing them 
with support . Such practices not only undermined the process of democracy but 
also preserved the adversarial and confrontation relation between the legislative and 
executive branches, with very little apparent cooperation and collaboration, as 
required by the Constitution. Moreover, the three suspensions followed by fresh 
elections suggest the continuation of the preponderance of state power over the 
elected body. These assemblies confirmed the view that there is limited meaning to 
these assemblies and the degree of democracy they represent, as they are in effect 
“consultative rather than legislative …they are not allowed to enact law” (Landon, 
1993).  
 
 
4.5   The Second Political Reform: Separation of the Posts of Crown Prince 
and Prime Minister 
The second political reform, the separation of the posts of the Crown Prince and the 
Prime Minister took effect on the 3rd of July 2003 when Amir Jaber al Sabah gave 
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the premiership to Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah while Sheikh Saad Al Abdullah retained 
the Crown Prince position. 
 
The separation of the two posts has been a long-standing demand from the 
Opposition, as it was perceived to offer the National Assembly more power to 
question the Prime Minister and debate governmental policies and actions without 
appearing to humiliate the future Amir.  In addition to making the Prime Minister 
more responsible in front of the assembly, the MPs would also be encouraged to 
question him without fear or hesitancy. At the same time, the Amir would still retain 
the authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minster as well as the authority to 
accept his resignation. However, this reform was in the end introduced when it was 
convenient and useful to Al Sabah, representing a top-down reform rather than as a 
response to this long standing public demand, which in the eyes of the MPs  
undermined the legitimacy of this long awaited development. 
The views expressed by some of the interviewees support this point. Abdulmohsen 
Jamal (an ex-MP of the National Assembly) who had closely witnessed the debates 
and events surrounding this political reform, indicated that “what happened is that 
Sheikh Saad Al Sabah, who was the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister at that 
time, was ageing and was very sick, so it was hard for him to be present and carry 
his duties appropriately, while Sheikh Sabah was, behind the scenes, carrying out 
those duties” (Interview, 2013). Originally the idea to separate the two posts, as 
Jamal explains, “came from two MPs, Ahmad Al Shuraian and Muhammad Al 
Murshed, who had been calling for the separation of the two posts for a long time”, 
but he added that “I believe that the separation did not come as a result of pressure 
for reform but because there was no other option in front of the Amir, Sheikh Jaber, 
but to respond to Sheikh Sabah’s demands and appoint him the Prime Minister, 
effectively separating the two posts” (Interview, 2013). 
Jamal’s own view is important in that it shows that even though some assembly 
members supported the separation of the posts of Prime Minister and Crown Prince, 
the reform was not entirely popular within the assembly since it was seen primarily 
as a top-down reform and not in response to bottom-up pressure. Jamal’s reasoning 
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goes beyond just rejecting it due to it being a top-down reform; he views the reform 
as problematic and unbeneficial.  He elaborates his position by saying: 
 
I believe the separation of the two posts is not good for the country. When the 
Crown Prince is also holding the post of the Prime Minister this makes him 
more powerful in the assembly and decreases the amount of questioning and 
conflicts we see in the assembly. The thing is that the parliamentarians were 
only afraid of questioning Sheikh Saad because he was very strong, not 
because he was the Crown Prince or the Prime Minister. I think that holding 
the two positions together is a positive thing for Kuwait and having a strong 
Prime Minister would also empower the ministers. In Kuwait when we do 
have a strong assembly and a strong government with strong ministers 
cooperation between legislative and executive is enhanced. However, we have 
a view that the government must be weak and the assembly has to be strong 
or the opposite so that one can control the other and this is not a good thing 
(interview 2013). 
 
 
Also, it is significant to note that he perceives the balance of power between 
executive and legislative in both being strong and finding ways to cooperate for the 
benefit of national interest. His position acknowledges the need to move away from 
the confrontational and adversarial interaction that have characterised the 
institutional relations of National Assembly and the government to a more 
favourable one based on cooperation and mutual strength (Interview, 2013). 
 
In contrast, Al Abdullah expresses the view in support of the separation. He states, 
“There was a popular demand to separate the position of the Prime Minister from 
the position of the Crown Prince” (Interview 2013). He further indicates that the 
demand stemmed from the prevalent traditional political culture that eschews 
offending the Prime Minister because of the position he also holds as Crown Prince, 
and who in the future will be the Amir himself.  So the separation will enable the 
assembly to hold the Prime Minister accountable while safeguarding the future 
Amir from any kind of offence and embarrassment. Because of this Al Abdullah 
emphasised that the assembly was always cautious in questioning and criticising 
the Prime Minister, so when the separation took place the MPs were relieved 
because it had offered them the ability to question him freely (Interview, 2013). 
Al Awadhi was also in favour of the separation but points to what she considered 
the real motivations of Al Sabah to implement such reform”.  She says “The 
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separation of the post of the Prime Minster from the Crown Prince was a major 
reform that needed to happen.” However, she notes that the separation was not done 
as a step forward towards reforming Kuwait’s political system but in order: 
“To protect the Crown Prince from being impeached in the assembly. Because 
when he is holding the two positions together then he is exposed to 
questioning and criticism and because we live in a culture that is more 
patriarchal … and very far from being democratic, you know what it means 
to question a parent ... You know that criticising the ruler is something not 
acceptable, it is the same as criticising our father or the head of the tribe or the 
family. It is just totally unacceptable, so since the Crown Prince is by law 
going to be the father of the country in the future ... Which is the perception 
of the ruler here in Kuwait ... you know they do not think of a ruler as a job 
they think of it as a family and as a father figure, which implies that I just have 
to blindly respect him, no matter what ... so the separation was a tactic to save 
him from being scrutinised, it was not a step forward towards democracy” 
(Interview, 2013). 
 
Al Qahtani has a similar view to Al Awadhi.  He indicates “The separation of the 
two posts of the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister was a significant reform in 
Kuwait’s history which was made possible when Sheikh Sabah was appointed as 
Prime Minister and Sheikh Saad continued to hold the position of the Crown 
Prince”. Al Qahtani states “This reform took place due to the fact that members of 
the assembly were embarrassed to question the Prime Minister who is at the same 
time the Crown Prince and who is going to be the future Amir”. However, Al 
Qahtani insisted “The political reforms in Kuwait in general come as a reaction, 
and not as a series of organised political measures taken by the ruling elites of 
Kuwait to introduce real advancements to the political system... in their content, the 
reforms are not geared towards achieving a real democratic system in Kuwait ” 
(Interview, 2013).    
The benefits of separating the two posts for the process of democracy are apparent 
from the discussion above. Whether the assembly was able to capitalise on this will 
be discussed in Chapter Six. Suffice it to say here that the Amir ended up dissolving 
the Tenth assembly, in 2006, partly due to its insistence on questioning the Prime 
Minister, a sign of the limitation of this reform. 
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4.6   Evaluation of the Institutional Relation of the State and National 
Assembly 
This section evaluates what this period meant in terms of shifting the balance of 
power between the State and National Assembly and if there was any noticeable 
changes in the institutional power balance, which can be an indication of a move 
towards a less authoritarian and more democratic system as Potter’s (1997) scheme 
suggests. Recall from Chapter Three how the institutional relation during the period 
1962-1990 was primarily constrained by two obstacles for transition to democracy: 
the prevalence of segmented identities and cleavages and the subsequent lack of 
national unity, and the ability of Al Sabah to manipulate and control the political 
process through various mechanisms and tactics. The discussion in the following 
section continues to focus on these two essential elements to assess any changes 
that either enhanced the chances of democratisation or augmented these hindrances. 
The discussion starts off with analysis of the consolidation of segmented identities 
and cleavages and then analyses Al Sabah’s continued ability to dominate. 
 
4.6.1   The Consolidation of Segmented Identities and Cleavages   
 
Al Sabah cultivated segmented identities and sustained social cleavages as opposed 
to promoting national unity and/or an arching unifying identity as a tactic to 
maintain their dominance and the centrality of Al Sabah to the political system. 
These segmented identities have been consolidated and even formalised in the 
political process and used to counter each other for the benefit of Al Sabah. During 
this period another factor further augmented this segmentation on the expense of 
developing a national identity and national political agenda, namely, Kuwait’s 
political blocs that emerged, in 1991, post-liberation, as each one of them 
represented a very narrow base and narrow political agenda. These blocs are divided 
along two major ideological orientations: the first bloc is the Islamist and the second 
is the secular/liberal.  These are, in turn, split into several sub-political movements.  
For instance the Islamist bloc is typified by three groups: the Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (ICM) representing the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ikhwan Moslaimeen 
and uses primarily the non-governmental organisation Jamiyyaht Al-Islah Al-
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Ijtama’i (the Social Reform Society) to spread its influence in the Kuwaiti society 
(Brown, 2007). The second group is the Islamic Popular Gathering  (IPG), known 
as Al-Salafin,(Al Mdaires, 2010). Similar to the ICM, it spreads its influence 
through a non-governmental organisation, the Reviving Islamic Heritage society, 
Jamiyyaht Ehya’a Al-Torath Al-Islami (Ismael, 1993). Lastly, is the National 
Islamic Alliance (NIA); a moderate Shi’i bloc, many of whose members come from 
Al-Jamiyyah Al-Thaqafiyyah, the Cultural Association, an organisation 
incorporating several factions among the Shi`a community (Al Mdaires, 1996). 
As for the secular and liberal bloc they are composed of two major groups.  The 
first is the Kuwait Democratic Forum, Al Wast Al Demoqrati, (KDF); a liberal 
opposition bloc with Arab nationalist and left leaning roots (Al Mdaires, 2010). The 
KDF integrated with the National Democratic Alliance, Al Tahalf Al Watani Al 
Demoqrati, which mainly consisted of left-wing liberals (Sharar, 2010). The 
integration can be seen as a forward step to consolidate political blocs with similar 
views making them more effective. The second is the Constitutional Bloc, Al 
Tajamo’o Al Destory and draws its members from the elite and old merchant 
families (Al Mdaires, 1996).   
The emergence of these political blocs suggests on the one hand an increase of 
political awareness and a modernised society, both positive signs from the point of 
view of Potter’s (1997) six prerequisites for democratisation. In addition, this 
development indicates the emergence of organised political activity and an attempt 
to play a part in the decision making process along with Al Sabah. These political 
blocs, nonetheless, were constrained in two essential ways from playing a 
meaningful role in countering the power of Al Sabah, considering that the 
Opposition won the majority of the seats in 1992,1996, 1999 and 2003 assemblies. 
Firstly is the uncertain legal status of the political blocs, which did not allow them 
to evolve into true political parties, due to the fact that the Constitution does not 
technically discuss their establishment. In light of this, the establishment of parties, 
while not “technically illegal” is in practice “not permitted” (Brown: 2010). Article 
(43) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom to form associations and trade 
unions without a provision on forming political parties. The political blocs in 
Kuwait, therefore, are not officially licensed, leading to a debate and confusion 
about their legal status. Sowing further confusion, Article (45) of the Constitution 
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gives organisations the “right to address the authorities”. Some politicians and 
activists take this stipulation as proof of the legitimacy of forming political parties. 
Secondly is the narrow base that they operate from which did not allow for mature 
political agendas to emerge that can effectively address some of the serious 
economic and political issues facing Kuwait. This aspect has been emphasised by 
Alawadhi, Al Qahtani, Al Ghabra, and Jamal as a major obstacle in developing an 
institutional relation between the state and the National Assembly that can curtail 
the dominance of the ruling family and the government, allowing for more 
cooperative and participatory governing processes (Interviewes, 2013). Moreover, 
interviewees (3 & 4) expressed a view acknowledging the difficulty in considering 
these political blocs as instruments for change as their very narrow base and the 
divisive nature of their political positions limits their contribution towards the 
democratisation process (Interview, 2013). Interviewee (6) even rejected the 
position taken by Al Ghabra, (1992) that identifies these blocs as “quasi-parties,” 
because he argued candidates still run as independents indicating that the first 
criterion for considering these as political blocs is an ability to run their own 
candidates formally and on a clear political platform, believing that this will force 
these political blocs to mature and go beyond reflecting their very narrow base, 
which only serves Al Sabah’s rule (Interviews, 2013). Al Awadhi states, “The 
Opposition is weak and highly fragmented; in this respect they mirror Kuwaiti 
society. At the end, the Opposition reflect the composition of the society and they 
mirror the social division found in the society itself. Whether it is tribal, sectarian 
or urban, even the merchant families they have their own representatives in the 
assembly ... each work for their own benefits and have their own political and 
economic agenda…This does not help in establishing genuine powerful 
oppositions … our Opposition and subsequently the assembly are both weak” 
(Interview, 2013). 
One must recognise that the lack of a unified coherent agenda and the presentation 
of narrow based interests that reinforced the segmented identities and cleavages of 
the society have weakened the Assembly’s political role and maintained the 
leverage of the ruling family. Nonetheless, the very existence of these political 
blocs is significant; they are a factor in increasing political awareness and 
encouraging the development of a political environment that could foster 
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democratic values, leading to more favourable conditions for democratising the 
political system. Also they are an important source of political pressure on Al Sabah, 
despite their apparent weakness.   
 
4.6.2   The Continued Dominance of Al Sabah 
 
The second hindrance to the process of democratisation is the enduring ability of 
Al Sabah to maintain dominance, facilitated by the constitutional power invested in 
the Amir thRough his control of the executive (appointing the Prime Minister) as 
well as the right to dissolve the National Assembly which he used three times; only 
one Assembly served its full term during this period 1992-2003. This continued to 
weaken the assembly in relation to Al Sabah, and explains the calls by Opposition 
MPs for more elected members to be part of the Cabinet, which could encourage 
more collaboration between the Assembly and the government and help avoid the 
antagonistic and confrontational politics characterising the political system. 
However, Al Sabah have resisted this as it weakens the control of the ruling family 
over the process of government, since key positions are reserved for Al Sabah 
family members. Also, the presence of 15 unelected members–from the appointed 
Cabinet- with equal voting rights further skews the balance in the assembly in 
favour of Al Sabah ruling family.  
 
Al Sabah’s political dominance (as discussed in Chapter Three) is also facilitated 
by the “rentier ” nature of the economy, which continued to allow the ruling family 
to control this massive wealth and re-channel it in a manner that enhances their 
dominance and increases their ability to manipulate and control social forces and 
the various political blocs.  This explains the focus and determination of the ruling 
family after liberation to restore its dominance by giving the recovery of the oil 
sector and reconstruction efforts high priority. It was also necessitated by the fact 
that Kuwait’s financial system on the eve of the Iraqi invasion was just beginning 
to emerge from the problems related to Souq al Manakh collapse (discussed in 
Chapter Three). The wide spread destruction heaved on the country during the Iraqi 
occupation undermined further the fragility of the system and necessitated the quick 
recovery of the oil sector. In addition, the cost of liberation (large payments to 
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Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations) and cost of reconstruction had eaten a 
large proportion of the Kuwait Fund for the Future. This fund was set up in 1976 in 
order to invest a percentage of around ten per cent (increased in 2011 to 25 per cent) 
of Kuwait’s annual oil revenues for the protection of future generations. It is 
estimated that the cost of liberation and reconstruction at around 20 billion USD 
(El-Ebraheem, 1996: 6) 
 
Nonetheless, Al Sabah family was utterly focused on recovery and reconstruction 
irrespective of cost, especially considering the massive damage inflicted on the oil 
sector and the country’s overall infrastructure. By June 1992 oil production and 
exports resumed, and by 1995, oil production capacity and exports were above the 
pre-invasion levels, the cost of this was estimated at 6.5 billion USD (Metz,1993). 
The value of exports retuned to its 1990 level of around 6 billion USD and 
continued to rise through out this period reaching nearly 27 billion USD in 2004, 
as seen in Table 4.9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9:  Value of Petroleum Exports of Kuwait 1992-2005 (million USD) 
Year Value of Total 
Exports 
Value of Petroleum 
Exports 
Petroleum Exports to 
Total Exports (%)* 
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1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
6,572 
10,246 
11,260 
12,780 
14,889 
14,222 
9,554 
12,192 
19,436 
16,212 
15,351 
20,675 
28,729 
45,011 
6,221 
9,711 
10,459 
12,054 
14,132 
13,468 
8,472 
11,026 
18,185 
14,980 
14,060 
19,005 
26,675 
42,583 
95% 
95% 
93% 
94% 
95% 
95% 
89% 
90% 
94% 
92% 
92% 
92% 
93% 
95% 
             *Calculated by the author: Source: OPEC, 2005, OPEC, 2000. 
 
The massive increase in the value of exports in 2005 to 43 billion USD is a 
reflection of a sudden jump in oil price from 36 USD to nearly 51 USD per barrel. 
The continued dependency of the economy on oil is seen from the share of oil 
exports to total exports averaging 93 per cent for the period 1992-2005, as seen in 
the table above. The recovery of the oil sector and continued flow of massive oil 
revenues has been crucial for Al Sabah in reclaiming legitimacy and maintaining 
the loyalty of citizens, especially in the immediate post-liberation period. 
Government expenditures remained high, as seen in Chart 4.1. It peaked in 1992 to 
11 billion USD due to the extra expenditures associated with the Iraqi invasion such 
as payment to all government employees for the seven month period of the 
occupation, raised salaries, and written off 1.2 billion USD in consumer loans and 
3.4 billion USD worth of property and housing loans made before the invasion 
(Mertz, 1993). The average spending during the period 1992-2005 stood at 9.36 
billion USD per annum. 
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Chart 4.1: Kuwait Government Spending 1992-2005 (billions USD)  
        Source: Global Economy, 2016). 
 
This continued reliance on oil indicates that the country’s long-term strategy to 
diversify the economy and lessen dependency on oil revenues and provide more 
opportunities for private sector involvement in economic development in 
preparation for the post-oil era has not materialised. Kuwait has found such a 
transition very difficult as the public sector’s economic dominance as well as the 
philosophy of the welfare state has become ingrained in the society. At both 
domestic and international levels, the capacity of the government to continue with 
its very generous distributive function has been highlighted as unsustainable, and 
also the necessity to embark on economic reforms as crucial to the economic 
progress of Kuwait (Oxford business group, 2015: 1).  
 
This difficulty is shared with other Gulf Monarchies where such trends of 
redistributive polices of oil wealth are part of the legitimisation process of ruling 
families. So the question of how to embark on an economic reform agenda that 
implies the restructuring of the relation between citizen and state without losing the 
legitimacy of the ruling families is of a paramount importance to these states. 
Kuwait is in a better position than the rest of the Gulf States because of its long 
standing constitutionally guaranteed elected legislative body. This coupled with the 
adoption of political reforms that are intended to promote democratisation could 
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potentially strengthen the National Assembly and civil society organisations and 
facilitate the gradual restructuring of the relation of state and society while 
maintaining the rule of Al Sabah. It is noticeable, however, from the above 
discussion that political reforms have not produced such an outcome, moreover, 
political blocs have been unable to promote national unity and/or national agendas 
and are still focused on narrowly based interests emphasising divisions and social 
segmentation, which in turn undermines the very process of democratisation as well 
as the process of economic reforms. 
 
This lack of national unity and national political or economic agenda have served 
Al Sabah well as they continue to provide the basis for their dominance and 
relevance as the force that ties and unites all these fragmented social forces. Al 
Sabah ruling family remain the “arbiter” and the “unifying” force among the 
plethora of interests and they continue to cultivate these segmented interests rather 
than national unity. However, this has created more antagonism, which 
consolidated the confrontational pattern of politics and encouraged a stalemate in 
the relation between state and society. Al Sabah have shown little commitment for 
creating the conditions that allow for a structural shift in the relation between the 
legislative and executive branches, and Kuwait appears to be locked in a vicious 
circle. The political reforms need to actually establish a participatory governing 
process that enhances a collaborative relation between the assembly and the 
government in order to embark on the difficult task of rolling back the state and 
adopting the long standing diversification strategy. The inability to break this 
vicious circle has sown the seeds for further significant deterioration in the relation 
between assembly and executive, during the period 2006-2013, as the discussion in 
Chapter Six will show, resulting in political instability and turmoil causing a retreat 
in the process of democratisation and in turn impacting on economic progress and 
development.   
 
 
4.7   Conclusion 
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This chapter shows that the golden opportunity afforded to post-liberation Kuwait 
to move towards a more democratic political system was thwarted despite the 
revival of the National Assembly in 1992. Al Sabah continued with its tendency to 
dissolve the National Assembly as the ultimate mechanism for resolving differences 
and protracted political debates, albeit the dissolutions were constitutional and the 
ruler called for elections within the constitutionally specified period. In addition, 
they continued to rely on the manipulation and promotion of societal divisions and 
segmented identities and oil wealth as mechanisms of control and suppression and 
basis of their legitimacy.  
Nonetheless, despite the lack of change in the institutional relation between the 
National Assembly and the State, one of Potter’s (1997) main conditions for a 
transition to democracy, manifested by the continued reliance of Al Sabah on the 
mechanisms of control and dissolutions, the fact that the assembly was restored and 
its dissolutions occurred in accordance to the Constitution is significant to the 
process of political reform. The successive assemblies, also, showed themselves 
capable of challenging Al Sabah, indicating that pro-democracy political culture 
that could already be discerned in the period prior to 1990 continued to exist in the 
post-war period, as the majority of the assemblies during this time were composed 
of oppositional politicians. Moreover, the citizens’ strong impulse towards 
democracy is also shown by the value attached to the National Assembly’s elections 
reflected in voter turnout and the assembly’s debates. In this sense Dahl’s emphasis 
on the importance of political participation and contestation bears fruit as Al Sabah 
are constantly being challenged by these two processes, and that despite their many 
shortfalls are still factors to be considered as promoters of democratisation.  
 
It is also noticeable that Potter’s (1997) factors of civil society and transnational 
and international engagement have had a definite influence on promoting 
democracy. The analysis showed that pressures exerted by the U.S. as well as 
societal bottom-up pressures during and after liberation led to the restoration of the 
National Assembly. However, a mixed picture emerges when we examine Potter’s 
(1997) economic development and societal divisions indicating that these acted as 
both promoters and inhibitors. In the case of economic development it continued to 
have a mixed impact as urbanisation and education enhanced the impulse towards 
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democracy and the activism exhibited by Kuwaitis during occupation and in post-
liberation Kuwait, while the “rentier ” nature of the economy continues to keep 
Kuwaitis highly dependent on the state which gives Al Sabah immense power over 
society. Segmented identities and societal divisions have been further augmented 
as a result of the consolidation of a number of political blocs that uses these 
divisions as a base for its political activities, hence weakening the development of 
a national identity that could serve as a promoter of democracy. 
The following chapter analyses the circumstances that led to the second set of 
political reforms, in specific the two amendments of the 1981 election law: women 
suffrage in 2005 and the redefining of the electoral districts in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five:  The Reforms of the Electoral System and State-
Society relation 2005-2006 
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5.1   Introduction  
The two major political reforms of the electoral system: granting women political 
rights in 2005 and redefining the electoral districts in 2006 require detailed analysis 
in order to provide a full understanding of the circumstances that led to these 
significant reforms and to assess the dynamism between state and civil society in 
Kuwait. Substantial and sustained bottom-up pressure was put on the State by 
women organisations and women activists in order to effect the first reform while 
the youth movement, which became known as the Orange Movement pushed for 
the second one. 
 
The analysis, other than completing the narrative of the democratic reform process 
during the period under study, has a theoretical value also as it focuses on the role 
of CSOs and civil movements in effecting change towards democratisation. Potter 
(1997) indicates, in line with the wider literature on democracy (discussed in 
Chapter Two), of the importance of civil society in restricting the power of the state 
through mobilisation and exerting bottom-up pressures. This chapter shows how 
these two civil movements have successfully organised, mobilised and vocalised its 
demands in order to effect these two important reforms. Furthermore, giving 
women political rights falls in line with Dahl’s (1971) emphasis on the need to 
widen political participation in order to create a more democratic political system, 
while reducing the electoral districts helps in making contestation, Dahl’s other 
significant element, more meaningful based on national agendas and programmes 
rather than the segmented and narrow based interests. The increased activism of 
civil society through these two movements corresponds to Dahl’s third element of 
the importance of civil liberties and political freedoms and more importantly the 
presence of the possibility of effecting change through the activism of CSOs and/or 
civil movements.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
examines the challenges and the legal and practical restrictions faced by Kuwait’s 
CSOs due to state’s imposed control. The discussion, then moves, in the second 
section to examine the arduous and long process that led to granting women their 
political rights while the third section details how the youth Orange Movement 
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pushed for the second reform in an unofficial alliance with the reformist MPs. The 
chapter concludes with the assertion that civil society and its associations and/or 
movements have a role in effecting changes and pushing for bottom-up reforms 
despite the legal and practical constraints imposed by the state.  
 
 
5.2   Overview of the State and Kuwait’s Civil Society Organisations  
The literature on civil society organisations, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
emphasises two aspects that make them effective in counterbalancing the power of 
the state; being autonomous and voluntaristic. Part of the debate on CSOs in the 
Middle East region is the fact that these do not lend themselves to such a definition.  
However, despite the control and restrictions imposed by the Kuwaiti state on these 
organisations and despite the fact that they are dominated by primordial affiliations 
and identities some of these CSOs have been instrumental in limiting the power of 
the state and in pushing for the electoral reforms that otherwise would not have 
happened. It is, thus, crucial to understand the environment that these organisations 
operate within in order to appreciate their value and their importance in effecting 
change, particularly in the case of women’s struggle for their political rights and 
the Orange Movement pushing for redefining the electoral boundaries.  
 
The legal frame imposed by the state on the formation and activities of the CSOs 
in Kuwait has been an influential tool in keeping them weak and relatively 
ineffective and under the control of the government, manipulating them to serve its 
interests. Law (24) of 1962 that organises the formation and activities of CSOs 
makes the registration of CSOs with the government mandatory and requires them 
also to register as public benefit societies Jame’yat Nafa’a A’am. Moreover, Article 
(6) of the law bans the CSOs and the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) 
from “interfering with politics and religious conflicts”. Since the law does not 
define the term “political activities” the government, therefore, grants its 
representative bodies such as the Minister of Interior (MOI) the right to curtail a 
wide range of activities it deems politically threatening, also, banning the CSOs 
from participating in public policy debates.  
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In addition, there are restrictions with regard to fundraising, as Article (22) of the 
law stipulates that CSOs are only permitted to collect funds once each year after 
first receiving a licence from the government. This situation makes government 
funding crucial while simultaneously starving these organisations from access to 
other sources of funds that can expand their activities and increase their 
effectiveness. Government funding is in some cases insufficient to operate these 
associations, however, it provides other kind of benefits such as reimbursing travel 
expenses to conferences or missions, permits the secondment of civil servants to 
assist the CSOs with their work and provides grants for specific projects, all of 
which is designed to restrict and control the CSOs. 
 
Article (43) of Kuwait’s constitution 1962 grants citizens, on the one hand, the right 
to form associations, stipulating “Freedom to form associations and unions on a 
national basis and by peaceful means” while on the other, the same article stipulates 
that this right “shall be guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner 
specified by law”.  The law of associations has been organised in such a manner as 
to restrict this right in practice, prohibiting groups from engaging in political 
activities. Moreover, the law gives the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 
(MOSAL) the responsibility for either approving or refusing requests for licences 
of CSOs, in addition to rejecting some licence requests on the grounds that 
established NGOs already provide similar services or if it deems that the NGO does 
not provide a public service. Moreover, members of licenced NGOs must obtain 
permission from the MOSAL to attend international conferences as official 
representatives of their organisations(Al Mughni,1996). 
 
The government, thus, is deemed the ultimate political controller weakening civil 
society from functioning effectively, as MOSAL is in the end responsible for 
permitting the registration of an organisation, overseeing its functions and 
regulating its activities as well as its finances.  In addition, MOSAL can dissolve 
any association’s elected board of directors if it believes it is conducting 
inappropriate activity or mishandling the association’s funds and the Cabinet, upon 
its recommendation, can dissolve organisations. For example a Cabinet decree on 
6 of August 1993 ordered the dissolution of all unlicensed human rights and 
humanitarian organisations (Al Mdaires, 2010). Some human rights activists were 
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able to circumvent this order by holding their meetings under the umbrella of 
registered societies such as the Alumni Society (Assiri, 2007). Further control is 
practiced through the letter of the law. Although Law 38 of 1964 guarantees the 
rights of workers and employers to form labour unions, however, the same law 
states that any union must include at least 100 workers, 15 must be citizens. This 
requirement is limiting because it discourages unions in sectors that hire few 
citizens mainly the private sector with its high concentration of low skilled foreign 
labour.  
 
The level of autonomy of the CSOs from the state, as indicated by Rana Al 
Abdulrazzaq (political activist), “depends on the nature of their activities and how 
appropriate it is to the current political atmosphere; the CSOs that are not involved 
with political or legal issues and are involved with charitable activities are much 
more autonomous and enjoy greater freedom than those who have political agendas 
and activities” (Interview, 2013). However she added “all CSOs are monitored by 
MOSAL, which weakens them as pressure groups especially if they tend to be 
politically active and try to introduce reforms” (Interview, 2013). Tetreault and 
AlGhanim (2009), however, observed that despite these restrictions and control 
mechanisms, the shape, the role, the leadership and even the membership of the 
CSOs in Kuwait has developed over the years to address political issues. Hassan 
Joher (ex-member of the National Assembly) supports this idea, remarking that 
recently CSOs have flourished, and due to the absence of political parties it is 
common to see these associations “try to fill a gap and play the role of formal 
political parties; that is why they sometimes adopt cases of a political nature.” He 
points out “for example the Teachers, Lawyers and the Student Unions, though they 
are meant to be professional associations, tend to play a political role and this have 
empowered and strengthened the democratic movement in Kuwait” (Interview, 
2013). This suggests that CSOs are adaptable and responsive to the climate in which 
they find themselves and that they can exert bottom-up pressures to effect political 
reforms.  
 
Joher, Al AbdularazaQ, Al Abduallah and Al Qahtani emphasise that Kuwait 
enjoys an active civil associational life, and was a pioneer among Gulf States in this 
regard whether through the early establishment of women, professional and Alumni 
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associations, or labour and student unions (Interviews, 2013). Nonetheless, the 
number of the CSOs in Kuwait is relatively small; by 2011 Kuwait had only 84 
CSOs  (Al Anba’a, 2012). These have expanded to include a much wider range of 
associations such as activists’ associations serving certain purposes such as 
women’s rights, human rights, the disabled and children’s rights (ibid.). Al Awadhi 
supports this view, stating, “civil society associations whether formal or informal 
like the diwaniyyas, have always been politically active” (Interview, 2013). 
However, she adds, “some of the associations cannot engage directly in politics, but 
many oppose the government such as the Alumni’s Association, but also there are 
those who are pro-government and there are those who are dominated by a 
particular political group, such as Kuwait’s University Student Union who for 
decades has been controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.” (Interview, 2013). Al 
Awadhi also mentions a trend by which people who are politically active and have 
a political agenda use civil society organisations in order “to easily jump to the 
assembly and become MPs” (Interview, 2013). Meaning these associations become 
training grounds and channels of public exposure that provide Kuwaitis with a 
platform to develop their political expertise, preparing them to enter the political 
arena.  
 
Al Qahtani, emphasises the increased political activities of CSOs by indicating that 
they “do interfere now in politics; for example we saw the committees and the 
groups who were concerned with the disabled have been politically active to the 
point that they had succeeded in issuing a law for the establishment of an authority 
for the handicapped people in Kuwait”. Besides that, he said, “regarding the 
increasing of salaries …in many occasions we saw the unions and associations … 
demonstrating in front of the assembly to achieve their goals” (Interview, 2013). 
Joher, Al Awadhi and Al Qahtani all agreed that recently the politics in Kuwait is 
not only led and monitored by the Amir and the assembly; it is also led by a variety 
of civil society associations.  Moreover, Al Abdullah states, “The existence of 
CSOs in Kuwait reflects the increased awareness of the society and their concerns 
towards human rights, citizenship and political participation, besides the active role 
of the youth and their desire to bring about more political reforms”.  However, he 
accepts the control of CSOs by the various political blocs by indicating: 
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Political blocs control of CSOs is something normal in any society. If you 
have a political bloc how do you think it will be able to represent itself in the 
society? You will be for sure using, for example, the Student Unions and any 
other civil association as a conduit to reflect and represent your ideas and 
ideologies, in addition to using the media. So I believe those organisations do 
represent and reflect the larger political blocs found in the society and I would 
add that most of them represent the Islamic blocs in the state of Kuwait” 
(Interview, 2013). 
 
 
Abdullah’s position and acceptance of the link between political blocs and civil 
society organisations is problematic, as this linkage has contributed to the weakness 
of Kuwait’s civil society. As much as the state controls and manipulates CSOs to 
its advantage, the political blocs do the same, hence, restricting the autonomy of 
civil associations to act as a counter force to state power.  
This autonomy as the literature on civil society (as discussed in Chapter Two) 
indicated is an essential component in making CSOs a channel for the discontent of 
citizens away from both state and political blocs. Thus the function and 
effectiveness of CSOs varies in accordance to their ability to escape the restrictions 
imposed by the government and their financial dependency on the state as well as 
the influence of the political blocs they are associated with. In other words the road 
for autonomy is complex and challenging. Interviewee (7) (member of a civil 
society organisation) emphasised this negative influence of political blocs in 
restricting the autonomy of civil society by “making and using the associations as 
a mirror reflection of their ideas, beliefs and political positioning”, in particular he 
emphasised that the Islamists political blocs exert an influence on the direction and 
activities of some civil associations as much as the state (Interview, 2013).   
  
Funais Al Ajmi, (consultant for Kuwait Labour Union), on the other hand, 
emphasises the negative influence of government funding on the autonomy of 
CSOs by indicating that those CSOs fully subsidised by the government are “pro-
governmental”, they do not dare oppose the government; they lack autonomy so 
they are always supportive of the government’s policies and they do not deny that ” 
(Interview, 2013). He adds, “A good example of these are the lawyers and teachers 
associations as well as some of the financial associations. Whereas the associations 
that are not subsidised by the government are always opposing government policies 
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and are hence being monitored closely...those include the National Labour Union 
and Kuwait’s Transparency Association” (Interview, 2013). 
 
Al Awadhi points to another recent restriction that weakens CSOs by indicating that 
sometimes the international political environment, especially post 9/11 exercises 
pressure on the government to scrutinise and limit the work of some CSOs “under 
the umbrella of fighting terrorism”.  She added a number of CSOs work have been 
restricted and others were banned from raising funds for humanitarian aid for fear 
they have links to international terrorism, without the government providing any 
evidence of that (Interview, 2013).  
 
In summary, Kuwait witnessed the emergence of CSOs of various nature, activity 
and scope, however, the manner in which the government organised the relation 
with CSOs through Law Number 24 /1962 weakens civil society and restricts their 
autonomy. Moreover the government’s strategy in dealing with CSOs is based on 
breaking down solidarities built on voluntaristic identities and reinforcing 
traditional primordial or religious identities, which further undermines the 
development of an effective civil society and the liberal/secular impulses in the 
society. Nonetheless, the liberal reformist impulse of the Kuwaiti society allowed 
some associations, notably women organisations and activists and the Youth 
Orange Movement, to overcome the restrictions and control mechanisms of the 
state and resist the segmented traditional and conservative trend to become effective 
in pushing for political reform of the electoral system as the following discussion 
shows. A note of caution about the next section, the discussion only focuses on 
women activism and their long struggle for their political rights rather than on 
assessing women CSOs and their impact on the overall position and role of Kuwaiti 
women which is beyond the scope of this study.   
 
5.3   Women’s Struggle for Equal Rights and Political Participation  
On 16 May 2005, the Tenth National Assembly granted women full political rights 
allowing them to vote and run for office in parliamentary and local elections after 
a long struggle by women rights’ campaigners. As indicated by Lulua al-Mulla, 
general secretary of Kuwait’s Social and Cultural Women’s Society, “It has been 
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20 years of work, but at last we got our rights. It is about time” (CNN: 2005b). In 
fact the time it took women to be treated equal to men was over four decades. The 
analysis starts off with the constitutional view on women’s political rights as this 
contradicted Election Law No 25/1961. 
 
Constitutional-legal perspective     The election Law (1961) limited suffrage to 
male Kuwaiti citizens above the age of 21. When examining Kuwait’s Constitution 
1962, Articles (6) and (7) stipulate that, “The System of Government in Kuwait 
shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides in the people, the source of 
all powers.  Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner specified in this 
Constitution” (Kuwait’s Constitution, 1962). Furthermore, Article (7) states 
“Justice, Liberty, and Equality are the pillars of society; co-operation and mutual 
help are the firmest bonds between citizens”. In addition to that, Article (29) states 
“(1) all people are equal in human dignity and in public rights and duties before the 
law, without distinction to race, origin, language, or religion. (2) Personal liberty is 
guaranteed.”  The Election Law, therefore, contradicts the constitution with regards 
to depriving females of their political rights and offering them only to males.  
 
It can be noted that the Constitution did not discriminate in its provisions between 
male and female; instead it emphasised equality to each and every citizen.  Since 
the Constitution is the guide of the state then offering women their political rights 
was an obligation since its promulgation. Moreover, the Constitution does not 
differentiate between male and female with regard to the membership of the 
Legislative Authority; Article (80) elaborates on this, stating, “The National 
Assembly is composed of fifty members elected directly by universal suffrage and 
secret ballot in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the electoral law”.  
While the Constitution declares that men and women are to be equal before the law 
and ensures them equal rights and opportunities, in practice this principle was 
ignored in the election law as it denied women their political rights. This situation, 
as described by Mohammed Al Yousifi, (political activist and a writer), “raises 
questions about the assembly's claim to be the legitimate representative of Kuwaiti 
citizens”, however, “it encouraged women to fight to gain their political rights” 
(Interview, 2013). The exclusion of women from playing any political or public 
role was not at odds with the times then, as indicted by Al Abdullah, “This exclusion 
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was imposed by the old, traditional nature of the society and at that time was 
acceptable for a conservative society such as Kuwait” (Interview, 2013).                                                                                                           
 
The traditional and conservative political and ideological environment was a huge 
obstacle to the advancement of women’s rights as they based their opposition on 
the Sunni’s strict religious Islamic interpretations of women’s rights and place in 
society. In the assembly the demands to grant women their political rights were 
always opposed by the different conservative forces; royal, tribal and Islamist 
groups, in addition, opposing women’s political rights was sometimes based upon 
the electoral calculations of some MPs who were only trying to appease their voters 
and achieve political gains in their constituencies 
(Salim,2007).                                                                                                              
Another significant obstacle that delayed the granting of full suffrage to women is 
what Wills (2013:174) considers Kuwait’s paradox concerning two of Dahl’s 
important conditions for the transition to democracy: contestation and political 
participation. She indicates that the politics of Kuwait and the National Assembly 
points to a focus on contestation and the increased power of the assembly rather 
than widening political participation (ibid.). This focus is also seen through the 
aforementioned restriction on the overall electoral base, which approximates what 
Dahl calls “competitive oligarchy” (1971.) The expansion, thus, in the electoral 
base through giving women their political rights is a significant development in 
terms of increasing electoral participation and undermining the oligarchy that   
characterised the electoral system. This enfranchisement was overdue and came 
after a long struggle.                                                                                                    
 
Women’s long arduous struggle     Organised women’s activism began in 1962 
when the Liberal female activist, Noureya Al-Saddani, established Kuwait’s first 
women’s association, the Arab Women’s Renaissance Association, later changed 
to the Family Renaissance Association (Tetreault, 2004). Many other associations 
followed this development such as the establishment of the Arab Women’s 
Development Society (AWDS) in 1963, whose members were middle class women, 
and marked a qualitative change in the type of women association (Al-
Mughni,1993). AWDS was a vocal association empowering women to exercise 
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their full citizenship rights and working towards improving women’s status and 
demanding gender equality in all fields of life. Also they touched on sensitive issues 
relating to family law such as the provision of child allowance for divorcees and 
the restriction of Polygamy (ibid.).                                                        
As early as 1973, Kuwait’s assembly reviewed the “Equal Rights Bill” put forward 
by AWDS to grant women “equal societal and political rights” including the 
demand on restricting polygamy in the society. The assembly was not in favour to 
the “scope of the feminists’ demands” and rejected the Bill (Olimat, 2009: 201). 
The Sunni Islamists and the traditionalists MPs represented by the tribes, held the 
view that the exposure of women to public life through suffrage would lead to 
women’s moral corruption (Tetreault, 2011). The secular opposition and women’s 
rights movement responded with increased persistence on demanding political 
rights. For instance, the Girls’ Club, Nadi Alfata, established in 1975 by a group of 
upper-class women and focusesd on women in sport, in conjunction with AWDS 
demanded the change in the electoral law to give women political rights (Olimat, 
2009). Two MPs, Jassim Al Qatami and Rashid Al Farhan in 1975 submitted  a 
draft of a law to offer women their political rights, however, the draft was not 
discussed due to the dissolution of the assembly in 1976 (Joher, 2001).  The 
government did not tolerate the pressure from those associations and in order to 
weaken the influence of the secular opposition it closed the Independent Club and 
dissolved the elected boards of most of the associations controlled by the left and 
nationalist groups and appointed new ones (Al Mdaires,                       1996).  
 
This was part of the overall intolerance of the government to any sort of organised 
political activity. The government in 1978 accused AWDS of financial fraud, 
although, this was never evidenced (Al Mughni, 1993). A female government 
the continued refusal of the but after  official was appointed president of AWDS
members to collaborate with the newly appointed leader, the government disbanded 
AWDS (ibid.). This incident reinforced government’s control and its intolerance of 
dissent, indicating a continuous struggle for power between the associations and the 
government. Such control and restrictions also explain to some degree why the 
women enfranchisement movement took such a long time to materialise.  
Nonetheless, Women Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) continued to work on 
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raising awareness about women’s rights and promoting the advancement of women 
despite numerous failed campaigns.                                    Lulwa AL Qattami, the 
leader of the WCSS, recognised the strength of the opposition to women suffrage 
and acknowledged, “They are very organised. We as liberal women are not so 
organised.” (GNAD, 2011)  Also a poll by Kuwait University showed that 58 per 
cent of men eligible to vote opposed women suffrage, and only 27 per cent 
supported it  (ibid.).                                                                                               
However, during the Iraqi occupation, women played an active role in the resistance 
movement, smuggling food and weapons across the Iraqi checkpoints, participating 
in demonstrations against the occupation, volunteering in hospitals, some women 
were detained and killed while others went missing (Al Dhamki, 1991). Because of 
that extensive role, the government following the liberation of Kuwait, promised 
women that they would be acknowledged for their efforts by granting them their 
political rights (Olimat, 2009). Al Yousifi and Al Abdulrazzaq indicate that the 
occupation was an opportunity to gain greater support for the women rights’ 
campaign due to internal pressure as well as external pressure primarily from 
Western allies (Interview, 2013). Also during the post-liberation period women 
began to campaign effectively for their rights. For example, in 1996, 500 women 
stopped working for an hour to demand suffrage, whereas, in 2002, a group of 
women organised non-violent demonstrations near two voter registration centres in 
an attempt to vote and enter their names on the ballots, and during the elections of 
2003, women established mock ballots that allowed hundreds of women to cast 
symbolic votes for real candidates (GNAD, 2011).                                                                
On 22 October 1992, a proposal was presented by the MP Hamad Aljoa’an, offering 
women the right to vote and to lower the age of the voters to 18 but was rejected by 
the “Interior and Defense Committee” of the assembly, and consequently was not 
discussed (Joher, 2001). Simultaneously a committee was established to study the 
viability of offering women their full political rights according to Islamic rules. In 
1994 a new proposal was presented by three MPs: Jassim Al Saqer, Abdulmohsen 
Jamal, Abdullah Al Naibari and Ali Al Baghli but it was rejected again by the same 
committee, saying that the proposal is not acceptable because it stands against 
Islamic rules and regulations, which do not approve offering women political rights 
(Joher, 2001). On 31 December 1996, the MPs Sami Al Monais, Abdullah Alnaibari 
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and Hassan Joher proposed the same law but it was refused again on 29 January 
1997 (Joher, 2001). The MPs Abdullah Khorshid and Abbas Alkhadari also 
proposed a draft bill offering women their political rights but it was also rejected in 
1997 (ibid.).  The rejection came with an excuse presented by the Ministry of Awqaf 
and Islamic Affairs reiterating that it is not Islamic to offer women their political 
rights and that it is against Shari’a, Islamic rules (Olimat, 2009). 
A turning point came on May 1999 when Sheikh Jaber promulgated the Amiri 
Decree Number 9 of the Year 1999 granting women electoral rights, allowing 
women to vote and run for office in the elections which was due in 2003 (Tetreault, 
2003:217). The decree was issued after Sheikh Jaber dissolved the assembly in 4 
May 1999. There was huge support for the decree from women’s advocacy groups 
and international actors (Joher, 2001). However, the Islamists and Liberals opposed 
the move; the Islamists based their opposition on religious grounds, while the 
liberals based their opposition on the grounds that this action was a direct attack on 
the power of the National Assembly. The decree, as stipulated by the Constitution, 
needed to be ratified by the assembly, elected in July 1999 (Tetreault, 2003). The 
assembly rejected the Amiri Decree on November 1999 by a vote of 41 to 21 
(Olimat, 2009). Jamal explains: “The MPs rejected the Decree as a matter of a 
principle because they did not want it to be imposed from above and by Sheikh 
Jaber himself as a top-down reform” (Interview, 2013). However, when a group of 
liberals introduced an identical bill, at the end of November 1999, the bill also 
failed, with a vote of 32-30 (Joher, 2001). This indicates that a more complex 
dynamic was at play exposing the paradox of democratisation in Kuwait as the 
focus of the National Assembly’s members continued to be on increasing the 
assembly’s power over increased participation of Kuwaiti citizens.  
When examining the government’s initiatives for political reforms in regard to 
women suffrage and how serious the government was in widening the electoral 
base, Tetreault argues that the topic of women’s political rights was a “playing 
card” used by the government to distract people’s attention from criticising it and 
focusing on its policies (2003:232). This was evident in 1999 when Sheikh Jaber 
Al Sabah decreed the enfranchisement of women, which was only “an attempt to 
refocus the election campaign away from criticism of the government, and onto 
divisions in society over the issue of votes for women” (Al Najjar, 2001). Some of 
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the interviewees (4,5,6,) confirm such a view, indicating that Al Sabah resort to all 
sorts of distractions and manipulations of the divisive divisions in the society to 
maintain their dominance and to avoid accountability (interviews, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the emergence of Islamist groups in the early 1980s and the increased 
Islamisation of the society through emphasising religious norms and values and a 
rejection of Western ideas and norms was accompanied with an expansion in 
women involvement in the Islamic movement. This involvement revolved around 
emphasising women’s traditional role in society towards their family and 
community as well as wearing the Islamic dress (Olimat, 2009). Islamic dress 
became increasingly visible on campuses and in society at large. Two main active 
women Islamic organisations were formed, Bayadir al-Salam, and Islamic Care 
Society, supporting the resurgence of the traditional female virtues and morality 
and stressing the differences between female and male, and their different roles in 
life (Al Mughni, 1996). They emphasised the domestic role of women of 
establishing a family and raising children, while stressing women’s role in society, 
urging them to defend society’s traditions and customs (ibid.). 
 
This involvement, however, had the impact of women seeing that they were outside 
the political decision making process and on the fringes of a male dominated 
movement. A noticeable change, hence, occurred in the 1990s where some vocal 
Islamist women began to address gender inequalities and articulate women’s 
interests and rights away from the traditional views of women’s role in society, and 
they began announcing their public support for the suffrage struggle (Olimat, 2009). 
Furthermore, they formed an alliance with liberal women activists, hence, giving 
greater credibility to the suffrage movement as women’s rights advocates can use a 
religious argument, in addition to the arguments based on the stipulations of the 
Constitution and international human rights declarations to advance their cause (Al 
Mughni, 2010).  According to Lama Al Othman (Journalist) , “this was a dramatic 
shift in favour of women suffrage and also a warning to the Islamist movement of 
the changing political awareness of their women members” (Interview, 2013). 
More attempts followed in support of women suffrage. In October 2003, the 
Cabinet approved a draft legislation to grant women their political rights; the 
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legislation, once again did not receive parliamentary approval. However, women’s 
rights campaign received some new support in 2005 from the Ummah party, Hizeb 
Al Ummah, which became the first Sunni Muslim group in the Gulf region to 
publicly support women’s suffrage (Al Mdaires, 2010). A possible reason is that 
the “active participation of Islamist women in the suffrage movement was 
instrumental in softening the Islamist position towards the enfranchisement of 
women” (Al Mughni, 2010: 8).  In March 2005, 1,000 demonstrators gathered 
peacefully outside of the assembly to reinforce their demand for suffrage (GNAD, 
2011). A small number of male protesters were present demonstrating against 
women’s suffrage but were overshadowed by the large number of the pro-suffrage 
demonstrators who wore pale blue to represent the struggle for suffrage (ibid). 
Women's rights’ groups also started a publicity campaign and continued to 
demonstrate. The Tenth National Assembly passed law 17/2005 on the 16th of  May 
2005 granting women their political rights (Herb, 2005).  
Jamal stated in his reaction to the passing of the bill that “I regard this reform as 
correcting a mistake that was made in the past by excluding the other half of 
society … now I can say we are in the process of completing our democratic journey 
by widening political participation and enhancing government accountability” 
(Interview, 2013). However, this win came with a price tag in which the Islamists 
insisted on adding a clause requiring women both voters and candidates to adhere 
to Shari’a by the specific stipulation that "A Kuwaiti woman, voting and running 
for political office, should do so while fully adhering to the dictates of Islamic 
Shari’a” (BBC, 2005). Islamists women activists, nonetheless, continued to work 
together with liberal women on the full integration of women in the public political 
sphere (Al Mughni 2010: 9). Such cooperation leads to undermining the 
conservative male dominated religious groups, and is essential to further women 
causes and issues in Kuwait. Al Ghabra pointed to the success of the Islamist and 
liberal women agreeing on a political platform, despite their ideological differences, 
something that needs “to extend to other groups in the society in order to act above 
parochial and segmented interests towards a national political platform” (Interview, 
2013). 
It is important to clarify the circumstances of such a historical vote, as this 
ratification appeared to have come unexpectedly. The National Assembly met first 
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to discuss legislation introduced two weeks earlier allowing women to run in 
Municipal Council elections, which was thwarted by the assembly (Olimat, 2009). 
The Cabinet opened the session on 16 May 2005 by proposing a complete 
amendment of the election law and it invoked a rarely used “order for urgency” to 
push through the legislation in one session rather than two (Tetreault in Wills, 
2013:182). The legislation was ratified by a vote of 35 in favour and 23 against, 
with one abstention (BBC, 2005). An explanation to this unexpected turn of events 
just two weeks after the assembly rejected the right of women to run in Municipal 
council election relates to the Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Jaber Al Sabah and 
his planned trip to U.S. (NY Times, 2005).  Sheikh Sabah was under immense 
pressure to grant women their full political rights prior to arriving in the U.S. A 
spokesman for the U.S. State Department, Richard A. Boucher, called the 
legislation “an important step forward for the women of Kuwait and for the nation 
as a whole “ (ibid.). 
In summary, a combination of factors played a role in enfranchising women after a 
long struggle and many failed attempts. Firstly, is the long activism of women 
themselves and the increased bottom-up pressure through increased public actions, 
secondly, the consistent and multiple attempts by the enlightened segments in the 
assembly that were willing to keep pushing until the legislation was enacted as law, 
thirdly, the role of the government in pushing it through the assembly and 
persuading reluctant elements to vote in favour and finally the role of Islamist 
women activists and the support of Hizb Al Ummah political party. It was claimed 
that the government used bribery to get the vote through (Shultziner in Wills, 
2013:182).  
 
Although this has been a significant moment in Kuwait’s democratisation process, 
women political rights do not necessarily translate into liberating women from the 
traditional and restricting social attitudes and/or elevating their status and place in 
the society as equal to men. Interviewee (8), (blogger and political activist) 
“considers the advancement of women through granting them political rights as a 
superficial gesture and not enough to effect a structural change in the role of women, 
moving it from fundamentally being a family and house bound role to a wider scope 
of opportunities in order to contribute fully in social, cultural and political life” 
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(Interview, 2013). However, the interviewee notes, also that women’s associations 
were very active in pushing for other rights such as of those Kuwaiti women who 
are married to non-Kuwaitis. This suggests the multi-layered aspect of women’s 
struggle for equality and the awareness of women associations of the crucial social 
issues that matter also to Kuwaiti women.   
 
 
5.4   The Orange Movement and Redefining the Electoral Districts  
The educated Kuwaiti youth played an active civil role in pushing for political 
reforms, in particular, the redefining of the electoral districts. Smith Diwan notes 
that the youth in Kuwait are “Like the youth in Tunis and Cairo, working toward a 
more civic order, grounded in constitutional rights and realised through citizens’ 
activism” (2011:16).  Yet while in harmony with some of the objectives of other 
Arab youth movements in the Middle East, “the Orange Movement predates them 
and is driven by developments specific to Kuwaiti politics.” In so far as, it does not 
call for the downfall of Al Sabah rule but for a curtailment of their dominance (ibid.). 
Political activism in Kuwait is more about changing the relation with the state and 
ruling elites rather than overthrowing the rule of Al Sabah. Despite this, there is, as 
the discussion in the previous chapters indicated, little evidence of the willingness 
of Al Sabah to concede to such a change in the relation.  
 
The gridlock characterising the political system and the increased level of 
combativeness and belligerence between the government and the National 
Assembly was the catalyst behind the emergence of this new force embodied in the 
youth AL-Ḥaraka AL-Burtuqaliyya, the Orange Movement, or nabiha khams, “We 
want it five”, meaning we want five electoral districts. “Kuwait’s youth movement 
arose in response to the weakening of political institutions, both the monarchical 
institution and the national assembly” (Diwan, 2011:16). This combined with the 
bitter standoff between the government and the Opposition in the assembly over the 
electoral reforms gave the youth the impetus to mobilise around this issue. 
The Orange Movement and the reformist MPs in the assembly blame Election Law 
Number (25) of the year 1981 for Kuwait’s rampant corruption saying it promotes 
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vote buying and thus produces corrupt MPs. Ibtehal Al Khateeb  (assistant professor 
at Kuwait university and political activist) endorses that view indicating that, “the 
electoral system was responsible for the spread of corruption among candidates” 
(Interview, 2013). Nathan Brown stated that allegations of vote buying were rife, 
and tribes would (in contravention of the law) hold “primaries”, he also describes 
the electoral campaigns under the 1981 Electoral Law as a “close race and 
campaigns that seemed to revolve around neighbourhood issues, pitting families 
and tribes against each other” (2008a: 3). Diwan stresses that the main objective of 
the youth movement was to stop “political money that distorts the Amirate’s 
governing institutions and threatens its constitutional order” (2011, 16). 
 
This corruption of the electoral system encouraged the reformers, both the Orange 
Movement and some of the MPs in the National Assembly to unite and rally for a 
system with five rather than twenty-five districts in which each voter selects four 
candidates, and the top ten vote-winners in each district win a seat in the assembly. 
Brown pointed, “The reformers hoped to eliminate vote buying, since a much larger 
number of votes would be necessary to win. Thus the electoral campaigns would 
be run on the basis of platforms, programs, and ideologies rather than family and 
neighbourhood loyalties”, accordingly, this would “create a more cohesive body 
concerned with broader issues rather than being a constituent service assembly” 
(2008a.: 3). Al Yousifi points out  “the law of the electoral system of 1981 had been 
fought against intermittently by the opposition in National Assembly since it was 
introduced” (Interview, 2013). However, the efforts towards amending it only 
escalated in the spring of 2006 when the Orange Movement erupted onto the 
political scene of Kuwait. 
 
The movement started to organise a series of demonstrations demanding a change 
to the law and used social media to promote their campaign through Internet blogs 
(Diwan, 2011) as well as SMS text messages (Tétreault, 2006a). One of the 
movement leaders, Khaled Al Fadalah, explains, “Our beginning was 
spontaneous…We were discussing the political crisis in Kuwait at a restaurant. We 
said we should act. We decided to hold a protest at the council of minister. Between 
400 and 500 people gathered and a very successful peaceful rally took place on 5 
May 2005 outside Al Sayf Palace to coincide with Cabinet meeting” (Hasan, 2006a).  
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As for the colour orange, the activist, Nada al-Mutawa stresses that it was chosen 
“for no political reason… It has nothing to do with Ukraine or Lebanese Christian 
leader Michel Aoun’s movement”. The movement quickly became known as the 
“Orange Movement”.  It was also called the “Orange Youth” or alternatively 
“Orange Revolution” (ibid.).  
 
This was followed by an “all-night vigil” on 14 May 2006, outside the National 
Assembly, ahead of the crucial debate on the government’s own proposal of a ten-
district rearrangement as a strategy to contain the movement’s anger as well as the 
embittered MPs (Hassan, 2011b). It was called the “flag night”, where the 
organisers encouraged everyone who supported them to plant the Kuwait flag in the 
grass in front of the assembly (Tétreault, 2011). The demonstrators, who were 
estimated at 1,000, gathered along with some MPs and campaigned all night (Hasan, 
2006a). The next morning, on 15 May 2006 they entered the National Assembly to 
place orange leaflets on the desks of ministers and MPs, and then took seats in the 
gallery (Tétreault, 2006a). As soon as “it was indicated that the ten-district proposal 
would have government support, all 29 proponents of the alternative five-district 
proposal left the assembly including Ahmad Al Sadoun” (Tétreault, 2011:83). The 
assembly session, subsequently, was postponed until the next day.  
 
The Orange Movement demonstrators gathered again on 16 May 2006, in front of 
the assembly. This time, the government surrounded the demonstrators “using 
police and Special Forces dressed in riot gear and armed with batons”(Tétreault, 
2006a). A number of MPs joined the rally. In this impasse, Ahmad Al Sadoun called 
a public meeting at the assembly that evening, which also happened to be the first 
anniversary of the passage of the bill giving women political rights. Approximately 
4,000 gathered but the Special Forces blocked entry to the assembly (Tétreault, 
2011). These events indicated that the government, once cornered politically, did 
not hesitate to revert to the repressive arm of the state.  Also in response to this 
standoff, Sheikh Sabah on 21 May 2006 resorted to his ultimate power and 
dissolved the Tenth assembly. In a televised speech he stated that he was using his 
powers under Article (107) of the Constitution to dissolve the assembly and call for 
new elections (previously scheduled for summer 2007) for 29 June 2006 (ibid.). 
Sheikh Sabah stated that it was “a difficult decision that I had never wanted to take”, 
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and he added that the dismissal “was necessary to preserve national unity”  
(AlQabas, 2006).  
 
Joher believes that Sheikh Sabah dissolved the assembly for two main reasons: the 
“first relates to the failure of the MPs to reach an agreement on the amendment of 
electoral law. The Cabinet had insisted on amending the electoral law by reducing 
the districts to ten arguing that this number was necessary to create a more open 
electoral sphere, meanwhile, the majority of the MPs insisted on reducing the 
districts to five arguing that this would stop the government from manipulating the 
elections” (Interview, 2013). The second reason “relates to the request by three MPs 
to question the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser. This was the first time that the 
assembly requested the questioning of the Prime Minister.  It was not yet accepted 
in Kuwait that a member of Al Sabah in such a high position to be questioned” 
(Interview, 2013). This suggests that by separating the posts of Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister, Al Sabah’s intention was not to democratise the system and allow 
the National Assembly to hold the government accountable but it was a way to 
overcome the difficulty faced by the sickness of Sheikh Saad, the Crown Prince.  
 
The dissolution of the assembly did end the demonstrations, but the 2006 election 
for the Eleventh Assembly that took place on 29 June 2006 did not give the Amir 
the desired results as it returned an assembly dominated by the Opposition. This 
assembly will be discussed in the following chapter but it is important to point out 
that on 17th July 2006, the assembly’s major accomplishment was to introduce the 
amendment to the electoral system by passing Law Number 42 of the year (2006) 
stipulating that “Kuwait is divided in five electoral districts, each of which elects 
ten deputies. Each voter may vote for up to four candidates” (KTS: 2008). The 
passing of this law was an achievement that illustrated how an alliance between a 
civil society movement and the National Assembly could produce results 
unfavourable to the regime and could push the boundaries of the political system.   
However, even with the success of bottom-up pressures in amending the electoral 
law, some scholars such as Brown see the amendment of limited significance and 
the amended law as still problematic to the process of democratisation by stressing 
that,  
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Kuwait’s electoral districts are of sharply uneven size the largest one has more 
than twice as many voters as the smallest one yet all will elect the same 
number of deputies. The malapportionment is not accidental: the 
overrepresented districts are the most urban ones. These lie closer to the 
historical centre of Kuwait and are populated by wealthier and more educated 
Kuwaitis as well as by the most prominent political and business elites. They 
are inclined to view the Kuwaiti constitutional system as a pact between the 
ruling Sabah family and other leading and long-established families. They 
tolerate the entrance of outlying districts (where tribal identities tend to be 
stronger and many residents gained full citizenship rights only in the past few 
decades) to the political system but hardly on equal terms (Brown 2008a: 4) 
 
Some of the interviewees (Jamal, 3, 4 and 6,) also expressed similar reservations as 
they saw the basis of the unfairness of the election law unchanged as it continued 
to give unequal weight to the different districts and consequently unequal weight to 
each vote, while this unfairness of the distribution of the districts has facilitated Al 
Sabah’s manipulation of elections in order to control the composition of the 
assembly (Interviews, 2013). The impact of this reform on elections and the 
composition of the national assembly is discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
On the other hand, Abdularazaq points to the importance of recognising the positive 
elements in the Orange Movement towards democracy as it indicates an active civil 
society and moreover, “it was a youth active movement that represented different 
sects of the society...they were successful in pointing at the source of corruption 
and they succeeded in putting a pressure on the government” (Interview, 2013). Al 
Ajmi agrees with Al Abdularazaq’s view in that “The Orange Movement was an 
active national political youth group albeit a temporary one that succeeded in 
fulfilling its aims through bottom-up pressures manifested in the several rallies and 
demonstrations held in Kuwait and it ended with the achievement of that aim” 
(Interview, 2013). Also, the emergence of a youth movement should be seen as 
something hopeful: evidence that “a capacity for change or at least the desire for it 
exists..” (Diwan, 2012). 
 
In summary, like the women suffrage political reform, a combination of 
circumstances produced a fortuitous moment to enact a reform that had been the 
focus of a long dormant campaign by the National Assembly, but which suddenly 
erupted vociferously by becoming the focal point of the well organised Orange 
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Movement, attracting huge support among the youth. The youth’s anger and the 
impasse in the National Assembly accompanied by antagonism and animosity 
between the Amir and the MPs gave such an impetus to the movement. Unlike the 
previous reform, this time the government was against the five-district proposal so 
chose to suspend the National Assembly and call for election rather than concede 
to the change in the law in accordance to the demands of the Orange Movement.  
 
Al Qahtani remains critical of the two reforms of the electoral system as he points 
out that “the reforms were introduced randomly and were not planned for; they 
came as a reaction … same as what had happened in Turkey for example in 2010 
when Turkey made 19 political amendments to the constitution all at once. So in 
Kuwait the reforms were done randomly” (Interview, 2013). In response to such a 
sentiment, one can point to the fact that women suffrage took more than four 
decades to achieve and redefining electoral boundaries has been a dormant 
campaign since the Amir changed the law in 1981 and increased the electoral 
districts from 10 to 25. These were long campaigns fought by committed activities 
and the reformist segment of the assembly and not “ random” reforms. Also, as 
pointed out by one interviewee (12), (blogger and political activist), what is 
important is that the “Youth had been energised and there was recognition of their 
ability to organise, mobilise and challenge the regime but there remains a need to 
build on this through the strengthening of CSOs” (Interviews, 2013).  
 
5.5   Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the state in Kuwait exerts massive control over CSOs 
through a comprehensive legal framework that controls licensing, auditing, scope 
of work, finances and ultimately dissolution. This excessive involvement of the 
government in administering the CSOs weakens their function and undermines their 
autonomy, so civil associations are unable to hold back and counterbalance the 
power of the state. Complicating this situation further is the fact that political blocs 
have strong links with civil society organisations, in particular the Islamists, which 
further curtails their autonomy and limits their ability to represent households and 
market vis-á-vis the state and its institutions.    
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However, the discussion illustrated that despite these restrictions, women and youth 
movements were able to escape this restrictive frame and effect political reforms. 
Thus indicating the possibility of change through civil society even in states where 
civil society is apparently very weak. In the case of women gaining political rights, 
multiple of factors came together including the need of Al Sabah to enact the bill 
before the Prime Minister’s visit to the U.S., the alliance between women Islamist 
advocates and liberal women, the siding of one of the Islamist groups with the 
women’s rights campaign and the intensified public fight by women during the year 
2005.  In the case of the Orange Movement, the level of discontent among Kuwaitis 
in general and the youth in particular allowed this movement to grow and gain 
support becoming a natural ally to the reformist movement in the National 
Assembly. Thus, it cannot be argued that civil society is absent in Kuwait even 
though it is not as autonomous and voluntaristic as civil society in the West. These 
two moments are significant indicators of possible change and a need for less focus 
on the National Assembly as the only institution that can curtail the dominance of 
the state and Al Sabah family.   
 
On a theoretical level, these two reforms attest to the importance of civil society as 
suggested by Potter’s scheme for the transition to democracy as well as the role of 
economic development, especially as it brought about significant improvement in 
the level of education of the society and to women in particular, encouraging them 
and pushing them to demand equal rights to men. However, the political culture 
being divided between a very traditional conservative outlook on women’s role in 
society and the secular liberal outlook pushing for women’s political right caused a 
huge delay, over four decades, of women gaining what is constitutionally their 
right.  As Potter (1997) suggests political culture can either be a hindrance or a 
boost to democracy. Kuwait again shows that there is always a dynamic relation 
between elements that hinder and those that promote and hence Kuwait remains in 
a state of flux in its transition to democracy as the pull and push factors are much 
in play. The political culture continues to be not yet sufficiently sympathetic also 
because of the segmented and divisive identities: conservative, liberal, urban, tribal, 
secular and religious which are constantly reinforced and manipulated by the 
regime at the expense of the democratic elements and the general democratic 
impulse of the society. Nonetheless, it is these contradictions and the dynamic 
164 
 
relation of state-society that carry with it the possibility of change.  
 
The following chapter continues to assess the political reform process focusing on 
the deepening of the democratisation crisis during the period 2006-2013 as the 
dynamic of state and society became more confrontational and civil society more 
active and assertive as a result of the reassertion of Al Sabah authoritarian 
tendencies leading to a further significant undermining of the democratisation 
process. 
 
 
Chapter Six: Reassertion of State Power and the Deepening of 
Kuwait’s Democracy Crisis 2006-2013 
 
 
6.1   Introduction  
Following the increased activism of civil society movements (women and youth in 
alliance with Opposition MPs) as seen from the discussion in Chapter Five, 
Kuwaitis became more optimistic and hopeful about pushing forward the political 
reform process. Also, the period under investigation started off with what was 
perceived by many Kuwaitis as an enhanced standing of the National Assembly 
through the active involvement of the Tenth Assembly in resolving the crisis of 
succession, following the death of Amir Jaber Al Sabah on 15 January 2006. This, 
coupled with the remarks by the new Amir, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, of the 
importance of trust and the need of cooperation between the National Assembly 
and the Kuwaiti government gave further credence to that optimism.  
 
However, during this period, Kuwait has become mired in a perpetual crisis 
between the National Assembly and the government, with the Amir resorting to his 
ultimate power as the arbitrator and decider of the fate of the assembly. The 
dissolution of the National Assembly, as seen from the previous chapters, has 
become common practice but over the short span of 2006-2013, the assembly was 
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dissolved 4 times, suffered two legal annulments of two elections (the February 
2012 and the December 2012) and the unprecedented dissolution of the 2009 
assembly twice. This instability forced Kuwaitis to go to the polls six times in seven 
years exposing the limited impact of the political reform process and the persistent 
unwillingness of the ruling family to relinquish its dominance and share power with 
the elected National Assembly. This period, hence, can be characterised as an 
abandonment of any semblance of a process of democratisation as the authoritarian 
tendencies of Al Sabah increased substantially, weakening the National Assembly 
further and undermining civil liberties and political freedoms as well as entrenching 
the antagonistic relation between the government and the National Assembly.  
 
The chapter focuses on examining this deepening of the democratic crisis and starts 
off by discussing the succession crisis of 2006 and the effective role played by the 
Tenth National Assembly in its resolution, resulting in optimism about the process 
of democratisation at the beginning of the rule of Sheikh Sabah Jaber al Sabah. The 
discussion then moves to focus on the successive assemblies, elected during this 
period, in the same vein as seen in Chapters Three and Four, focusing on the level 
of interest in political participation (number of candidates, turnout and debates in 
the assembly). This is followed by an overall evaluation of these assemblies, 
highlighting the accentuation of the authoritarian tendencies of Al Sabah but also 
showing that despite the state’s ability to dominate, civil society during this period 
became much more assertive and active in attempting to counter balance the power 
of the state in alliance with the reformist elements in the assembly. 
 
The Chapter concludes, first in reference to Dahl’s criteria indicating that despite 
the exercise of elements that denote democracy (political participation and 
contestation), the frequency of dissolutions and lack of impact of the assembly on 
the government, combined with the increased curtailment of civil liberties and 
political freedoms, an essential part of the exercise of democracy, has rendered the 
process futile as it lacked any degree of real and meaningful collective control over 
public policy.  Secondly, in terms of Potter’s scheme, this period, in a similar vein 
to the period discussed in the previous chapters, shows a pattern of a mixed 
influence of the factors that promote and those that hinder the process of 
democratisation, with a propensity for the factors that hinders to dominate. 
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Nonetheless, this reassertion of state domination was met with a reassertion of civil 
society activism, apparent in mobilising Kuwaitis to hold demonstrations and rallies, 
attracting thousands to protest the top-down decisions and measures of the Amir 
and his government. The substantial increase in bottom-up pressures indicate that 
civil society movements remain a determining factor of the possibility of 
democratising the political system.   
 
 
 
 
6.2  The Role of the Tenth National Assembly in the Succession Crisis of 2006 
The nine days between the automatic succession of the ailing Crown Prince, Saad 
Al Sabah, on 15 January 2006 and his deposing on 24 January, witnessed two 
interrelated and significant developments for the democratisation process in Kuwait. 
First, the power struggle among Al Sabah, splitting the ruling family into two 
opposing groups; those in support of the accession of Saad and those in support of 
Sabah, became a public affair. It shattered a taboo in the Gulf States where 
deliberations over succession, especially when the competency of a ruler is 
challenged due to mental or physical fitness, are held exclusively within ruling 
family councils (Lawson, 2006: 109). Rumours of a power struggle among the 
ruling family over the position of the future Emir were confirmed in Kuwait when 
Sheikh Salem Al Ali Al Sabah (the senior and most respected member of Al Sabah 
family and the Head of the National Guards) in a statement to the local press on 10 
October 2005 referred to it openly by indicating: 
 
When our inherited traditions are overrun, and the senior figures of the ruling 
family are excluded, and the decisions are foreclosed but to one side without 
refereeing to these figures, a very dangerous matter is indicated…it is not 
permissible that the government becomes the opponents and the arbitrator at 
the same time... Separation of powers is a constitutional principle that must be 
maintained… Consequently, the government’s situation is becoming 
increasingly unacceptable constitutionally and will raise doubt among the 
people and their representative unless the government address the real issues 
and their consequences, which from our point of view is an issue pertaining 
to the senior members of the ruling family. What we are discussing now is not 
a secret …We have to work on solidarity of the ruling family since this affects 
the solidarity of the ruling family, stability, and unity of Kuwait and its people 
(Ibrahim, 2006:23). 
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He called for the formation of a troika, to address this matter, compromised of the 
Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, Sheikh Mubarak Abdullah Al Sabah and 
himself (Ibrahim, 2006:22). However, on 11 October 2005, the Emir, Sheikh Jaber 
in response spoke to the head of the National Assembly, Jasim Al Khorafi, 
indicating that he fully trust the Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah. 
Accordingly Jasim Al khorafi held an extraordinary session for the National 
Assembly in which he convened the Emir’s message to the MPs and in return the 
MPs renewed their trust and voiced their confidence in the Prime Minister (Ibrahim, 
2006:23). In fact, Jasim Al khorafi had asked the ruling family in July 2005 to “ 
settle all the differences among its senior figures, saying that the family was the 
only mechanism to cope with such differences, and he considered that the best way 
to deal with this issue was to restrict discussions to senior figures of the ruling 
family” (Ibrahim, 2006:24). 
Following these events, Sheikh Sabah himself went public. He issued a statement 
in Al Siyasah newspaper on 22 November 2005 saying:  
I would like to affirm that the leaders of the Kuwaiti State shall remain, and 
we are against any notion their posts should be inherited while they are alive. 
We should not forget that Kuwait is a state of institutions, and we thank God 
that these institutions are integrated and work in harmony. Yes, I hear of the 
criticism regarding the ruling family, and about relieving this or that figure in 
the family of his post, or about giving this position to X or Y, but this is not 
true. The leaders of our country shall remain, and we shall never allow the 
thought of their positions being inherited while they are still alive (Ibrahim, 
2006:24). 
 
Subsequently, the issue regarding the succession and the suitability of the ailing 
Crown Prince, Sheikh Saad, remained unresolved until the death of the Emir, 
Sheikh Jaber on 15 January 2006 when the automatically succeeded him. This 
brought to a head the succession issue regarding the ailing Emir and Sheikh Sabah 
intention of challenging his suitability. The issue was also taken up by the local 
media resulting in widening public debate and making the succession a national 
concern, and more importantly influencing the outcome, especially in light of the 
liberal newspaper, Al Qabas, siding with Sheikh Sabah and calling on Sheikh Saad 
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to step down (ibid.,108). Also the editor in chief, Jasim Boodai, of Al Rai 
Al Am wrote strongly in support of Sabah Al-Ahmed stating: 
Kuwait has rarely known such a dynamic, calm, and cautious 
personality. He was raised alongside the departed Emir and 
experienced everything with and was also with His Highness 
Shaykh Saad Al-Abdullah throughout all the stages of 
international relations and has benefited from both of them. 
Sabah Al-Ahmed is a man who was and will remain the voice of 
Kuwait and its image. His wisdom is needed now more than any 
other time to close the files forced open by circumstances. Your 
vision is required now more than any other time in order to turn 
over a new leaf. Your strength is needed now more than any other 
time to promote the Kuwait experience to the entire region; the 
experience of promise and contract between the ruled and the 
ruler (WikiLeaks, 2006)  
 
 
The second development that accompanied the succession crisis is the confirmation 
of a change of a ruler, for the first time in the history of Al Sabah ruling family, 
through the constitutional process, seen by some as an enormous assertion of the 
power of the National Assembly and the need to share power (Yamani, 2006). This 
gave rise to huge expectations that a new phase in the relation between the assembly 
and the executive was emerging based on cooperation and collaboration.  
 
Before delving into how the succession crisis was resolved it is important to clarify 
what the Constitution stipulates with regard to the heir and the system of 
government. There are four relevant stipulations: Article (4) stipulates, firstly, that 
“Kuwait is a hereditary Emirate” (monarchy) through the progeny of Sheikh 
Mubarak Al Sabah” (founder of the Emirate) and his descendants. Secondly, it 
imposes fundamental conditions regarding the heir, including: “The heir should be 
wise, sensible and enjoy good mental health and must be in a healthy condition in 
order to be capable of exercising his role as a ruler. Thirdly, the designation shall 
be effected by an Amiri order upon the nomination of the Amir and the approval of 
the National Assembly, which shall be signified by a majority vote of its members 
in a special sitting. Lastly, Article (60) stipulates that the Amir, before resuming his 
powers, must take an oath at a special session of the National Assembly. It is clear 
from the Constitution that Sheikh Sa’ad does not fit the criteria of “must be in a 
healthy condition” and able to “take an oath” due to his long serious illness. As 
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discussed in Chapter Four his inability to discharge his duties while Crown Prince 
and Prime Minister was the main reason that Sheikh Sabah was able to force the 
hand of Amir Jaber to separate the two posts and appoint Sheikh Sabah the Prime 
Minister.  
 
To achieve his aim, Sheikh Sabah, first, turned to the ruling family to gain their 
support, which split Al Sabah into two camps, one supporting Sheikh Saad and 
other supporting Sheikh Sabah. The “Kuwait’s succession issue, on the one hand is 
complicated by the stipulations in the Constitution that restricts the right to rule to 
one branch of the Al Sabah, the descendants of Sheikh Mubarak Al Sabah, while 
on the other hand, in practice, the simple stipulation translates into a complex and 
informal procedure regulating the alternation of power between the two branches 
of descendants of Sheikh Mubarak’s two sons, Salem and Jaber” (Khalaf, 2006:46). 
Al Sabah family, by conceding the accession to the throne to Sheikh Sabah, would 
have helped in breaking this essential rule of alternation between the two branches.  
Thus his attempt to gain the approval of Sheikh Salem Al Ali Al Sabah and his son 
Sheikh Fahed Al Salem Al Sabah, in addition to Sheikh Saad’s wife, Sheikha Latifa 
Al Sabah, and her son Sheikh Fahed Saad Al Sabah - who represent the Al Salim 
branch- was essential to avoid a serious split in the cohesiveness of the ruling family.   
 
Eventually after several private meetings, Sheikh Salim gave his approval 
conditioned on offering high governmental positions for certain members of the 
ruling family (Al Watan Voice, 2006). On the other hand, Sheikha Latifa and her 
son Fahed insisted on opposing Sheikh Sabah’s plans and opted to support Sheikh 
Saad as the ruler.  However Sheikh Sabah managed to grant Sheikha Latifa her 
demands of “private jets, annual salary for the ailing Emir and his family and 
promises to offer high posts to her family members”, thus gaining her eventual 
support ( Al Watan Voice , 2006).   
 
 
Sheikh Sabah, despite silencing the opposition of Al Salim branch of the ruling 
family, sought also the support of the Cabinet and utilised the articles of the 
Constitution to legitimately take the rein of power in Kuwait (Al Baik, 2006).  As 
mentioned earlier, Article (60) of the Constitution, requires that the Amir be sworn 
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in before the assembly in order to resume his powers as a ruler. This offered Sheikh 
Sabah the opportunity to get the support of both the Cabinet and the National 
Assembly to be the Amir of Kuwait. The Cabinet decided to activate the 
constitutional procedures set forth in Article (3) of the Amir Succession Law 
pertaining to the Amir’s incompetence due to his mental and physical inability to 
exercise his powers. Thus the Cabinet on 23 January 2006 sent a letter to the 
assembly stating:  “The Amir Sheikh Sa’ad has lost his health capability to exercise 
his constitutional prerogatives”, in effect asking the assembly to use its 
constitutional mandate in determining whether or not Sheik Sa’ad possessed the 
capacity to serve as ruler (BBC, 2006).  Ironically, on the same day the assembly 
received another letter from Sheikh Sa’ad, which included an order to hold a session 
to take the oath the same evening. However, the assembly’s Chairman and Speaker 
Mr Jassem Al Khorafi “refused the demand” suggesting that the assembly will 
decide the Amir’s fate in a vote in the Assembly (Tetreault, 2011:167).   
 
According to the Constitution the assembly requires a vote by a two-thirds majority 
to depose an Amir on the grounds of ill health (BBC, 2006). Some thought that 
majority was not guaranteed. However, moments before an official letter of 
resignation of Sheikh Saad was received, the assembly deposed him in a unanimous 
vote in the session held on 24 January 2006, (Tetreault, 2006). Due to this, it was 
incumbent on the Cabinet to exercise the function of state president pursuant to 
article (4) of Amir Succession Law and recommended Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Al 
Jaber Al Sabah for the position of the Amir of the State of Kuwait, who was at that 
time the Prime Minister. Sheikh Sabah received the endorsement of the assembly 
and won their votes as the new ruler and took the oath to become Amir, in an 
extraordinary parliamentary session, on 29 January 2006 (ibid.). In a gesture of 
appreciation of the National Assembly’s role in settling the succession crisis, the 
Amir expressed the view that, “Your trust is an honour” (KUNA, 2012). In addition, 
Sheikh Sabah in his first public speech, in his role as Amir of Kuwait, emphasised 
cooperation with the Kuwaitis saying that, “No leader can succeed unless he has 
his people’s cooperation” (KUNA, 2012). The Amir was seeking the approval of 
the assembly and the people and hinting at the legitimacy of his succession over 
Sheikh Saad - who died on 13 May 2008 after ruling Kuwait for few days. 
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Sheikh Sabah was the first ruler to come to power by challenging royal norms, and 
consequently enhanced the power of his own branch of Jaber Al Sabah at a time 
where the turn was for Al Salim branch of the family to rule.  He not only “broke 
an unwritten rule in Kuwaiti politics that power was to alternate between the Jaber 
and Salim branches of Mubarak’s descendant” (Roberts 2011: 94), he also 
appointed his half-brother, Sheikh Nawaf Al Ahmad Al Sabah, Crown Prince and 
his nephew Sheikh Nasser Mohammad Al Ahmad Al Sabah the Prime Minister 
leading to what was described by (Tétreault, 2011) “as a monopoly of power”, of 
Al Jaber branch. The appointment of Nasser Muḥammad Al Jaber Al Ṣabah as 
Prime Minister brought about a power struggle within the second generation of the 
ruling family, and that played out in the assembly where co-opted representatives 
sided with one faction against the other and used interpellations as the tool to 
counter the power of each other (Azoulay & Beaugrand, 2015). This added a new 
element to the divisions in the assembly and consequently played a role in the 
frequency of dissolutions and the impasses that characterised the assemblies during 
this period, undermining the process of political reforms.  
From the view point of Kuwaitis, they saw the crisis and its conclusion as a victory 
for the Kuwaiti Constitution and the rule of law, as suggested by the chairman and 
speaker of the Tenth National Assembly, “Kuwait built on tribalism, and run by one 
family, yet you can go through something like this while life goes on outside, 
without security men or tanks on the street ”(Fatah, 2006). Affirming this view, Al 
Ghabra stated, “The contribution of the assembly for the first time to remove the 
ailing Amir Sheikh Saad and appoint Sheikh Sabah is very significant…It is a 
historical moment in Kuwait’s politics to see that the assembly actually participated 
in selecting the new Amir. This never happened before not in Kuwait not in any 
GCC state” (Interview, 2013). The invigoration of the authority of the National 
Assembly gave rise to popular expectations of an enhanced role of the assembly 
and a strengthening of the political reform process. Opposition newspapers started 
to demand that the Prime Minister be entrusted to someone outside the ruling family, 
especially that Amir Sabah had institutionalised the separation of the post of Crown 
Prince and Prime Minister by appointing two different Al Sabah members to each 
post, thus opening the door to that possibility. In addition, the MPs began to lobby 
the government to permit the formation of political parties (Lawson, 2009).  
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However, as the discussion in the following section of the successive assemblies 
elected during 2006-2013 shows, the process of political reforms has in effect 
regressed and the relation of National Assembly and the State deteriorated 
significantly undermining political reforms and the process of democratisation, 
despite the increased vocal political activism of the civil society in alliance with the 
Oppositions MPs in the assembly. This period saw more protests and large rallies 
opposing Al Sabah’s top-down measures and policies and demanding the 
democratisation of the political system than any other period. This affirms–as 
suggested in the previous chapters- that the society, in spite of the “rentier” nature 
of the economy and the high dependency of the society on the state’s economic 
activities, is neither passive, nor acquiesce, which keeps the prospect of political 
change realizable.  
 
6.3   The Successive National Assemblies of the Period 2006-2013 
The weakening and undermining of the political reform process is manifested, 
clearly during this period by the repeated dissolutions of the assembly (four in total), 
the annulment of two elections, and dissolving one assembly twice. This resulted 
in deepening the schism between the National Assembly and the government and 
increasing political instability that held up Kuwait’s economic reforms and 
investment projects and programmes. The disruption, delay or block of the 
necessary legislative measures needed for Kuwait to face its economic challenges 
as well as the needed legislation to implement its economic development plans have 
severely impacted on the economic progress of Kuwait (Al Qabas, 2017). 
 
This, also, increased the tension between the Kuwaiti civil society and the state 
expressed by the increased level of political mobilisation at street level; rallies and 
demonstrations attracting thousands in opposition to government’s top-down 
policies and practices. Thus, challenging the state became, as indicated by 
interviewee (1) “no more the privy of the National Assembly, the State has become 
increasing embroiled with street level political activities” (Interview 2013). As 
discussed in Chapter Five, this is a continuation of a trend of increased activism on 
the part of civil society and less focus on the National Assembly as the only 
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institution that can counter the power of the State and Al Sabah.  The diwaniyyas 
continued to act as a gathering place for MPs to discuss their electoral campaigns 
and engage with Kuwaiti citizens. With women given their political rights, women 
diwaniyyas also emerged and even mixed gender diwaniyyas began to appear as Al 
Othamn stressed, “this is changing the political culture towards women’s political 
role” (Interview, 2013). The diwaniyya continued, also, to function as an alternative 
to public places. Recall from Chapter Three how the Amir when he dissolved the 
Sixth Assembly in 1986, called for communication via the diwaniyyas arguing that 
those institutions are more representative of citizens than the assembly.  However 
this position shifted during this period as these informal gathering places started to 
appear threatening. For instance, a gathering on 8 December 2010 in the diwaniyya 
of the ex-MP, Jam’an Alharbash, where Obaid Al Wasmi (a Law professor at 
Kuwait University) was giving a speech attracted a large number of Kuwaitis 
estimated at about 150 (AMNESTY, 2011). Nonetheless, the government opted to 
use heavy-handed tactics in order to disperse the private gathering (Al Jazeera, 
2011). 
 
The military forces along with the police surrounded the area, while special forces 
entered the house and attacked the attendees, some of the MPs were injured, while 
Al Wasmi was arrested, accused of violating the Law of Public Gathering of 1979 
in which more than 20 people must have a police permit in advance (Al Watan, 
2010). The offices of Al Jazeera satellite channel in Kuwait, who aired the events, 
were closed “as the MOI accused them of interfering in Kuwait’s internal affairs 
and threatening the national security” (Al Jazeera, 2010). This is an indication of 
the increased intolerance of Al Sabah even of this long standing and well 
established tradition of using Diwaniyyas as safe places for meeting and debating, 
as well as the escalation of the repressive means to restrict civil liberties and 
political freedoms and freedom of the media.  
 
The following discussion expands on these developments by examining separately 
each of the assemblies elected during 2006-2013. 
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6.3.1   The Eleventh National Assembly 2006-2008 
 
The Tenth assembly, elected in 2003 was dissolved on 21 May 2006 as a result of 
the pressures emanating from the Orange Movement and the demands for 
redefining the electoral districts (KNA, 2011a). The Amir ordered new elections to 
be held on 29 June 2006 in the hope of returning a more pliable assembly and more 
importantly to evade the issue of the amendment of the election law.  
 
The elections for the Eleventh Assembly came not just in the wake of the 
dissolution of the Tenth Assembly but also in the wake of the Law (17) 2005 giving 
women political rights. Thus, there was a noticeable increase in the number of 
eligible voters, reaching 340,248 voters from the level of 136,715 in the previous 
assembly; the number of the registered female voters was 149,614 approximating 
43 per cent of total eligible voters (Doumato, 2011). The total number of candidates 
was 249; among them were only 27 women running against 222 men, voter turnout 
was high at 77 per cent (see Table 6.1) but much lower in comparison to the 
previous assembly where turn out stood at a high 90 per cent. 
 
Table 6.1: Political participation in the 11th National Assembly 2006 
 
 
Date of Elections Number of Electoral 
Districts 
 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible 
Voters 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Male Female 
 
29 June 2006 
 
 
25 
 
222 
 
 
27 
 
 
340248 
 
77% 
  Source: MOI ,2017 
 
None of the women won a seat, constituting quite a blow to women candidates and 
voters alike. However, this can be attributed to the fact that the time span, between 
the dissolution of the Tenth Assembly on 21 May 2006 and the holding of the new 
election on 29 June 2006, did not give women enough time to prepare and organise, 
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especially that this was the first time to run as candidates and to exercise the right 
to vote. So it should not be a surprise that none of the candidates won a seat, nor 
did they introduce any kind of change in the type of MPs and composition of the 
assembly. As Doumato observed, “as male Islamic assembly members had 
calculated, women voters are socially conservative and cannot be presumed to 
support other women” (2011:211). Similarly, Brown observed that “woman 
performance in the elections did not change a thing” and that they are not different 
in their political views than men, stating that they for example, “have strengthened 
the Islamists in at least one case where women voters pushed a candidate from the 
ICM: a movement that had opposed granting full political rights to women victory” 
(2008a:5). 
 
The role played by political culture and patriarchy in women’s failure to win a seat, 
is acknowledged by Al Yousifi indicating, “The electoral reform was a challenging 
one to the women themselves in such a conservative society where most of the blocs 
were not ready to challenge the traditional norms in society in support of women 
candidates” (Interview, 2013). Besides that, Al Abdullah argues “in 2006 the 
Kuwaiti society and the political blocs were not ready to see women in the assembly” 
(Interview, 2013). There was also the element of fear, where “losing a few voters 
from those reluctant to support a woman may spell the difference between victory 
and defeat; so most blocs fielded all-male slates” (Brown, 2008a: 5). Thus political 
culture on the one hand values contestation and political participation but on the 
other hand has not yet translated into support to women candidates as it primarily 
contradicts with the traditional view of women and the different roles expected of 
men and women. As indicated by Al Abdulrazzaq, “that change requires more effort 
on the part of civil society especially women organisations in raising the awareness 
of women themselves so they are able to support women candidates. One must not 
forget that gaining the right to fully participate in the political process is a 
significant first step towards the eventual integration of women as full partners and 
equal to men” (Interview 2013).   
 
Al Awadhi emphasises that “even the exercise of political rights have not helped 
women to empower themselves as the results of the elections of 2006 reveal. What 
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did the women do? They instead of empowering themselves, empowered men and 
encouraged male dominance in the society through voting to those who opposed 
offering their political rights” (Interview, 2013). Furthermore she stresses that the 
results of the 2006 elections were expected because of the “mentality of the Kuwaiti 
women” and the way  “Kuwaiti women are brought up ” stating that in our society 
women are always oppressed socially. However, she does not deny that Kuwaiti 
women realised the importance of having the right to vote and run for office, stating 
“women recognised they are not less than men…this was evident in the next 
elections” (Interview, 2013). To some extent, having the right to vote does not 
instantly, despite the long wait for it, translate into a radical shift of how society 
perceives women and their role, and how women themselves choose to use such a 
right. But that political right opens the door for the possibility to promote the 
empowerment of women and to struggle towards removing the cultural/traditional 
and institutional barriers limiting the full engagement of women in all aspects of 
the economy and the society. 
 
The election did not return the desired assembly that Al Sabah hoped for as the 
Opposition took more than two thirds of the seats in the assembly (Assiri, 2007:143). 
The composition continued to reflect the three main political blocs: 23 candidates 
represented the various tribes, 19 represented different Islamic blocs while only 4 
represented the liberal/secular bloc. Consequently, as pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the assembly passed the amendment that was fought for by the Orange 
Movement and Law No. 42 /2006 reduced the electoral districts from 25 to 5 (Al 
Kuwait Alyoum, 2006). Also, the assembly, having had such a strong presence of 
Opposition MPs, attempted to assert its constitutional right to hold the government 
accountable through the only constitutional mechanism available to them, the 
interpellations of ministers. Assembly members continue to be excluded from the 
Cabinet where they can be directly involved in governing and policy formation, and 
beyond the symbolic one or two in non-crucial ministerial posts; key posts of 
Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs are still reserved for Al Sabah family 
members. 
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This assembly requested seven interpellations addressed to various ministers, as 
seen in Table 6.2. Most of these interpellations were unsuccessful in effecting any 
accountability as either these ministers resigned (Minister of Information, Minister 
of Energy and Minister of Health); were removed by an Amiri decree (Minister of 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs) or moved to another position (Minister of Finance 
moved to the Oil Ministry but eventually resigned (KNA, 2015a). Resignations 
became the way out of being held accountable by the assembly, further angering 
the MPs and increasing levels of frustration among Kuwaitis in general. Only one 
interpellation took place, addressed to the Minister of Education, Nouria Al Subeih, 
in January 2008. She was accused of mismanagement and also challenged on her 
position as a minister on the ground that Sharia law does not allow women to work 
in high positions in the government (Al Mdaires, 2010), indicating the continuation 
of opposition by some Islamists of women political participation. The Minister, 
however, survived the vote of no confidence by 26 against and 19 for, with two 
MPs refraining from voting. But she acquiesced to approving an extension of the 
law of segregation (adopted in 1996) between females and males at Kuwait 
University to private universities and to high schools as well (Tetreault, 2011:87). 
 
Table 6.2: Interpellations of the Eleventh National Assembly 2006 
Number of 
Interpellations 
Ms presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of Interpellations 
1  Faisal Almoslim 
3 December 2006 
 
The Minister of 
Information  
Mohammed 
AlSanousi 
The minister resigned, so the 
interpellation was not valid and 
was moved from the agenda 
2  Waleed Al 
Tabataba’ei 
Ahmed Al 
Shahoumi 
Jama’an Al 
Herbesh 
17 January 2007 
The Minister of 
Health  
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Abdullah Al Sabah 
A vote of no confidence was 
presented but the Cabinet of 
resigned on 4 March 2007, one 
day before the vote of no 
confidence was to take place 
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3 Adel Al Sarawi 
Abdullah Al Roumi 
Mussalam Al 
Barrak 
10 June 2007 
The Minister of 
Energy  
Sheikh Ali AL 
Jarrah Al Sabah 
A vote of no confidence was 
presented but the minister 
resigned before a no-confidence 
vote could be held  
4 Waleed Al 
Tabataba’ei 
 Faisal Al Moslim 
25 August 2007 
The Minister of 
health  
Masouma Al 
Moubarak 
The interpellation was presented 
but on the same day the minister 
resigned  
5 Dhaif Allah 
Bouramyah 
22 October 2007 
The Minister of 
Finance  
Bader Al Homaidi 
The interpellation was not 
discussed as the minister was 
moved to the Oil ministry. 
However, he resigned in 16 
November 2007 
6 Ali AlOmiar 
Waleed Al 
Tabataba’ei 
22 October 2007 
Minister of Awqaf 
and slamic Affairs  
Abdulla Al 
Ma’touq 
The interpellation was not 
discussed and the Minister was 
dismissed form his position by 
Amiree Decree No.329/2007 
issued on 28 October 2007. This 
is the first time for that to happen 
in Kuwait.  
7 Sa’ad Alshura’i 
24 December 2007 
The Minister of   
Higher Education 
Nouria Al Subai’h 
A vote of no confidence was 
requested and the minister 
survived as 26 MPs voted against 
while only 19 for and 2 refrained  
Source : KNA, 2016 
 
 
However, a rift in the relation between the MPs and the government continued to 
grow coming to a head over demands by MPs for a further salary rise for Kuwaiti 
civil servants, which had been rejected by the Cabinet. The demand to increase 
salaries seems at odds with the time where economic reforms especially controlling 
public expenditures and the massive wage bill have been a top priority of the state. 
The resignation letter of the Cabinet on 17 March 2008, however, complained the 
MPs were “interfering” in government business and had “disabled the cabinet from 
carrying out its responsibilities”. Consequently, the Amir, Sheikh Sabah, 
announced on 19 March 2008 the dissolution of the Eleventh Assembly and called 
for new elections to be held on 17 May 2008 (KNA, 2011a). With each new 
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suspension the legitimacy of the political reforms and the commitment of Al Sabah 
to share power with the constitutionally guaranteed people’s representative 
diminishes making it more difficult to establish a cooperative relation between the 
assembly and the executive. As indicated by Al Awadhi “the sincerity of Al Sabah 
in sharing power is chipped away with each successive suspension” (Interview 
2013), while interviewees (9) (member of an Islamist bloc) and (10) (member of a 
secular bloc) complained of the short sightedness of some MPs and questioned their 
motivations indicating that some of the Opposition has become self-serving 
(Interviews, 2013). 
6.3.2   The Twelfth National Assembly 2008-2009  
 
The new elections called by the Sheikh Sabah in the wake of the suspension of the 
Eleventh Assembly were the first to run in accordance with the new election Law 
No. 42 of the Year 2006.  Therefore, it is very important to assess whether that 
political reform had produced the desired outcomes of making vote buying harder, 
increasing women’s chance to be elected and encouraging candidates to campaign 
based on political platforms that allow for alliances beyond the narrow electoral 
base of each political blocs (O’Grady & Meyer-Resende 2008:8), and hence 
moving away from the political culture that emphasises ‘constituent service’ MPs.   
 
Elections were held on 17 May 2008 and turnout was low, less than 53 per cent. 
This is understandable considering the constant political clashes and impasses 
between the cabinet and the assembly, in addition to being the third election called 
for in three years. Approximately 362,000 Kuwaitis were eligible to vote and the 
number of female candidates was 28, while males reached 246, as seen in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Political Participation in the Twelfth National Assembly 2008 
Date of 
Election  
Number of 
Electoral Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible 
Voters 
 
Voter 
Turnout  
 Male Female 
180 
 
 
17 May 2008 
 
5 
 
246 
 
 
28 
 
361684 
 
53% 
Source:  MOI  ,2017 
 
 
The results show that none of the female candidates won and seats have been 
distributed in the customary pattern:  Islamist blocs won 29 seats (21 Sunni and 9 
Shi’a,) liberal/secular bloc won 7 seats and tribal representatives and pro-
governments won 17 seats (Al Mdaires, 2010). That composition indicates that the 
three main desired outcomes of the amendment to the election law did not 
materialise at least on the short term; women failed to win any seat, alliances 
between various political blocs to campaign on national platforms did not happen, 
and instead of buying votes, they resorted to trading votes to maximise votes. This 
strategy, admitted by some blocs such as the Islamist and tribal forces, involves 
encouraging supporters of the candidate of one bloc to vote for candidates of 
another bloc on the understanding that the other candidate’s supporters reciprocate, 
thus bringing in new votes or maximising the vote (O’Grady & Meyer-Resende 
2008: 29). 
 
Interviewee (2) and interviewees (1 & 4) argued that shifting the long established 
voting behaviour based on the segmented and divisive affiliations to voting based 
on political programmes needs time as well as a shift in political culture. They also 
indicated that the same could be said about women candidates, perhaps more so, as 
shifting traditional patriarchal views of women is very difficult and needs increased 
mobilisation from women organisations (Interview, 2013) Most of the interviewees 
acknowledged that the desired or expected benefits that were attached to the 
amendment of the electoral districts were either premature or unrealistic as a change 
in the law without addressing the bigger issue of the unfairness of the electoral 
weights of the different districts as well as the entrenched political attitudes that 
continue to vote on the segmented and divisive affiliations and identities. 
Campaigning on political agendas or programmes remains very weak and 
undeveloped.  
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The assembly did not last long. The MPs requested the questioning of the Prime 
Minister, Sheikh Nasser, over a recent visit of the Iranian Shiite cleric, Mohammad 
Baqer Al Fali, who was banned from entering Kuwait after he was convicted by the 
Court of “insulting some of the Prophet Mohammad's companions, and was fined 
KD10000 (37,000 USD) by a lower court in June 2008” (Al Arabiya, 2008). 
However, in November 2008, Al Fali entered Kuwait, arriving from Iran, Tehran, 
and was detained for a short period of time before being released and allowed to 
remain in Kuwait. Allowing him to enter and remain in Kuwait angered the MPs 
who argued that it was illegal (Al Arabiya, 2008). In order to evade being 
questioned by the MPs, and thus avoid a vote of no confidence, the Cabinet resigned 
on 8 November 2008.  
 
Despite this obvious collapse of the relation between government and assembly the 
Amir re-appointed Sheikh Nasser as Prime Minister in December 2008, and most 
of the ministers were retained with the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Muhammad Al 
Salem taking on an additional role as acting Energy Minister. As a clear indication 
that using resignation as a tool to avoid questioning does not work, the Cabinet was 
faced with more questioning from the MPs. Three interpellations, as seen in Table 
6.4, were requested at the start of March on the 1, 2 and 9 demanding that the Prime 
Minister answer questions on a number of grievances in relation to mismanagement 
of oil revenues, misuse of public funds, alleged financial irregularities at his Diwan, 
office, and an accusation of being responsible for allowing the demolition of two 
mosques built illegally on state land (Al Arabiya, 2009).  However, two days before 
the date of the questioning, on 16 March 2009, the Prime Minister resigned for the 
fifth time since he assumed the post in 2006 (KNA, 2011a:48). 
 
This time the resignation of the Cabinet was followed by an Amiri decree dissolving 
the assembly on 19 March 2009 (KNA, 2015a). It stated that the dissolution was 
inevitable due to “certain circumstances and the fact that some did not adhere to the 
laws and the Constitution in using their tools to watch and check the executive 
branch, therefore, and in order to secure the country’s national safety and stability 
this dissolution was a must” (MONA: 2015:26). The Amir, reverted to the same 
reasoning (used many times) of political stability and national security to justify the 
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dissolutions, however, the real issue is that Sheikh Sabah did not accept the political 
pressure caused by the frequent requests of the MPs to question the ministers, 
especially the Prime Minister.  
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Interpellations of the Twelfth National Assembly 2008 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs Presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of Interpellations 
1 Waleed Al Tabataba’ei 
Mohammed Hayef 
Abdullah Al Barqash 
 
18 November 2008 
The Prime 
Minister 
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
The government resigned 
in 25 November 2008 and 
the Amir accepted the 
resignation 14 December 
2008 
 
2  Faisal Al Moslim 
 
1 March 2009 
 
The Prime 
Minister  
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
 
 
 
Interpellations 2, 3, and 4 
did not take place because 
the government resigned 
in 16 March 2009 and the 
Amir accepted the 
resignation on the same 
day. On 18 March 2009 
the Amir dissolved the 
assembly and called for 
new elections. 
3 Dr Jama’anAlHerbesh 
Dr NaserAlSane’i 
Abdul Aziz ALShayji 
 
2 March 2009 
The Prime 
Minister  
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
4 Mohammed Hayef 
 
9 March 2009 
The Prime 
Minister  
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
Source: KNA,2016 
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For that reason, Jamal sees the effect of the separation of the two posts of Crown 
Prince and Prime Minister as undermining the process of governing.  He stressed 
“Kuwait’s political system, before the separation of the two posts, was more stable 
and the National Assembly had red lines that MPs would not cross in terms of their 
criticisms of the government and Al Sabah, and that was needed in the political 
culture of Kuwait, where respect of the posts of both Crown Prince and Prime 
Minster facilitates the stable functioning of the state and avoids the current political 
deadlocks and antagonism”  (Interview, 2013). The real issue, however, is that the 
executive and the Amir are reluctant to share power and to allow the National 
Assembly to use its constitutional right as a legislative arm of the state. It is that 
unwillingness that ends up with MPs insisting on their right to question the 
government resulting in gridlock and impasse followed by dissolution. The fact that 
the Prime Minister is appointed by the Amir and is from Al Sabah family makes his 
questioning difficult to accept by both the Amir and the ruling family.  
 
That is why, as mentioned before, there have been calls over the years for the Prime 
Minister to be elected by the assembly and hence directly accountable to the 
electoral body removing this sensitivity about his questioning.  As indicated by 
interviewee (11) (lecturer at Kuwait University) “as long as the Prime Minister is 
appointed by the Amir and is a member of Al Sabah family, assembly members 
will not be permitted to question him freely and hold him accountable” (Interview, 
2013).  There is also the issue of the attitude of the ruling family towards the 
National Assembly desiring a rubber-stamp body or government-friendly one. This 
explains the continuance interference in elections via manipulations of the various 
political and social blocs playing one against the other, and aiding those most pro-
government. Also, this attitude aids some of the Opposition MPs, to use questioning 
as a self-serving tool to assert their authority and assertiveness especially in relation 
to their constituency and those who voted them in. As a majority of the anonymous 
interviewees (1, 2, 6, 12, 11) and (8) (Blogger and political activist) as well as Al 
Ghabra and Alwadhi indicated, the blame for the impasse and gridlock lies in both 
the assembly and the government (Interviews, 2013).   
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6.3.3 The Thirteenth National Assembly and the Turbulent Period 2009-2013  
 
The period 2009-2013 represented a high level of political instability and turmoil 
leading to a total collapse in the relation between the legislative and the executive 
as well as increasing the anger and frustration of Kuwaitis. The escalation and 
accentuation of the already strained relation between the assembly and the 
government is indicated by three dissolutions, four elections and two annulments 
of elections in the span of four and a half years. This political instability has affected 
the functioning of the government and delayed addressing many of the economic 
challenges facing Kuwait that required cooperation and collaboration between the 
assembly and the government. The increased economic pressures on the 
government to carry out unpopular austerity measures such as raising prices and /or 
removing subsidies, further aggravated the situation.  For instance one of the most 
difficult subsidies to remove has been the fuel subsidy. Energy subsidies have long 
been a significant expense to the state, and all GCC countries have increased petrol 
prices in light of the drop in oil prices except Kuwait, due to resistance from the 
National Assembly, labour unions and most Kuwaitis  (Oxford business group, 
2016).  
 
The long dependency of Kuwaitis on the state and its generous benefits and 
subsidies has made “rolling back popular subsidies” and reforming public sector 
expenditure controversial, and resistance to such measures extensive (ibid). That is 
why it has been crucial for the government to embark on “confidence boosting 
measures that might craft a consensual way forward for Kuwait” with the National 
Assembly, if Kuwait is to face its economic challenges (Ulrichesen, 2012). Such a 
view is reiterated by some of the interviewees (1,2,6,9&10) affirming that 
cooperation with the National Assembly, consensus building among Kuwaitis and 
a move away from the confrontational and adversarial politics is essential to 
overcome the significant economic problems facing Kuwait (Interviews, 2013). 
The following are details of this period of extreme political volatility that caused an 
impasse in government and also undermined the process of democratisation. 
 
1. The Thirteenth National Assembly 2009    
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The start of this highly unstable period coincided with the fresh elections of the 
Thirteenth National Assembly, held, as ordered by the Amiri decree, on 17 May 
2009 as a result of the dissolution of the Twelfth Assembly (KNA, 2011).  Only 
210 candidates ran with a decreased number of women candidates (16) as compared 
to the previous two elections and turn out was relatively low at 58 per cent of total 
eligible voters, of whom 175,679 were men and 209,111 were women, as seen in 
Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Political participation in the Thirteenth elections of the National Assembly 2009 
Source : MOI,2017 
 
 
During this election two CSOs, Vote for Kuwait (information centre) and the more 
explicit advocacy organisation, ‘Sawt Al Kuwait’, Voice of Kuwait, became heavily 
involved in the election campaigning, bringing new initiatives to Kuwaiti politics, 
especially with respect to voter mobilization and lobbying. Leaders of Vote for 
Kuwait created an interactive website providing regularly updated rally and public 
speaking schedules, statements issued by political groups, and the most up-to-date 
information on agreements between two or more candidates to convince their core 
supporters to vote for both of them and their allies. The founders wanted to reach 
voters who were reluctant to attend a rally or speak with a candidate” (Tetreault and 
Al Ghanim, 2009).   
On the other hand, and as a sign of increased intolerance of dissent, the government 
resorted to intimidation tactics against some of the vocal politicians and candidates. 
For instance the tribal MP, Khalid Al Tahous, was arrested and accused “of 
Date of 
Election 
Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
 
Voter Turnout  
 
Male  Female  
 
16 May 2009 
 
 
5 
 
194 
 
16 
 
384790 
 
58% 
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incitement against the state” because he publicly warned the Minister of Interior 
that “Kuwaiti tribes would oppose any attempts to enforce the law prohibiting tribal 
primaries, recalling the violence of the 2008 campaign, when tribesmen surrounded 
a police station demanding the release of persons arrested for violating the law” 
(Tetreault and Al Ghanim, 2009).  
Dayfallah Abu Ramya, another tribal leader, was arrested on 17 April 2009 for 
commenting on the leaked news, that senior Al Sabah members were thinking of 
replacing the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser, with the deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence, Jabir Al Mubarak, indicating that Sheikh Jabir Al Mubarak 
was not suitable for such a post. As a result of his comment, he was accused of 
challenging the Amir’s power to appoint and dismiss ministers. Their arrests, 
however, contributed to their substantial win in the elections (after they were 
questioned by the police, they were both released and allowed to run for elections) 
(Tetreault and Al Ghanim, 2009). The government also arrested the urban candidate 
Khalifa Al Khorafi, because in an interview aired on Kuwaiti TV he criticised the 
Royal family saying, “Neither the Amir nor the other Al Sabah possessed the 
faculties needed to run the state”, however, he lost in the elections (Tetreault and 
Al Ghanim, 2009). As interviewee (13) (a lecturer at Kuwait University) indicates 
“it is the lack of tolerance on behalf of the ruling family and their avoidance of 
sharing power with the assembly that pushes some MPs to personalise their attacks 
on Al Sabah and by doing so they further aggravate the situation. It becomes a game 
of point scoring between Al Sabah and the MPs” (Interview, 2013).  
Election results gave women four seats: Aseel Al Awadi  (secular/liberal), Rola 
Dashti (secular/liberal), Salwa Al Jassar (moderate Sunni Islamist) and Massouma 
Al-Mubarak (the first women minister appointed by the Amir, Sheikh Sabah in the 
Cabinet of July 2005, heading the Ministry of Planning and Administrative 
Development)  (Shalaby, 2015).  This is an indication that it is a matter of time and 
experience before women increase their chances of winning seats. Although the 
number of women candidates and number of seats won is insignificant compared 
to the dominance of male candidates and winners- it is the start towards more 
progress. Al Othman expressed a very optimistic view indicating that “Women 
participation is changing the political arena and even the women themselves, their 
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personality has changed and you can notice that they are empowered and 
vocal…they are no more on the audience seats just watching, now they are on the 
field” (Interview 2013). Al Awadhi supports this view by adding that she notices  
“a difference. Now females realise how valuable they are …the females in our 
society now realise that they could use their vote to actually make a change… but 
it still needs more time, and increased awareness especially in countering the 
patriarchal force within the Kuwaiti society, removing the distinction between men 
and women and that women are only suitable for home and raising kids” (Interview 
2013). As these interviewees indicate, women participation is the way forward for 
gender equality but as for pushing the process of democratisation, women deputies 
tended to side with the government.  
 
The rest of the seats were distributed between the main political blocs; the Islamists 
won 20 seats (11 seats to Sunni and 9 Shiites), the Liberals took 10 seats up from 
seven while candidates from six tribal groupings won a total of 20 seats. These 
results continued to reflect the same pattern of segmented seats based on 
religious/tribal/secular basis without any signs that political forces are moving 
towards forming alliances beyond the traditional blocs.  As observed by Geoffrey 
Gause  (2009) the amended election law did not achieve the goals of the Orange 
Movement and did not solve Kuwait’s constant political crisis between the 
assembly and the government. Also the Amir on 21 May 2009 reappointed Sheikh 
Nasser as Prime Minister, a source of much tension and antagonism for National 
Assembly members. Additionally, he notes “Unless the Prime Minister … is willing 
to play assembly politics, face confidence motions and put together coalitions to 
defeat them, we will probably have a replay of the political crises that have led to 
the past three election” (ibid.). That is exactly what happened as no attempt was 
made by the government to accept being questioned and to accept the assembly’s 
responsibilities in holding the cabinet accountable.  
 
The assembly, consequently, witnessed 16 interpellations, a very high number 
especially in comparison to the other assemblies. This is a sign of the increasing 
deterioration in the relation between the government and the assembly and lack of 
cooperation on many pressing issues such as to the longstanding issue of corruption 
and misuse of public funds.  According to Transparency International, Kuwait is 
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ranked as the most corrupt among the Gulf States, and as expressed by the MP 
Shuaib al Muwaizri, “The future of Kuwait is threatened by the pervasiveness of 
corruption, putting the country and the people in what I call a ‘resuscitation room’ 
in dire need of prompt recovery in order to end corruption by all means” (Al Qabas, 
2016). 
 
A close scrutiny of these interpellations, however, reveals that the assembly was 
weak in holding the government accountable. It escaped 6 votes of no confidence 
(4 of these were held in private sessions), 6 interpellations did not take place (2 
because the minister in question reigned, 1 was withdrawn and 1 was removed, 2 
were not discussed), another 3 did not take place because the government resigned 
and one interpellation was removed with the approval of the National Assembly, 
and the last interpellation to question the Prime Minister did not happen because 
the government resigned again (see Table 6.6). Most of these interpellations were 
aimed at key posts: 6 for the Prime Minister, 3 for Minister of Interior, 1 for Minster 
of Defence and 1 for Minister of Oil.  
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Table 6.6:  Interpellations of the Thirteenth National Assembly 2009 
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Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of the Interpellations 
1 Mussalam AlBarrak 
8 June 2009 
The Minister of 
Interior  
Sheikh Jaber  Al 
Khalid Al Sabah 
A vote of no confidence was 
presented. The result of the 
vote was in favour of the 
minister: 30 against, 16 for and 
2 MPs refrained  
2 FaisalAlmoslim 
 
15 November 2009 
 
The PM  
 
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah  
The interpellation was 
discussed in a private session 
and for the first time a prime 
minister was questioned. The 
result of the vote of no 
confidence was in favour of the 
PM: 13 for, 35 against and one 
MP did not vote. 
3 Mubarak Alwa’alan 
18 November 2009 
The Minister of 
Municipality  
Fadel Safar 
The assembly only discussed 
the interpellation 
4 Mussalam Al Barrak 
 
18 November 2009 
The Minister of 
Interior  
Sheikh Jaber Al 
Khalid Al Sabah 
A vote of no confidence was 
presented. The result of the 
vote was in favour of the 
minister as 31 refrained from 
voting while 18 voted for 
5 Dhaif Allah 
Bouramyah 
 
19 November 2009 
The Minister of 
Defence  
Sheikh Jaber Al 
Khalid Al Sabah 
The interpellation was held in a 
private session. A 
recommendation was made to 
pay money for the relatives of 
the Adaira’a accidents and to 
be treated like martyrs by 
Kuwait’s Martyrs’ Office 
6 Ali Aldouqbasi 
 
23 February 2010 
The Minister of 
Information and 
Oil  
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Abdullah Al 
Sabah 
A vote of confidence was 
requested. The result of the 
vote was in favour of the 
minister: 23 voted against, 22 
for, whereas 3 MPs refrained  
 
7 Khalid AlTahoos 
 
30 May 2010 
The Prime 
Minister  
 
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
The assembly agreed to the 
request of the government to 
hold the session in private, 
however, the MP withdraw the 
request and it was removed 
from the agenda of the 
assembly 
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8 Dama’an AlHerbesh 
Salih ALMulla 
Mussalam AlBarrak 
 
30 November 2010 
The Prime 
Minister  
 
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
The assembly accepted the 
government request to hold the 
session in private and the 
interpellation took place. The 
PM survived a vote of no 
confidence in a session held on 
5 January 2011: ‘25’ MPs 
against, 22 ‘for’ 1 MP 
refrained. This is second time 
the PM survives a vote of no 
confidence  
9 Waleed AlTabtabai 
ShuaibAlMouiszr 
Salim AlNamlan 
24 January 2011 
The Minister of 
Interior 
Sheikh Jaber Al 
Khalid Al Sabah 
The interpellation did not take 
place because the minister 
resigned 
 
10 Adel ALSarawi 
MarzooqALQanim 
22 March 2011 
The Minister of 
Residency and 
Development 
Sheikh Ahmed 
AL Fahad 
 
Interpellations 10, 11 and 12 
did not take place as the 
government resigned on 31 
March 2011. 
 
 
 
11 Faisal AlDouwaisan 
29 March 2011 
 
The minister of 
Information and 
Oil 
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Abdullah Al 
Sabah 
 
12 
 
Salih Ashoor 
30 March 2011 
The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Sheikh 
Mohammed Al 
Sabah 
13 Adel Al Sarawi   
Marzooq Al Ghanim 
 
 
 
15 May 2011 
Minister of state 
for Housing 
&Development 
Affairs  
Ahmed Al Fahad 
Al Sabah 
 
The minister resigned and an 
Amiree decree was issued 
accepting his resignation so the 
questioning was removed from 
the agenda 
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14 Mubarak 
Mohammed Al 
Mutairi 
 
Waleed Al Tabtabai 
 
 
 
22 May 2011 
 
The Prime 
Minister 
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah  
 
The questioning was held in a 
private session after the end of 
its discussion   10 MPs 
presented a letter of non-
cooperation with the PM in a 
session held in 23/6/2011. The 
PM survived the vote: 25 
‘against’, 18 ‘for’, while 6 
refrained  
  
15 Khalid Faisal 
Musalim 
 
23 June 2011 
 
The Prime 
Minister  
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah 
The request was withdrawn as 
it was concerned with the 
allegation of misuse of public 
finds and lands  
16 Abdularahman Al 
Anjiri 
Faisal Musalim 
 
15 November 2011 
The Prime 
Minister  
Sheikh Nasser Al 
Sabah  
 
 
The questioning did not take 
place (the interpellation was 
concerned with bribes and the 
transferring of money from 
public funds to the private 
account of the PM abroad) 
because the government 
resigned in 28 November 
2011and an Amiree decree was 
issued dissolving the assembly 
in 3 December 2011 
 
Source: KNA,2016. 
 
The strained relation between the assembly and the government culminated in a 
campaign to oust the Prime Minister. Although this campaign coincided with 
uprisings of the Arab spring  that erupted in December 2010, it had its domestic 
roots and was motivated by popular demands to remove Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah 
from his position as Prime Minister. As a result of this Kuwait witnessed an 
escalation of political unrest and protests.  
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The spark of the unrest was the corruption scandal that was known as  “the MPs’ 
deposit Graft Case” when Al-Qabas newspaper published an article on 20 August 
2011 concerning a secret report issued by Kuwait’s Central Bank indicating that 
unnamed government officials had transferred millions of dollars to MPs accounts 
out of Kuwait (Baker, 2011). This implicated 15 MPs, allegedly having received 
bribes of around 360 million USD, deposited into their bank accounts, supposedly 
coming from Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah, in order to guarantee the MPs 
loyal votes for the government (Al Watan, 2011). In addition to the accusation of 
the Prime Minister misusing and transferring money from public funds to his 
private account abroad (Katzman, 2012). As a result of this scandal the Opposition 
and some MPs insisted on the removal of the Prime Minister from his position.  
On 16 November 2011 about 15,000 Kuwaitis, mostly young men of tribal 
background in alliance with Opposition MPs (tribal and Sunni Islamists) 
demonstrated around Eradah Square, the ‘Will Sqaure’ next to the National 
Assembly’s building, demanding the dismissal of the Prime Minister and chanting: 
“The people want to bring down the head of the government” (Al Watan, 2013b). 
Around 600 protestors led by the ex-MP Musallam Al Barrrak (from the influential 
Al Mutayr tribe) ended up storming the assembly. The Amir described the incident 
as a “black day for Kuwait” and he stressed that “according to the Constitution, I 
have the power to appoint or to force the Prime Minister and the Ministers to resign 
...and if I was going to ask the Prime Minster to resign I would not do that because 
of pressure exercised by those people ”(BBC, 2011d). 
Some also considered the storming of the assembly to force the resignation of the 
Prime Minister as unconstitutional and an escalation marking “a new low in 
Kuwaiti politics”, as there “are constitutional ways to take down the Prime 
Minister” (Baker, 2011). However, as pointed by interviewee (6) the constitutional 
tools had been used many times to no avail, Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah survived 
several no confidence votes in the assembly through the support of pro-government 
MPs (Interviews, 2013). The protests, combined with a series of strikes by some 
labour Unions that threatened to disrupt oil and gas shipments forced the hand of 
both the Prime Minister and the Amir to act. The Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser, 
resigned on 28 November 2011 followed by the Amir dissolving the assembly on 
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the 6 December 2011 and scheduling new elections for 2 February 2012 (KNA, 
2015b).  
 
2. The First Annulled National Assembly 2 February 2012       
The election of the Fourteenth National Assembly has a particular significance for 
two reasons.  Firstly, the bottom-up pressures, due to the “the MPs’ Deposit Graft 
Case” associated with Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah forced the Amir to 
appoint Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah as the new Prime Minister (Al Shehabi et al., 2013). 
He was the former Minister of Defence and also a potential number three in the race 
for succession.  The Amir was also forced to refer the allegation about the 15 MPs 
to the public prosecutor to question them, in addition to questioning the 9 opposition 
MPs who stormed the assembly (Al Watan, 2013a). The public prosecution on 17th 
of October 2012  "decided not to press any charges due to insufficient evidence of 
any crime of bribery, graft, money laundering against any suspects in the case" 
(Lazem, 2012). The special court of the ministers’ judicial panel investigating the 
allegation against Sheikh Nasser, also, found no evidence and dismissed the case 
on 9 May 2012 (Al Watan, 2012).  However, as indicated by interviewees (10) and 
interviewee (7) in the mind of Kuwaitis these MPs and the Prime Minister remain 
guilty and corrupt (Interviews, 2013). 
Secondly, the election results gave the Opposition a landslide victory where 35/50 
members were tribal and Islamist opposition MPs; an evident sign of the depth of 
the public’s anger and frustration at the government. The number of candidates was 
high at 389 of which 29 were women.  Turnout was near the average around 60 
percent of eligible voters. None of the 29 women who ran were elected, while the 
Shiites increased their share to 6 seats (Herb, 2012) As shown in Table 6.7.   
 
Table 6.7: Political Participation in the First Annulled National Assembly February 2012 
Date of Election Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of Candidates Number of 
Eligible 
Voters 
Voter 
Turnout 
Male  Female  
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2 February 2012 
 
5 
 
360 
 
29 
 
400296 
 
59.5% 
Source: MOI,2017 
  
The Opposition dominated the legislature and was more assertive, demanding a 
larger role in the government and insisting on increasing the number of elected 
deputies in the cabinet. Ahmad Al Sadoun, a leading opposition figure, returned to 
the post of Speaker of the assembly (a position he held between 1989-1999) 
replacing the pro-government Jassim Al Khorafi (Al Arabiya, 2015b).             Prime 
Minister Jabir Al Sabah retained his post but, in defiance of the demands of the 
Opposition, he appointed only four members of the assembly to the cabinet KNA, 
2012).  As Table 6.8 shows, the assembly in its very short term, five months, 
requested 7 interpellations to key ministers including the Prime Minister. Only three 
were discussed without reverting to a vote of no confidence, one was not discussed, 
two ministers resigned  (Minister of Finance and Minister of Social Affairs and 
Labour) to avoid the possibility of a vote of no confidence, while the last 
interpellation of the Minister of Interior did not take place because the assembly 
was suspended (KNA, 2015b).  
However the Amir, in an attempt to avoid the outright dissolution of the assembly, 
and in an unprecedented move, exercised his authority under Article (106) of the 
Constitution to suspend the assembly for one month on 18 June 2012 (BBC, 2012).  
But two days later, the Constitutional Court in Kuwait issued a Hokom, a ruling, on 
20 June 2012 stating that the elections of the Fourteenth assembly were invalid, and 
that the MPs who had been elected were not valid MPs, on the grounds that the 
dissolution of the Thirteenth Assembly was invalid, so the call to hold the elections 
for the Fourteenth Assembly was not constitutional, therefore the Thirteenth 
Assembly could restore and reactivate its powers and authorities as if the 
dissolution had not taken place (KNA, 2012 ). 
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Table 6.8: Interpellations of the First Annulled National Assembly 2 February 2012 
Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs Presenting the 
Interpellations 
The Minister Results of 
Interpellations 
1 Salih Ashoor 
19 February 2012 
Prime Minister  
Sheikh Jaber Al 
Mubarak Al Sabah 
 
The interpellation was 
discussed only 
2 Hussain Al Qallaf 
17 March 2012 
Minister of 
Communication  
Sheikh Muhammad Al 
Abdullah Al Sabah 
 
The interpellation was 
discussed only 
 
3 Muhammad Al Jowaihel 
8 May 2012 
Minister of Interior 
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Humod Al Sabah 
 
The interpellation was 
discussed  
 
4  Obaid Al Wasmi 
  22 May 2012 
Minister of Finance  
Mostafa Al Shamali 
 
The interpellation was 
not discussed 
 
5 Khalid Al Tahoos 
Musalam Al Barrak 
24 May 2012 
Minister of Finance  
Mostafa Al Shamali 
 
The interpellation was 
discussed and 
a request of a vote of 
no confidence was 
presented. However 
the minister resigned 
6 Al Saify Mubarak Al 
Saify 
Riuadh al Adsani  29 
May 2012 
Minister of Social 
Affairs and Labour 
Ahmed Al Rojaib 
The interpellation was 
dropped because the 
minister resigned on 
12 June 2012 
7 Muhammad Al Jowaihel 
June 2012 
 
Minister of Interior  
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Humood Al Sabah 
  
The interpellation did 
not take place and was 
dropped due to the 
dissolution of the 
assembly 
SOURCE: KNA, 2016 
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3. The Reinstatement of the Thirteenth National Assembly of 2009   
     
The MPs and most Kuwaitis vehemently opposed the top-down decision by the 
Amir, following the June 2012 court ruling to reinstate the 2009 assembly. 
Subsequently, the majority of MPs boycotted the assembly’s sessions, forcing the 
hand of the Amir to dissolve it on 7 October 2012  (KNA, 2015b). This assembly 
was the first assembly in Kuwait’s political history to be dissolved twice. In 
response to the Amir’s autocratic measures, Mulsallam Al Barrak in a speech given 
on 15 October 2012 directly addressed the Amir in stringent terms: “We will not 
allow your highness to take Kuwait into the abyss of autocracy…We no longer fear 
your prisons and your riot baton” (Dazi Heni, 2016). As the Constitution prohibits 
directly or indirectly criticising the Amir, Al Barrak was arrested on 29 October 
and sentenced to five years in prison but this was reduced to two years (Al Watan, 
2015).  
 
Nonetheless, the suspension was followed by another top-down decision by the 
Amir ordering changes to the electoral system and announcing in a public speech 
on the 19 October 2012, “I have directed the government to issue a draft law to 
make partial amendments to the electoral system aimed at improving the voting 
mechanism to preserve national unity and to strengthen the practice of democracy”  
(Hagagy, 2012). This led to a series of demonstrations known as Maserat Karamet 
Waten the ‘Dignity of a Nation Demonstrations’ (DNDs) which was organised by 
youth activists and the Kuwait student union, in alliance with Opposition led by the 
Islamists, the tribal forces and the liberal blocs. They saw the change in the electoral 
law as a means of breaking the Opposition and producing a government–friendly 
assembly as well as increasing the autocratic practices of the Amir. This also 
touched a raw nerve in Kuwaiti politics, as the issue of electoral reform had been a 
major feature of the Orange Movement (the youth-led public protests in 2005) 
resulting in the amendment of the law. 
The first DND took place on 21 October 2012 with an estimated 50,000-150,000 
protestors gathering in the ‘Will Square’. They were shouting 'the youth wants to 
bring down the Amiree decree, Marsoom Al Shabab youreed esqat Al Marsson Al 
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Amiree, (Al Watan, 2013c).  The Special Forces tried to stop the demonstration by 
using tear gases and stun grenades while female police stopped women from 
gathering (Al Shahabi et al, 2013). One youth activist summarised the spirit of the 
demonstration by indicating “we want a little more democracy, more freedoms, 
more rights” (Westall, 2012). Another activist, expressing how bitter and 
disappointed Kuwaitis have become of the state of their affair and how political 
infighting has stalled Kuwait development said: “Twenty years ago Kuwait was 
number one in the region, there was no Dubai, no Qatar. Now it is the last place” 
(ibid). A second DND took place on 4 November 2012. It was estimated that 
150,000 participated and the demonstrators were shouting that the MP Musallam 
Al Barrak is Dhameer Al Omah meaning the “conscious of the nation”. The police 
used tear and smoke gases and sound bombs to end the demonstration (Al Aan, 
2012e)                
Despite this public display of rejection of the autocratic rule of Al Sabah and the 
derailing of the political reform process, the Amir did not respond to the escalating 
civil movement and the Opposition’s demands. Moreover, in support of the Amir, 
the Constitutional Court issued a ruling that allowed for any necessary changes to 
be made to the country’s electoral system.  This is the second time the Amir sought 
the support of the judicial system, as mentioned before (the Court dissolved the 
14th assembly and reinstated the 13th).  As put by interviewees  (9 and 6) the 
authoritarian tendency of the Amir has become more obvious and the collective 
reluctance of the government and the Amir to seek a more collaborative relation 
with the assembly has totally undermined the process of political reforms. These 
practices show that democracy in Kuwait is a façade and the elections and the 
assembly are just tools in the hands of Al Sabah for maintaining the dominance of 
Al Sabah” (Interview, 2013). 
 
The new election Law No. 21 for the year 2012 was approved on 16 June 2013 by 
the Constitutional Court, which means it gained protection and immunity, the law 
reduced the number of candidates Kuwaitis could vote for from four to one (Al 
Ateeqi, 2013). On the surface this egalitarian principle of “one person, one vote” 
appears as an advancement of democracy. However, in Kuwait as mentioned 
before, the five electoral districts represent an inequality of the weight of each vote 
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as some districts have more electors than others. This results in over representing 
or under representing the electoral districts. For instance in the 2008 elections 
districts 4 and 5 (93,710 and 101,294 electors respectively) were underrepresented 
by 3 and 4 seats in comparison to districts 1,2 3, (66,641, 41,365 and 58,674 electors 
respectively) over represented by 1, 4 and 2 seats respectively, thus to achieve 
equality of the vote, the electors in each district must have an equal weight to each 
vote (O’Grady & Meyer-Resende 2008: 28). 
 
The motivation, thus, of this top-down change, was to break the power of the 
political blocs especially the major Islamist political blocs (ICM and the ISM) and 
the tribal forces (Al Ateeqi, 2013). The old four-vote system allowed these tribes to 
coalesce the tribal vote (despite the law preventing tribal primaries, the tribes 
continued to hold it illegally) around a favoured candidate while leaving the three 
other votes to be distributed among other candidates. Having one vote made this 
harder to achieve and broke the monopoly of, in particular, the powerful tribes 
(Weiner, 2016).  Interviewees (5, 6 & 13) affirm this view by indicating that the 
fragmentation of votes produces a less cohesive assembly and makes alliances 
harder. It also prevents the emergence of a powerful force in the National Assembly 
able to counterbalance the power of the ruling family while making these 
fragmented groupings easier to manipulate and play one against the other 
(Interviews, 2013).  
 
4. The Second Annulled National Assembly 1st December 2012    
 
The Opposition continued to challenge the Amir and held a third DNDs, on 30 
November 2012, one day before the election day and called it Youm Al Samt Al 
Intikhabi, ‘The Day of the Electoral silence’ in reference to the Amir’s move to 
silence their voices and manipulate the elections  (SkyNews Arabia, 2012). The 
demonstration was held near Kuwait Towers; a well-known monument in Kuwait 
used to attract the attention of the national and international media to gain support 
for their demands as well as exercise pressure on the Amir. The Opposition also 
used the occasion to announce the boycotting of the elections, ordered for the 1st 
December 2013, including 35 former MPs from the February 2012 assembly (Al 
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Jarida, 2013) as a protest against the Constitutional Court decision and the 
amendment of the election law, contending that only the National Assembly, not 
the Amir, had the right to amend the electoral system.  
 
The Fifteenth National Assembly was the first assembly to be elected under the new 
top-down amended election law (No.20/2012). Turn out for the election was very 
low, around 40 per cent of the 440,000 eligible voters. But it could be considered 
an acceptable level of political participation considering the circumstances. The 
number of candidates was 279, of whom only 14 were women. See Table 6.9.  
 
 
Table 6.9: Political Participation in the Second Annulled National Assembly 2012 
Date of Election  Number 
of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible 
Voters 
Voter 
Turnout 
Male  Female 
 
 1 December   2012 
 
5 
 
265 
 
 
14 
 
440000 
 
39.7% 
   Source: MOI,2017 
 
The election of the new assembly along with the continued dismissal by the Amir 
of the demands of the protestors and the Opposition escalated the anger among the 
Kuwaitis. They were determined to force the hand of the Amir to dissolve the 
assembly by continuing to reject his autocratic measures and holding further 
demonstrations. They organised a further four DNDs, between 8 December 2012 
and 22 January 2013, reiterating the demand for the dissolution of the assembly and 
the retraction of the Amiree Decree of Law Number 20 of the year 2012 as well as 
the release of the political activists that have been detained due to their participation 
in the DNDs. The police used a variety of methods to intimidate the protestors such 
as blocking their way, tear and smoke gases and rubber bullets to disperse them 
(Kuwait Al Youm, 2012 and Al Jarida , 2013a). 
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Despite these DNDs, the Fifteenth Assembly began to approve major infrastructure 
and investment projects, such as the Subiya Causeway and the Az-Zour North 
independent water and power plant. Such projects formed the basis of Kuwait’s 
economic diversification and the long-term national strategic plan, but had 
constantly been delayed by the antagonistic and confrontational relation between 
the elected assembly and the appointed government; this stalled economic 
development plan is estimated at 105 billion USD (Arnold, 2013).   
Interpellations, however, continued to be requested, but due to the short-lived 
assembly, only four were requested; three of them being directed at key ministers: 
the Minister of Interior and Minister of Finance. These requests were postponed, 
with the approval of the assembly, on the basis that they would be addressed in the 
next assembly session, see Table 6.10. This never happened due to the dissolution 
of the assembly, in spite of the fact that this assembly was lacking of real opposition 
and was pro-government, it did not last more than six and a half months. The 
Constitutional Court on 16 June 2013 ruled that the change to a single vote per 
citizen was lawful, however, it cited technical flaws in the elections and annulled 
the Fifteenth Assembly. 
 
Table 6.10: Interpellations of the Second Annulled National Assembly 1 Dec 2012 
Number of 
Interpellations 
The MPs presenting the 
interpellations 
The Minister Results of the 
Interpellations 
1 
 
Hussain Al Qallaf  
5 February  2013 
 
Minister of 
Communication  
Salim Al Othaina 
The interpellation 
was postponed 
  Minister of Interior 
Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Homod Al Sabah 
The interpellations 
were postponed 
2 Faisal Al Dowaisan 
10 February 2013  
3 Nawaf Al Fozi'ea 
 
18 February 2013 
Minister of Finance  
Mostafa Al Shamali 
 
The interpellation 
was postponed 
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4 Sadoun Hammad  
Nawaf Al Fozi'ea 
18 February 2013 
Minister of Oil 
 
Hani Hussain 
The interpellation 
was postponed 
 
Source : KNA, 2016 
 
This move by the Amir (allowing the court to annul the National Assembly while 
upholding the legality of the change in election law) caused an immediate 
fragmentation of the Opposition, as the main liberal opposition group, the National 
Democratic Alliance announced that it would reverse its boycott and contest the 
forthcoming election: "We confirm our commitment to the constitutional court 
ruling ... and declare we will participate in the forthcoming elections "(Ahram 
online, 2017). Several of Kuwait’s largest tribes also declared their intention to re-
enter the political process and run candidates. In contrast the Islamists, the 
nationalist and other liberal groupings vowed to continue with the boycott of 
elections as they saw the acceptance of the court ruling as an encouragement of the 
autocratic rule of Al Sabah as well as undermining the whole process of political 
participation and contestation (ibid.). The eighth and last DND was held on 6 July 
2013, particularly targeting the Constitutional Court (as it has become a facilitator 
of Al Sabah autocratic rule) under the slogan Al Sha;ab Yoreed Tatheer Al Qada’a 
meaning the “People wants to purify/cleanse the Judiciary system” (Al Shehabi et 
al.,2013). The involvement of the Constitutional Court in resolving the political 
difficulties of the ruling family had undermined the legitimacy and integrity of the 
Judiciary.  
5. The Sixteenth National Assembly 2013    
 
The snap election of 2013 for the Sixteenth Assembly, (officially considered the 
Fourteenth due to the two annulments) held on 27 July 2013 produced, as expected, 
a government-friendly assembly, namely due to the boycott of some of the major 
Opposition groups. Turn out was relatively low at 52 per cent of eligible voters and 
eligible voters nearly halved from the previous election at 228,314 but the number 
of candidates was relatively large at 418, of whom only 8 were women, see Table 
6.11. 
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Table 6.11: Political Participation in the Sixteenth (officially the fourteenth) Assembly 2013 
Source: MOI,2017 
The elections returned a broad range of pro-government groups: 30 seats won by 
independents (tribalist, pro-business, and two women), 9 seats won by the liberals 
and 11 won by Islamists (8 Shii and 3 Sunni). Subsequently this assembly was  most 
cooperative, allowing the passing of many projects, although, it witnessed a total of 
ten interpellations. Of these interpellations four were discussed with no specific 
recommendations, one interpellation was withdrawn, there was one vote of no 
confidence, which the minister survived, and four resignations before the date of 
questioning, as seen in Table 6.12. This pattern confirms the inadequacy of 
interpellations as a tool to hold the government accountable as resignations 
continue to be used to avoid questionings, in addition to withdrawal of 
interpellations and a focus on discussing issues without recommendations for the 
government to consider. 
 
Date of 
Election 
Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Candidates 
Number of 
Eligible Voters 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Male Female 
 
27 July 2013 
 
 
       5 
 
410 
 
8 
 
228314 
 
   51.9% 
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Table 6.12:  Interpellations of the Sixteenth (officially the fourteenth) Assembly 2013 
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Number of 
Interpellations 
MPs presenting the 
interpellations 
The Minister Results of 
Interpellations 
1 Riyadh Al Aladsani 
31 October 2013 
Prime Minister  
Sheikh Jaber Almubarak 
Al Sabah 
 
The questioning was 
removed from the 
agenda after the Al 
Adsani withdrew it 
2 Dr Hussain Quai'an 
3 November 2013 
Minister of Health 
 Sheikh Muhammad Al 
Abdullah Al Sabah 
 
The questioning took 
place and a vote of no 
confidence took 
place. The vote was in 
favour of the minister: 
12 ‘for’, 31 ‘against’ 
while 6 refrained.   
3 Dr Khalil Al 
Abdullah  
10 November 2013 
Minister of State for 
National Assembly Affairs 
and Minister of State for 
Planning and Development 
Affairs 
Rola Dashti 
The questioning 
resulted with an 
agreement that a vote 
of no confidence to 
take place in the next 
session. The Minister 
a day before the 
session resigned 
 
4 Riyadh Al Aladsani 
13 November 2013 
Minister of Housing and 
Minister of Municipality  
Salim Al Othaina 
 
The questioning was 
discussed however, 
no recommendations 
was offered  
5 Riyadh Al Aladsani 
13 November 2013 
 
Prime Minister  
Sheikh Jaber Almubarak 
 Al Sabah 
 
The questioning was 
discussed however no 
recommendations 
was offered  
6 Safa Al Hashim  
14 November 2013 
Prime Minister  
Sheikh Jaber Almubarak 
Al Sabah 
The questioning was 
discussed however no 
recommendations 
was offered 
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7 Safa Al Hashim  
14 November 2013 
Minister of State for 
National Assembly Affairs 
and minister of State for 
Planning and Development 
Affairs 
Rola Dashti 
The questioning was 
discussed however no 
recommendations 
were offered 
8 Abdullah Al Tamimi 
Faisal Al Dowaisan 
17 November 2013 
 
Minister of housing and 
minister of municipality  
Salim Al Othaina 
 
The minister 
requested postponing 
the questioning. 
However, the minister 
resigned and the 
questioning was 
removed from the 
agenda 
9 Hamadan Al Azmi 
28 November 2013 
Minister of social Affairs 
and Labour  
Thekra Al Rashidi 
 
The minister resigned 
and the questioning 
was removed from the 
agenda 
10 Saleh Ashoor  
 
19 December   2013 
Minister of Education and 
Minster of Higher 
Education  
Nai'f Al Hajraf 
 
The minister resigned 
and the questioning 
was removed from the 
agenda. 
Source: KNA, 2016 
 
The assembly became the longest serving (three years and a half) during the period 
2005-2013. However, despite the relative stability during its life span, the assembly 
was dissolved on 16 October 2016 and snap elections ordered on 26 November 
2016 (Al Larika 2016). This election is beyond the scope of this study, but suffice 
it to say this came as a preventive measure; the political blocs that continued to 
boycott the elections were readying themselves for the election on 17 July 2017 
intending to end their boycott and accept the new change in the election law (Al 
Watan, 2016). However, despite the surprise snap elections, the results were not 
what Al Sabah hoped for, as the Opposition were able to capture 24/50 seats while 
new political faces won 30 seats.  
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6.4   Evaluation of the Institutional Relation of the State and National 
Assembly     
The evidence from the above discussion indicates that the overall impact of political 
reform process has not produced any shift in the balance of power between the State 
and National Assembly, which can be an indication of a move towards a less 
authoritarian and more democratic system, as Potter’s scheme implies. On the 
contrary Al Sabah reasserted their authoritarian tendencies by continuing to depend 
on old strategies and tactics to maintain their dominance (dissolutions, 
manipulation of elections, manipulation of societal divisions, oil wealth) while 
initiating new ones such as the reverting to the judiciary to attain their political 
objectives. The drawing of the Kuwaiti judiciary into the power struggle between 
the assembly and the government strengthened the autocratic rule of Al Sabah, 
while undermining the integrity of the Judiciary.   
 
This period also witnessed an increased attack on civil liberties and political 
freedoms, in contrast to Dahl’s emphasis on the importance of protecting and 
expanding civil and political freedoms as an element that denotes the exercise of 
democracy. Although freedom of speech and the press are protected under Articles 
(36) and (37) of the Constitution, this only applies, “in accordance with the 
conditions and in the circumstances defined by law”. Thus, the government was 
able to expand its restrictions through the Penal code (1961) Article (111), which 
impacted negatively on the political culture as it stifled political pluralism and open 
debate, instilling fear. For instance “penalties for criticising Islam were increased, 
and can include prison sentences of up to one year and fines of up to 72,000 USD” 
(Duffy, 2013).  These new restrictions followed previous sanctions of fines and 
imprisonment for publishing materials critical of the government, the ruling famliy, 
rulers of other Arab states, allies of Kuwait or religious figures as well as requiring 
all publications to submit a copy to the Ministry of Information in advance for 
approval (ibid.). Most importantly, the new amendments, also increased penalties 
for libel and slander and criminalised speech that threatened “national unity” and 
prohibited calls to overthrow the government.  
 
208 
 
Additionally, stricter regulations were imposed on internet-related offenses as the 
number of users had increased significantly “about 38 per cent of the population 
used the internet in 2010, more than six times the percentage in 2000” (Freedom 
House Report,2011). The tightening of the regulations of cyber space and the 
monitoring of communication through this medium was justified under the pretext 
of national security, and the Ministry of Communications (MOC) continue to block 
websites suspected of “inciting terrorism and instability”. Meanwhile, the state 
required all internet-service providers to install and operate systems to block 
websites carrying material that is regarded anti-Islamist or propagating extreme 
Islamist views as well as certain types of political websites, while Internet café 
owners were required to obtain the names and identification of Internet users and 
must turn over the information if requested by the MOC. In 2009 the government 
proposed a draft law that would further regulate Internet usage but was rejected by 
the assembly (ibid.). Instead, the government began to monitor Kuwaitis on social 
network and sometimes imprison people as a result.  
 
The National Security Office, for example, detained and imprisoned a man who 
tweeted against King Abdullah Al Saud and criticised the Saudi Royal family for 
their military intervention in Bahrain (AMNESTY, 2011). Another example is the 
lawyer Mohammed Abdelqader Al Jassem, the founding editor of the Arabic 
editions of Foreign Policy and Newsweek who was arrested in 2009 and faced more 
than 18 charges stemming from his newspaper articles, including, “slight to the 
personage of the Amir, ” and,  “instigating to dismantle the foundations of Kuwaiti 
society.”  He was convicted of criminal defamation in November 2012 and 
sentenced to one year in prison, though the sentence was later reduced to three 
months on appeal (Freedom House, 2013). Given the restrictions of the press law 
and the atmosphere of increased governmental intolerance towards critical 
reporting, journalists continued to practise self-censorship, as failure to do so often 
resulted in reprisals in the form of fines.  
 
Additional influence on reinforcing the lack of tolerance of civil liberties and 
political freedoms comes from the increased security concerns in the Gulf region, 
led by Saudi Arabia (instability in Bahrain and Yemen), pressurising Al Sabah to 
crack down on Opposition and to reassert their authority and power. The 
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government approved the Gulf Security Treaty, signed by the six members of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council on 14 November 2012. However, the Kuwaiti National 
Assembly refused to endorse this treaty arguing that some of its articles contradict 
and violate Kuwait’s constitutional laws on freedom of expression, (Al Tamimi, 
2014). Nonetheless, Kuwait’s government has been under massive pressure, 
notably from Saudi Arabia, to ratify the treaty. Saudi Arabia’s influential position 
in the region and its concerns with security issues, rather than democratisation, have 
always had a hindering influence on Kuwait’s progress towards democracy.  
 
Oil wealth, as in the previous periods, continued to feed the welfare philosophy that 
underpins al Sabah’s legitimacy despite the increased pressure on public finances 
due to the continued fluctuation of the price of oil. These variations are reflected in 
the fluctuation of the value of oil exports from a low 48.6 billion USD in 2006 to a 
high 112.9 billion USD in 2012 dropping to 108.5 billion USD in 2013 and then 
dropping massively to 48.7 billion in 2016, as seen in Table 6.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.12 Total Value of Petroleum Exports of Kuwait 2006-2016 (million USD) 
Year 
Value of Total 
Exports 
Value of Petroleum 
Exports 
Petroleum Exports to Total 
Exports (%)* 
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2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
55,996 
62,498 
87,427 
51,678 
65,984 
102,052 
118,917 
115,096 
103,891 
54,959 
53,160 
59,016 
82,656 
48,618 
61,667 
96,700 
112,933 
108,548 
97,554 
48,782 
95% 
94% 
95% 
94% 
93% 
95% 
95% 
94% 
94% 
89% 
      *Calculated by the author. Source: OPEC:2016.    
 
Government spending, irrespective of these pressures, continued to rise steadily 
from 14.11 billion USD in 2006 to 28.5 billion USD in 2013, as seen in Chart 6.1. 
The political volatility of this period continued to impede and delay the 
implementation of the critical strategy of economic reforms that acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with the continued dependence on oil as the major source of 
exports and major source of government revenues and the continued expansion in 
government spending especially that a large segment continues to be spent on 
wages and other social benefits to the citizens.  
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Chart 6.1: Kuwait Government spending 2006-2013 (billions USD) 
         Source: Global Economy, 2017 
 
 
Neither the government nor the National Assembly were able to debate these 
economic challenges of Kuwait and discuss “clearly and without ambiguity” the 
difficulty of continuing the past half a century of the extremely generous welfare 
state approach and address the “economic facts that confirm the fallacies of the 
current policies” (Al Hayat, 2012). The approach of the government, consequently, 
became increasing authoritarian attempting to impose top-down economic policies 
and measures while the assembly became increasing embroiled in attempting to halt, 
delay or oppose such measures. In the meantime, the economy continued to stagnate 
and be unprepared for a future less dependent on oil, this reliance increased from 
an average of 91 per cent of total value of exports during the previous periods to an 
average of 94.4 per cent for this period, as seen in Table 6.12 .  
 
As expressed by interviewees (9 and 13), “the preservation of the Kuwaiti ‘welfare 
state’ philosophy and ‘constituent service MPs’ mentality, at a time where past 
trends are becoming less maintainable points to the inability of both the National 
Assembly and Al Sabah to look beyond preserving their narrow interests and focus 
on the national interest” (Interviews, 2013). Moreover, interviewees (10, 11 and 13) 
indicated how election programmes of MPs rarely focused the attention of the 
electoral body on the economic reform agenda despite the continued domination of 
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discussion in the assembly of the issue of mismanagement of oil revenues, 
corruption and the deteriorating quality of social services and infrastructure, thus 
creating a growing gap between Kuwait’s economic development in comparison to 
other Gulf states especially Qatar and UAE (Interviews, 2013).  Thus the tenuous 
relation between the assembly and the government has been a major reason 
preventing Kuwait from pursuing what is considered essential reforms to address 
its high dependency on the oil sector and the fall out from the fluctuation of the 
price of oil. 
 
Moreover, this continued unresolved tension significantly weakened the assembly, 
and exposed the ineffectiveness of the politic blocs due to their narrow based 
interests and lack of coherent and well developed political programmes or agendas 
that address the socio-economic issues and problems facing Kuwait such as 
economic reforms, the Bidun issue and the deteriorating social services and 
infrastructure. This situation was exacerbated by another factor that augmented the 
level of confrontational politics and undermined the political reform process, 
namely the increased frequency and intensity of interpellations without producing 
results in holding the government accountable. As seen from the discussion in 
Chapters Three and Four, interpellations have always been the major constitutional 
tool of the assembly to hold the government accountable allowing MPs to question 
cabinet members and subject them to a vote of no confidence. This, however, was 
a relatively rare procedure, especially when directed at ruling family members. 
Between 1962 and 1976 six cabinet members were subjected to a vote of no 
confidence and only one was member of the royal family. Between 1981 and 1992, 
eight cabinet members faced questions and in the post liberation, 1992–1996, 
period, this number fell to 5, while a striking shift occurred during 2006–2013 when 
a total of 27 cabinet members had to face parliamentary interpellation, 21 being 
members of the ruling family (Dazi Heni, 2015).     
 
The separation of the two posts of the Prime Minister and Crown Prince was meant 
to enhance democratic practice as it provided the opportunity for the assembly to 
question the Prime Minister and hold him and his Cabinet accountable to the people 
without any disrespect to the post of Crown Prince. However, this period showed 
that none of these anticipated benefits materialised, instead a steady process of 
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delegitimising democratisation has actually occurred by the constant dissolutions 
followed by fresh elections; a seven year period witnessed six elections, instead of 
the two if the assembly was allowed to finish its term. Another factor that fuelled 
these interpellations was the increased rivalries and factionalism among Al Sabah 
family that spilled over to assembly politics (Katzman, 2012). In return for funding 
their electoral campaigns, the co-opted representatives would compete during 
question time in support of one faction over the other, contributing to the National 
Assembly being frequently dissolved and to repetitive governmental crises (ibid). 
 
The questioning during this period, as observed by David Roberts, “highlights an 
inherent weakness in the structure of the Kuwait’s assembly” as they have evolved 
from being a straightforward parliamentary tool to becoming a partisan circus act 
and they can be brought about by a single member over any matter (such as the 
destruction of a mosque) one member could literally force the dissolution of the 
government” (2011:98). Interviewees (2, 7, 9 and 12) reaffirmed such a view by 
stressing the “politicisation” of this constitutional tool, whereby it has become a 
tool to “score points, settle rivalries, and appease the narrow base of the MPs 
constituent”, and in the process has delegitimised this tool as an effective method 
to hold the government accountable (Interviews, 2013). 
 
On the other hand the weakness of the assembly combined with the reassertion of 
Al Sabah power opened the space for an expanded civil society activism as the 
discussion above showed. The rejection of Al Sabah’s top-down approach in its 
totality (National Assembly suspensions, amending of the election law, court 
interference, suppression of civil and political freedoms) by civil society in alliance 
with the Opposition could not be clearer. It evoked strong opposition, manifested 
in the large rallies and demonstrations, the storming of the parliament as well as the 
boycotting of elections by the alliance formed by the main Opposition groups.  This 
has been helped by the widening of social forces that have been drawn into the 
political arena namely the youth, women, younger and educated tribal elements as 
well as increased activism on the part of other segments of the society such as the 
labour unions (through a wide range of strikes, most prominent was the port 
workers strike that lasted two days over a pay dispute) and the Bidun (stateless) 
who were heartened and encouraged by International AMNESTY’s report to 
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demand citizenship and equal rights and fair treatment to Kuwaitis (AMNESTY, 
2013 ); the plight of the Bidun has been detailed in Chapter Three. The Bidun from 
January 2011 to December 2013 were very active and they held a series of 
organised demonstrations in order to stop the discrimination practised against them; 
demanding equal citizenship rights that allows them access to basic services, 
including personal documents, health-care, and education(AMNESTY, 2013 ). 
Because article 21 of the 1979 Public Gathering Law “bans non-Kuwaitis from 
participating in public gathering”, the Bidun demonstrations were all considered 
illegal and were stopped by the police and the special forces who used water 
cannons, smoke bombs, tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets to disperse the 
demonstrations  (USDS, 2012:11). 
 
Some of the other interviewees, Joher, Al Awadhi and Al Qahtani, acknowledged 
the expanded sphere of civil society activism and its significance, stressing that 
politics in Kuwait is no more led and monitored by the Amir and the assembly, it is 
also led by a variety of civil society associations and movements which is important 
to the process of democratisation as it opens channels of bottom-up pressures and 
introduces new elements in the political equation between state and society 
(Interviews, 2013). This is also a sign indicating that, despite the state’s ability to 
curtail the development and undermine the possibility of change from below, and 
more importantly despite the dependency of Kuwaitis on the state’s extensive 
economic role, a large segment of Kuwaitis were able to continue to mobilise and 
organise in opposition to top-down measures. 
 
 
6.5   Conclusion  
 
The discussion shows that the period 2006 -2013, despite its optimistic and hopeful 
start, exposed the limitations of the political reform process as the authoritarian and 
autocratic tendencies of Al Sabah and their reluctance to share power with the 
National Assembly became more pronounced, deepening the structural imbalance 
in the institutional relation between the State and the National Assembly, which 
remains the only significant political institution due to the continued absence of 
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political parties. This authoritarianism continued to be pinned by Al Sabah’s 
reliance on a variety of strategies and tactics (suspensions, increasing the 
ineffectiveness of interpellations as a tool to hold the government accountable, 
restricting civil and political freedoms through law, increasing divisions and 
fragmentation of political forces and the recent new tactics of resorting to the 
judiciary in support of top-down measures and policies) to maintain control over 
the political processes and political structures.  
 
Nonetheless, this reassertion of the power of Al Sabah has been vehemently 
opposed via the mobilisation and organisation of civil society manifested by the 
many rallies to defend democratic values and rights, in alliance with the reformist 
elements of the National Assembly aiming at a gradual erosion of the power of the 
state, vis-á-vis society.  This increased activism of civil society, especially from the 
youthful element of the population means that the zone of civil society in Kuwait 
can be a source of democratic change, particularly when considering Dahl’s criteria 
for the exercise of democracy. Kuwaitis continue to value political participation 
(high turn out despite the unprecedented frequency of elections during this period) 
and contestation has expanded to include women, although others are still excluded. 
Kuwaitis also continue to value and support the institution of the National 
Assembly despite the frequency of dissolutions and short-lived assemblies, which 
made the representative political process more of a spectacle while real political 
decision-making remained firmly in the hands of Al Sabah ruling family. 
Additionally, concerning Potter’s elements that act either as prompters/obstacles to 
democratisation, the picture remained mixed except in the case of civil society.  The 
discussion shows unmistakeably the expansion in the role of civil society 
emphasising Kuwaitis impulse for democratisation and insistence on curtailing the 
dominance of Al Sabah. Nonetheless, this has been hampered by the lack of 
‘national unity’ and the continual fragmentation of social forces as well as having 
a political culture that embeds both impulses; the Kuwaiti impulse towards 
democratisation and its values and the autocratic rule of Al Sabah, pulling in the 
opposite direction, augmenting the authoritarian impulse. However, economic 
development, especially in terms of its impact on education, continued to play a 
significant role as promoter, particularly in the case of women, as well as the 
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emerging educated tribal youth. Simultaneously, the oil wealth, despite the difficult 
economic circumstances (due to the fall of the price of oil) remains a significant 
factor in enhancing the power of Al Sabah vis-á-vis the society.  Security concerns 
during this period (Bahrain, Yemen) led to limiting the influence of transitional and 
international engagement as promoters of democracy, as the priorities of Saudi 
Arabia and U.S. were focused on promoting security rather than democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven: The Conclusion 
The study assessed the impact of the four political reforms implemented post-
liberation (the restoration of the assembly 1992, the separation of the posts of 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister 2003, the two amendments of the electoral law, 
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giving women their political rights 2005 and redefining the electoral districts 2006) 
on the process of democratisation in Kuwait, through the prism of a theoretical 
frame that uses Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy and Potter’s (1997) scheme 
of six requisites that promote and/or hinder the democratisation process.  
The study first established the structural parameters that underpinned Al Sabah rule 
and how the political system of Kuwait developed over the years especially the 
period post the promulgation of the Constitution, in 1962, in order to assess the 
manner in which the representative system of government, as envisioned in the 
Constitution developed up to 1990. The discussion revealed that Kuwait on one 
level fulfilled Dahl’s interpretation of what democracy means: participation, 
contestation, and civil and political liberties. Nonetheless, these existed in a 
restricted and heavily controlled form leading sometimes to total suppression of 
these three elements. The period can be described as an attempt to institutionalise 
democratic practices but ended up creating a political system that suffers from 
stagnation and impasse with a highly contentious relation between state and society, 
specifically between Al Sabah and the National Assembly. Moreover in regards to 
Potter’s (1997) scheme, while none of his six prerequisites seemed to present 
themselves unambiguously in Kuwait, the evolution of the system showed that 
these factors were essentially present at some level but not necessarily in the exact 
fashion suggested by Potter (1997). Most important among these prerequisites is 
the institutional relation of state and political institutions. The establishment of 
Kuwait’s National Assembly and the holding of the first elections in 1963 held the 
potential to be supportive of democratisation and the development of a broader 
political culture that fosters democratic values and ideas, thus in theory the 
institution of the assembly should have led to democracy through a change in the 
balance of power between the state and its citizens, devolving at least some power 
to the latter. However, the Amir retained ultimate authority in both the legislative 
and executive spheres, resulting in a system in which the legislature was unstable 
and ineffective, and unable to consolidate democratic processes in the functioning 
of the state.  The fact that conflict was so evident and so persistent across the post-
independence period and up until 1990, nonetheless, suggests that some of the 
political forces that came into existence through this process were more robust than 
the ruling elites had anticipated. This is positive both in terms of the development 
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of political institutions, and in its signalling of a certain level of political culture 
conducive to democratisation. Also bottom up-pressures have been present in the 
society despite the constraints and restrictions and repressive measures imposed by 
the state, although these were unable to produce an effective challenge to the 
autocratic rule of Al Sabah primarily due to the success of Al Sabah in consolidating 
societal divisions and maintaining their dominance and their role as the ultimate 
source of power over society.  
The discussion shifts then to determine whether Kuwait has moved beyond this 
conflicting environment in the post-liberation period towards a clearer path to 
democratisation, in light of the four political reforms.  The analysis of the first set 
of reforms (restoration of the National Assembly and the separation of the posts of 
Prime Minister and Crown Prince) reveal that these did not significantly alter 
Kuwait’s democratisation path as Al Sabah continued with its tendency to dissolve 
the National Assembly as the ultimate mechanism for resolving differences and 
protracted political debates, albeit the dissolutions were constitutional and the ruler 
called for elections within the constitutionally specified period, which is significant 
to the process of political reform. The successive assemblies, continued to show 
themselves capable of challenging Al Sabah, indicating that pro-democracy 
political culture that could already be discerned in the period prior to 1990 
continued as the majority of the assemblies during this time were composed of 
oppositional politicians. Moreover, citizens’ strong impulse towards democracy is 
also shown by the value attached to the National Assembly’s elections reflected in 
voter turnout and the assembly’s debates. In this sense Dahl’s emphasis on the 
importance of political participation and contestation bears fruit as Al Sabah are 
constantly being challenged by these two processes, and that despite their many 
shortfalls are still factors to be considered as promoters of democratisation.   
 
The study showed that other the set of reforms (giving women their political 
rights in 2005 and redefining the electoral districts in 2006) were the result of 
massive pressure from civil society that illustrated despite the state’s power over 
CSOs - through a comprehensive legal framework that controls licensing, auditing, 
scope of work, finances and ultimately dissolution- women and youth movements 
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were able to escape this restrictive frame and effect political reforms. Thus 
indicating the possibility of change through civil society even in states where civil 
society is apparently very weak. In the case of women gaining political rights, 
multiple of factors came together including the need of Al Sabah to enact the bill 
before the Prime Minister’s visit to the U.S., the alliance between women Islamist 
advocates and liberal women, the siding of one of the Islamist groups with the 
women’s rights campaign and the intensified public fight by women during the year 
2005.  In the case of the Orange Movement, the level of discontent among Kuwaitis 
in general and the youth in particular allowed this movement to grow and gain 
support becoming a natural ally to the reformist movement in the National 
Assembly. This shows that it cannot be argued that civil society is absent in Kuwait 
even though it is not as autonomous and voluntaristic as civil society in the West. 
On a theoretical level, these two reforms attest to the importance of civil society as 
suggested by Potter’s scheme for the transition to democracy. 
The study showed that the period 2006 -2013 exposed the limitations of the political 
reform process as the authoritarian and autocratic tendencies of Al Sabah and their 
reluctance to share power with the National Assembly became more pronounced, 
deepening the structural imbalance in the institutional relation between the State 
and the National Assembly, which remains the only significant political institution 
due to the continued absence of political parties. In fact the period 2009-2013 
represented a high level of political instability and turmoil leading to a total collapse 
in the relation between the legislative and the executive as well as increasing the 
anger and frustration of Kuwaitis. This is indicated by three dissolutions, four 
elections and two annulments of elections in the span of four and a half years. This 
political instability has affected the functioning of the government and delayed 
addressing many of the economic challenges facing Kuwait that required 
cooperation and collaboration between the assembly and the government.  
 
Nonetheless, this reassertion of the power of Al Sabah has been vehemently 
opposed via the mobilisation and organisation of civil society manifested by the 
many rallies to defend democratic values and rights, in alliance with the reformist 
elements of the National Assembly aiming at a gradual erosion of the power of the 
state, vis-á-vis society. The discussion shows unmistakeably the expansion in the 
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role of civil society emphasising Kuwaitis impulse for democratisation and 
insistence on curtailing the dominance of Al Sabah. Nonetheless, this has been 
hampered by the lack of ‘national unity’ and the continual fragmentation of social 
forces as well as having a political culture that embeds both impulses; the Kuwaiti 
impulse towards democratisation and its values and the autocratic rule of Al Sabah, 
pulling in the opposite direction, augmenting the authoritarian impulse.  
The overall conclusion of the study suggested that these reforms had limited impact 
on a trajectory towards democratisation. These were adopted by the ruling family 
as a part of a regime survival strategy evidenced by the reinvigorated 
authoritarianism of Al Sabah and the increased oppression of the Opposition.  The 
period is, thus, better understood as an effort to maintain the liberalised autocracy 
where ultimate power still rests in the hands of the state and the ruling elites.  
However, this process emphasised and exposed the contradictions inherent in the 
political structures and political processes of Kuwait allowing a space for civil 
society movements to emerge, mobilise and attempt to counter the dominance of 
the state as well as emerge as a second significant factor (the first being the National 
Assembly) pushing for democratisation. These contradictions led to a mixed picture 
in terms of Dahl’s (1971) criteria of the meaning of democracy and Potter’s (1997) 
drivers/hindrances to democratisation.  
In terms of Dahl’s emphasis on contestation and political participation as an 
indication of the definition and exercise of democracy, the analysis showed that the 
period witnessed multiple elections and enhanced participation through the 
inclusion of women as voters and candidates, however, these produced assemblies 
that were short-lived, undermining their effectiveness and consequently resulting 
in impasse and gridlock in the political process of governing. Kuwaitis were 
constantly required to participate in fresh elections following each suspension 
bringing instability and lack of legitimacy to the whole process as differences and 
disagreements between the government and assembly continued to be arbitrated by 
the Amir through decreeing the dissolutions of the National Assembly or through 
using the Constitutional Court to annul elections. This dynamic exposed the 
structural weakness of having a constitutionally guaranteed elected National 
Assembly and the constitutionally guaranteed right of the Amir to dissolve it. This 
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continues to skew the institutional relation between the National Assembly and the 
state in favour of the preponderance of the state.  In addition, the period witnessed 
increased levels of repression, targeting political opposition and civil society via 
the expansion in controls, regulations and monitoring of civil and political freedoms. 
Nonetheless, the Opposition as well as civil society became extremely vocal in their 
rejection of the invigorated authoritarianism, manifested by their increased political 
activism and resistance to the autocratic measures of the Amir and his appointed 
government.  
 
The period, thus, presented, in terms of Potter’s scheme, a mixed picture of the 
impact of those elements that promote and those that hinder the process of 
democratisation with a strong tendency for those elements to be more hindrances 
rather than promoters, allowing Al Sabah to reassert their power. For instance, no 
discernable shift occurred in the institutional balance of power between the 
National Assembly and the state. In fact, Al Sabah’s tactics and measures, aimed at 
maintaining their dominance, resulted in further diminishing the usefulness of the 
assembly, making a spectacle of the successive assemblies elected during the period 
1992-2013. Nonetheless, it is also noticeable the importance that Kuwaitis attach to 
this institution, especially in the absence of political parties, as their representative 
elected body that has been, since the promulgation of the Constitution 1962, at the 
centre of the politics of Kuwait and the struggle and strife to democratise the 
political system.   
 
On the other hand the increased civil society activism and the successful 
mobilisation and organisation of several large rallies and demonstrations attracting 
thousands of Kuwaitis across the political and social divide is a strong indication of 
a high level of political awareness and willingness to counterbalance state power. 
This is exceedingly important as it suggests that the possibility of change is present 
and achievable especially since civil society opposition is never targeted at regime 
change but rather focused on enhancing democratic practices and values and 
limiting the power of the ruling family.  
 
Political culture, another factor in Potter’s scheme, had been pulled into two 
opposite directions. The persistence of some strong elements of the patriarchal 
222 
 
nature of the Kuwaiti society has not helped women to benefit from the change in 
the electoral law that allowed them for the first time in 2006 to participate in 
elections as candidates and voters. Although the political culture in Kuwait values 
contestation and competition, when it comes to women rights and equal treatment 
the elections have shown that the Kuwaiti society is still patriarchal and women’s 
ascendancy to the political realm is still in its nascent form. Additionally, the 
introduction of a variety of laws restricting freedom of speech and stifling political 
pluralism and open debate instilled fear and self-censorship, especially in media 
outlets. Nonetheless, there was a noticeable increase in the use of digital media, 
despite the government’s monitoring of its content and sometimes arresting and 
imprisoning those it believed to be breaking the law.  
 
Economic development, a third factor in Potter’s scheme for the stimulation of a 
transition to democracy continued to have a mixed impact.  The mediating factors 
of education and urbanisation enhanced the political awareness of Kuwaitis 
expressed through the National Assembly and Kuwaitis’ persistence and constant 
demand for a share in political power. However, the ‘rentier’ economy as a 
mediating factor acted more as a barrier than as a stimulus to democratisation. Oil 
wealth supported the state’s massive expenditure programs and the generous 
benefits granted to Kuwaiti citizens, despite the increasing pressure on the state to 
undertake economic reforms and the unsustainability of the state’s extensive 
welfare philosophy. This suggest that the restructuring of the economic relation 
between state and society is a major challenge for Al Sabah as it requires the proper 
functioning of the National Assembly and a collaborative relation with the 
government that can facilitate and mediate this change. As seen from the discussion 
the top-down approach of the government in pursing its economic reforms and 
austerity measures has been stalled for a long time due to lack of support from the 
National Assembly.  At the same time the persistent attempt of Al Sabah to mollify 
the Assembly through the cycle of elections-suspension-elections accompanied by 
other measures of intimidation (imposing changes in the laws, involvement of the 
Constitutional court etc.) have failed spectacularly in bringing political stability.  
 
Divisive social divisions (urban/tribal, secular/religious, Sunni/Shi’i etc.) continued 
to be manipulated in order to enhance and maintain the authority of Al Sabah, 
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preventing the emergence, of a “national identity” that assists in redrawing the 
social boundaries and creating new political arrangement that facilitates 
democratisation. Having said that, Kuwait, during this period, witnessed the 
consolidation of new political forces that are mobilising and acting to challenge the 
parameters of the old political arrangements and challenging Al Sabah and the state 
directly through rallies, demonstrations and social media campaign. These new 
social elements: the youth, the younger educated generation of the tribes, in alliance 
with the reformist element in the National Assembly are a force that could bring 
about democracy from below, especially that none of these elements are seeking 
regime change but their constitutionally guaranteed political rights.  
Lastly, in terms of transnational and international engagement, Kuwait’s two main 
significant influences come from USA and Saudi Arabia, whose concerns during 
this period have been skewed towards security issues (Bahrain, Yemen, and the 
wider political instability in Syria, Iraq and Libya). This meant that the previous 
emphasis of the U.S. on encouraging the democratic process has waned while Saudi 
Arabia has been pressuring Gulf States to ratify a common Defence and Security 
agreement and encouraging Kuwaiti rulers not to tolerate the opposition. In this 
sense Kuwait’s international engagement has been a hindrance to the process of 
democratisation. 
The Al Sabah ruling family managed the political reform process in a systematic 
manner that ensured that no opposition group or civil society institution grew strong 
enough to challenge its autocratic rule and no institution is powerful enough or 
independent enough to threaten its rule. Thus, fragmented and segmented identities 
and political forces, instead of declining in importance, have been augmented as the 
only structures through which social and political groups can operate and interact 
with the state. This explains why Potter’s (1997) conditions seem to exist within a 
political environment that is nor permitting these conditions to drive the process of 
democratisation or is it capable of eliminating them as influences pushing towards 
a more democratic process of government.  And here lies the dichotomy between 
the democratic impulse of the Kuwaiti society and the authoritarian impulse of Al 
Sabah. Currently, the authoritarian impulse of Al Sabah showed itself capable, 
through its regime survival tactics and strategies, to continue to dominate and 
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maintain the preponderance of the state. Much depends on the ability of civil society 
and its institutions to push further for an expanded sphere of civil liberties and 
political freedoms in alliance with the reformist elements in the National Assembly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX (1) The Interviewees 
 
Referenced by name 
Abdulmohsen Jamal 
Interview in his office at (Gulf University for Science and Technology), Mishref, 
Kuwait 11/1/2013. 
 Ex-member of the National Assembly in the following assemblies: Ninth 
Assembly 1999-2003, Seventh Assembly 1992-1999, and Fifth Assembly 
1981-1985. 
 Associate Professor of International Relations at the Gulf University for 
Science and Technology, Kuwait. 
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 Writes articles for Kuwait’s daily News Papers and wrote the book: 
“Political Opposition in Kuwait”, Published in 2007. 
Aseel Al Awadhi  
Interview at her office, Kuwait University, Kuwait city, Kaifan, 8/1/2013. 
 Professor of philosophy, Kuwait University. 
 Ex-member of the National Assembly. First female candidate that won a 
seat in the National Assembly elections of 2009. In addition, she 
participated in 2008 Elections but she lost. She participated in February 
2012 elections but she lost. She boycotted the December 2012. 
Dahim Al Qahtani  
Interview at Second Cup café, Kuwait City, 27/1/2013. 
 Journalist in Al Rai Al Am, a Kuwaiti daily newspaper. 
 Social media blogger and a political activist. 
 Reporter for Al Jazeera office in Kuwait. 
Hassan Joher 
Interview at his office, Kuwait University, Al Shuwaikh, Kuwait City, 12/2/2013. 
 Professor of Political Science, College of social science, Kuwait University. 
 Ex-member of the National Assembly in the Thirteenth 2009-2012, Twelfth 
2008-2009, Eleventh Assembly 2006-2008, Tenth 2003-2006, Ninth 
National Assembly 1999-2003 and Eighth1996-1999. 
 
Hamed Al Abdullah 
Interview at his office, Kuwait University, Al Shuwaikh, Kuwait City 18/2/2013. 
 Assistant Professor of Political Sciences- College of Social Science, Kuwait 
University.  
 Former Assistant Dean - College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University. 
Ibtehal Al Khateeb  
Interview CHI CHI Café, Marina Crescent, Salmiyah, Kuwait, 17/1/2013. 
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 Assistant Professor of English and Literature, Kuwait University.  
 Vocal female activist in women’s political rights campaign. 
 A member of Group 29 Voluntary Group. "Group 29" is a voluntary group  
founded in 2012. It took the Article 29 of the Constitution as its slogan 
seeking to consolidate the concept of human rights in the society. The  
Article which states that "All Humans are equal in human dignity, and they 
are equal before the law in public rights and duties, without discrimination 
due to race or ethnic origin, language or religion."  
 A writer of numerous articles in the liberal daily newspaper, Al Qabas. 
 
Rana Al abdularazzaq  
Interview –at Star bucks, Kuwait 9/2/2013. 
 Political activist and a member of the voluntary association, Group 29.  
 Women’s rights activists. 
 A Hematologists at Al Amiri Hospital, Kuwait City. 
 
Shafeeq Al Ghabra 
Interview at Star Bucks, Palm Beach Resort, Salwa Kuwait, 15/2/2013. 
 
 Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University. 
 Former President of the American University of Kuwait (2003-2006). 
 Directed the Centre of Strategic and Future Studies. 
 Author of many books and numerous articles. His books include 
Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival, a study of 
the dynamics of state and society, published in 1989. 
 He received Kuwait’s highest award for scientific research in the humanities 
and social sciences from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of 
Sciences. 
 
Funais Al Ajmi  
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Interview at his office in The Public Authority for Applied Education and Training, 
PAAET, Al Shuwaikh, Kuwait City, 20/1/2013. 
 A consultant for Kuwait’s Labours Union and civil society activist. 
 An Employee of (PAAET). 
 
Lama Al Othman  
Interview at Starbucks, Kuwait City, 5/2/2013. 
 Journalists in Al Jaridah liberal daily newspaper, Social media blogger and 
political activist.  
 Member of the youth Orange Movement. 
 
Mohammad Al Yousifi  
Interview at his office in Esa Hussain Al Yousifi Son’s and Co., Kuwait City, Al 
Shuwaikh   24/1/2013. 
 Political activist, member of the youth Orange Movement 2006, active 
social media blogger. 
 Wrote the books: “Kuwait Form Establishment to Independence”, “Kuwait 
Form Constitution to Liberation” and ”Kuwait Form Liberation to 
Imbalance”. (2013) Beirut: Arabic Press for Research and Publication. 
 Writer at Al Qabas newspaper. 
 
The Anonymous Interviewees 
Interviewee Number (1) Ex –member of the National Assembly, at his office, 
Kuwait City, 14/2/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (2) Ex –member of the National Assembly, at his office, 
Kuwait City, 1/4/2013. 
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Interviewee Number (3) Ex –member of the National Assembly, at his office 
Kuwait, Khaldiyah 2/4/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (4) member of the National Assembly, Starbucks, Kuwait 
City, Salwa, 8/4/013. 
 
Interviewee Number (5) Ex-member of the National Assembly, at his office, 
Kuwait City, Al Jabriyahat, 13/4/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (6) Ex-Minister, Legarden café, Kuwait City, Al Sha’ab Al 
Bahri, 7/2/2013 
 
Interviewee Number (7) Member of Civil Society Organisation, Star Bucks, 
Kuwait, Mishref, 16/4/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (8) Blogger and political activist, at his office, Kuwait City, 
4/3/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (9) Member of an Islamist political bloc, at his office, 
Salmiyah, Kuwait, 15/4/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (10) Member of a secular and liberal political bloc, at his 
office, Al Shuwaikh, Kuwait, 1/3/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (11) A lecturer at Kuwait University, Costa Cafe, Kuwait, 
27/4/2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (12) A blogger and a political activist, Costa coffee shop 
Al Jabriyah, Kuwait, City, 17/3/ 2013. 
 
Interviewee Number (13) A lecturer at Kuwait University, at his office, Al 
Khaldiyah, Kuwait City,7/4/2013. 
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APPENDIX (2) History of the National Assembly (1963-2015) 
 
 
Years 
 
 
Legislative 
Term 
Speaker of the 
Assembly 
 
Dissolved Number of 
Electoral 
Districts 
Number of 
Votes per 
Citizen 
1963-1967 1st Sa’ud A. 
al-’Abd 
al-Razaq 
 
No 10 5 
1967-1970 
 
2nd Ahmad Z. al-
Sarhan 
No 10 5 
1971-1975 3rd Khalid S. al-
Ghanim 
No 10 5 
230 
 
1976-1981 4th Khalid S. al-
Ghanim 
Yes 10 5 
1981-1985 5th Muhammad 
Y. al- 
’Adsani 
No 25 2 
1985-1986 6th Ahmad A. al-
Sa’dun 
Yes 25 5 
1992-1996 7th Ahmad A. al-
Sa’dun 
No 25 2 
1996-1999 8th Ahmad A. al-
Sa’dun 
No 25 2 
1999-2003 9th Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 25 2 
2003-2006 10th Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 25 2 
2003-2006 11th Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 25 2 
2006-2008 12th Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 25 2 
2008-2009 
 
13th Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 25 2 
2009-2011 NA Jasim M. al-
Kharafi 
Yes 5 4 
February 
2012 
NA Marzuq A. al-
Ghanim 
Annulled by 
the 
Constitution
al Court 
5 4 
December
2012-June 
2013 
NA Marzuq A. al-
Ghanim 
Annulled by 
the 
Constitution
al Court 
5 1 
Source: Compiled by the author:(KNA, 2016) 
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APPENDIX (3) 
 
History of Women in the National Assembly 2006-2016 
The legislative 
Term 
Number of 
Women 
Candidates 
Number of 
Women 
Elected 
MPs Elected 
The Eleventh 
National 
Assembly 
2006-2008 
28 0 0 
The Twelfth 
National 
Assembly 
2008-2009 
27 
 
0 
 
0 
The Thirteenth 
National 
Assembly 
2009-2011 
16 
 
4 
 
Dr Masouma Al Mubarak, 
Dr Rola Dashti, 
232 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author.  
 Dr Salwa Al Jassar, 
Dr Aseel Al Awadhi. 
The First 
Annulled 
National 
Assembly 
February 2012 
– June 2012 
23 
 
0 0 
The Second 
Annulled 
National 
Assembly 1st 
Dec 2012 - 
June 2013   
15 3 Dr Masouma Al Mubarak, 
 
Safa Al Hashim , 
Thekra Al Rashidy. 
The 14th 
National 
Assembly 2013 
-2016  
8 
 
1 
 
Safaa Al Hashim (She Resigned in ) 
The 13th 
National 
Assembly 
November 
2016-present 
14 
 
1 Safaa Al Hashim 
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